
A
VINDICATION
OF
Mr. LOCKE,

ON THE
Controversy concerning the Resurrec-
tion of the same Body.

PART II.

CHAP. I.

Of the Resurrection of the same Body in general.

THERE is little worth taking notice of in the preamble to your first section, which consists of a vindication of that *warm exercise of your passions* against Mr. Locke, which I thought, and still think, he had given no occasion for; and some diminishing expressions of the worth and character of that truly great man. To the first part I shall only say, that as Mr. Locke never did oppose any doctrine, that he knew was esteemed an *article of faith*, you might have suppressed those *passionate emotions*, without disobeying the Apostle's injun-

injunction to contend earnestly for the faith; and might have indulged him on this article, in compliance with the command of another Apostle, *Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputation. The just and honest exercise of our natural passions is against the wilful faults of men, not against the errors or mistakes of their judgment.* And perhaps the gentlemen of moderation (as you call them) who can bear with those, that differ from them, in difficult and doubtful points, may be as likely to die martyrs for the essentials of religion, as the gentlemen of indiscriminating zeal; who take fire at the smallest opposition, and are generally better disposed to make than to die martyrs.

As to the lessening manner, in which you treat Mr. Locke's character, I believe the world will be apt to conclude, that those, who can suffer themselves to say, *that little honour is to be gained even by the confutation of him*, and talk of his *infamous heresies*, have much more exercised their natural passions (which you are so fond of indulging) than either their judgment or their candour. I pass over what mostly concerns myself. Whether I have been led to desert or deny my religion out of an idle partiality to Mr. Locke, as you seem to think, must appear by the sequel of this Reply.

S E C T. I.

The question stated.

THO' it may be indeed, as you say, nothing to your purpose to enquire, how Mr. Locke came into a dispute about the resurrection of the same body with the Bishop of Worcester; yet it was very much to my purpose, in vindication of him from the warmth of your resentment; for there is a great difference (especially as to the charge of heresy)

refy) betwixt a man's setting himself to oppose a doctrine officiously, or in zeal against it; and his being drawn in, by a groundless accusation, for his own necessary self-defence, first, to shew, that he had said nothing inconsistent with that doctrine; and next, to question, whether, if he had done so, he could be charged with saying any thing inconsistent with an article of faith; "which (says he) I do not yet know the resurrection of the same body to be."

But, "it is sufficient (you say) to your design, to observe, that Mr. Locke, in that dispute, did several times deny the resurrection of the same body; and upon that ground it is, that you looked upon him, and now upon me, to deny and oppose the Christian faith." Give me leave to tell you, Sir, that you go entirely upon a mistaken ground. Mr. Locke, as I assured you in my letter, and I here insist upon it, did never, nor do I, deny the resurrection of the same body. There is a wide difference betwixt denying a thing to be true, and denying it to be an article of faith.

Neither do those passages, which you have produced out of his third letter, serve at all to shew, as you pretend, *what his opinion of the resurrection was*, whatever appearance they may have, as they stand abstracted from the occasion of them; which was only to observe, that the expressions of Scripture did not seem intended to teach, as an article of faith, that the very same body shall be raised. So that it cannot be clear from thence, what his opinion of the resurrection was, one jot farther.

However, you have thought fit to determine his opinion for him, and to set down three propositions, as the state of the case between you and him, in which he is very little, if at all, concerned. The only question he has any thing to do with, in this controversy, is, whether the resurrection of the same body, either in his own sense of the words, or the

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Bishop of Worcester's, is so plainly declared in Scripture, that every *Christian* is obliged to an explicate belief of it. Mr. *Locke* does not find, that it is; and I have undertaken his defence in that opinion, which is all that I am obliged to make good. You, on the other hand, maintain, that the *very same bodies*, in which the dead lived before, shall be raised: That the sameness of human bodies implies not a philosophical and mathematical identity, but, what you term, a *vulgar sameness*: And that this *sameness* of the human body, at the resurrection (about which, by the way, Mr. *Locke* has said nothing) is grounded upon the express words, and clear intimations, of Scripture: And this you will have leave to call, not your *own opinion*, but that of the catholic church.

I must have leave too, Sir, to tell you, that if you defend these propositions, only as the *opinion* of the catholic church, neither Mr. *Locke*, nor I, would contend against you. The *opinion* of the catholic church, that a doctrine is true, will not erect it into an article of faith, in the strict sense of the words, as explained above. The doctrine of the *Milennium*, and some others, now universally rejected, were once the *opinions* of the catholic church, and thought to be grounded on clear intimations of Scripture; which yet, I believe, you will not say, are articles of faith, whatever they might then be esteemed. But I do not oppose even the *opinion* of the catholic church; and therefore need not *blush*, when I reflect who my adversary is. I only contend against you, that the resurrection of *the same body*, however general the opinion may be, or may have been, or how true soever, is not at this day an acknowledged article of faith in the catholic church, or particularly in the church of *England*.

S E C T.

S E C T. II.

The first general defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I Had urged, in behalf of Mr. *Locke*, that his faith in the last judgment, the *resurrection of the dead*, and that the dead shall rise again with *their bodies*, should secure him from being taxed with infidelity, or heresy, with respect to the article of the resurrection. For which, you make me give this reason, *because* this, surely, is all, that is of importance to the great ends of religion, in that article. Upon this supposed reason, you say a great deal, that I have no concern in; for I did not offer this, as a reason for my plea, though you have given it that appearance, by inserting the word *because*. The grounds, on which, I think, that one, who believes those articles, ought not to be taxed with heresy in the doctrine of the resurrection, is, because he believes all, that is plainly revealed concerning that doctrine; though he should not determine about something else, which might be obscurely implied in it. So that if it is essential to all heresy, as you say, to *substitute false opinions, into the room of articles of faith, upon that foundation, because they answer the great ends of religion*, I must be clear of that guilt, having substituted no opinions upon that foundation.

You go on to say! "Certainly it is of the last importance to religion, to preserve our faith, not only within the words and expressions of Scripture, but agreeable also to that sense of those words and expressions, which hath been received in the church of *Christ*; and which, upon Mr. *Locke's* own method of interpretation, by comparing one passage of the sacred books with another, appears to be true and genuine.

Most certainly, Sir, when we can, by comparing one place with another, clearly determine the *particular* sense of any *general* words of Scripture, we ought to preserve our faith agreeable to that *particular* sense: But when we cannot, by the Scripture itself, ascertain any sense more determinate than is expressed in the general words of it, I know no other authority, that can oblige us to any limited or particular sense.

"General words (you say) are capable of being applied to many senses, and some of those senses may be false. They must be limited to a particular meaning, to have their proper sense ascertained, and understood. — The resurrection of the same body is the particular sense, to which the Scriptures themselves, as well as the church of Christ, have ever limited that general expression of the resurrection of the dead." *Answer.* If the Scriptures themselves had limited this general expression to that particular sense, there would soon have been an end of our dispute; but that is what I cannot find out, nor have seen any proof of. And we doubt, whether any other authority has given, or can give it that limitation. As to the necessity of limiting the general words of Scripture to a particular meaning, I beg leave to answer you in the words of the judicious Mr. *Chillingworth*: "This presumptuous imposing of the senses of men, upon the words of God; the special senses of men, upon the general words of God; — this vain conceit, that we can speak of the things of God, better than in the words of God: — this restraining of the word from that latitude and generality, and the understandings of men from that liberty, wherein *Christ* and the Apostles left them, is, and hath been, the only fountain of all the schisms of the church." I confess, I see not any good use of limiting the general words of Scripture to a particular meaning: it is rather taking

taking them from, than ascertaining, their proper sense. *General words*, you say, *are capable of being applied to many senses, and some of those senses may be false.* And if this be so, those only, who restrain them to a particular meaning, are in danger of embracing any of those senses, which *may be false*; whilst those, who hold them in that general sense, which they undeniably express, are sure to hold nothing but what is true. As in the case before us, he, who believes the resurrection of the dead, and that the dead shall be raised with spiritual incorruptible bodies, certainly believes truths plainly revealed in Scripture. If any thing more particular concerning their bodies had been necessary to be believed, the Holy Spirit could, no doubt, have delivered it in words as particular as man can invent. But he, who believes all, that the Scripture plainly declares of the resurrection, cannot be in danger of the guilt of heresy in that article, though he should doubt about something, which *may be true*, concerning it, but not *plainly declared*. Heresy does not consist in being undetermined about some particulars relating to matters of faith, *that may be true*; but in asserting something, that is contrary to what is plainly revealed, which must therefore be *certainly false*. So that, Sir, with your good leave, Mr. *Locke* and I do, and must, stand acquitted of heresy, in the article of the resurrection, notwithstanding our being undetermined, whether the bodies raised shall be the *very same*; till you can prove, that, in believing the resurrection of the dead, and that the dead shall be raised with *their bodies*, we believe or assert something that is *false*. You say, that he must not be acquitted,

* There may be erroneous propositions in faith, which are not heretical. The question is, whether a mistaken notion, as to the manner, where the thing itself is asserted, can make a heresy. Bishop *Stillingfleet's Misc. Disc.* p. 289. published by his son, in 1735.

“^b since it is clear, that, under the general protection of that doctrine, he conceals the denial of “ the resurrection of the body, the same body.” But how can Mr. *Locke* be said to *conceal* what he so frankly and openly professes? That he would not presume to *deny* or assert the resurrection of the same body, because the Scripture had not plainly determined, *with what bodies the dead shall come*. Or what can there be in this *inconsistent* with the article of the resurrection?

S E C T. III.

The second general Defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I Had said, that what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up of, Mr. *Locke* looked on as a question of curiosity, which the Scriptures having said nothing of, he *modestly* concludes, is not for him to determine. To which you answer: “ This expression, *the Scriptures have said nothing of what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up*, is very proper to “ puzzle and perplex his reader, because it is in “ some senses manifestly true, and in others as manifestly false. For if by it he means, that those very words are not in the Scriptures, there can be no “ question but it is most true; or, if he means, that “ the Scripture states not precisely and philosophically, of what texture the rising body shall “ be, this also shall be allowed to be true. But if “ he intends by those expressions, that the Scripture “ says nothing, directly or indirectly, of the resurrection of the same body, this, I say, is manifestly false. So that this question of curiosity is

“ far enough from being our question, and it “ would not be want of modesty in him, but impertinence to determine it.”

I dare say, Sir, Mr. *Locke* did not intend to affirm, that the Scripture had said nothing *indirectly* upon this subject, because that is not to be enquired after, when we are in search of an article of faith; for all such articles must be directly and plainly declared. But if his question of curiosity be not the question now in debate between us, I know not what our controversy is upon. You allow it to be true, that the Scripture states not precisely and philosophically of what texture the rising body shall be: but you affirm, that it is false to say, that the Scripture says nothing *directly* or *indirectly* of the resurrection of the same body. Supposing then, that this is spoke of, some how or other, in such terms, as obliges us to believe it; is it not a reasonable question to ask, in what sense, or in what respect we are to believe, that the rising body shall be the same? Or can we believe it at all without being informed of this? Those, who maintain the resurrection of the same body, seem without scruple to resolve the doubt. Some will answer, that it must consist of all the particles of matter, that were ever vitally united to the soul, during the whole course of a man's life. Others say, that it will consist only of such particles, as were united to it at the point of death; or that it must have *no other* particles, but what were at some time united to it. You, Sir, tell me, that those parts of the old matter, which it pleases God to restore to life, will be sufficient, whatever *new* particles may be added to make it the same body. Now what are all or any of these answers but a determining this question of curiosity, *what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up of*? And this is what Mr. *Locke* affirms, and which you allow in this sense to be true, that the Scriptures

have said nothing of. But if any one to avoid the *impertinence*, as you speak, of determining this question, shall answer, that we are bound to believe the resurrection of the *same body*, but we are not to enquire in what sense, or in what respect it will be, or what is requisite to make it the same body; *i. e.* we are not to enquire what is meant by that expression; he manifestly makes an article of faith of a mere sound; or else he must mean nothing more by it than those, who say, that the dead shall be raised with *their bodies*, but they presume not to determine, whether those bodies shall be the very same they had in this life; for not to determine of what particles the rising body shall consist, and not to determine, whether it shall be the very same body, is all one. The only difference is, that those, who assert the *sameness* of the resurrection body, and yet confess, that they know not of what particles it shall be made up, use a more absurd expression, and assert somewhat like a contradiction. Mr. *Locke's* question of curiosity therefore must be the question between us, if you mean any thing different from him. And whether it be *impertinence*, or *want of modesty* to determine it, let those consider, who presume so to do.

To your repeated cautions *not to be so fond of mentioning Mr. Locke's modesty*; I shall only say here, that though I am convinced from all his writings, that modesty was a very eminent part of his character; I do not mean such a modesty, as you seek for, which would *stop his mouth*, or hinder him from writing *what he thought*; for that in some cases is a weakness or a vice: but such a modesty, as made him, in matters of reason and philosophy, frequently profess, that he pretended not to teach, but to enquire: And in those of revela-

* Vide third Lett. *Essay* B. ii. ch. ii. sect. xvii.

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tion (particularly on the subject we are upon) not to presume to be wise beyond what is written.

S E C T. IV.

The third general Defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I did indeed think, Sir, that your calling the subject of your Sermon, the *contentious* part of the article of the resurrection, implied a kind of owning, that the Scripture had not determined the matter. But it seems that was not your meaning, and you shall be allowed to have called that doctrine *contentious*, for what reasons you please; for this I am sure is not worth contending about. But I must not allow you to confound a dispute about the *same body*, with *opposing and contradicting the truth of the resurrection*. I doubt not to make it appear, that Mr. *Locke* is very clear from that guilt, though your over-abounding zeal for the resurrection of the *same body* will not suffer you to allow any resurrection at all without it.

I had pleaded in defence of Mr. *Locke*, from his express words to the Bishop, that he does not deny, that the same bodies shall be raised at the last day. To which you answer: "he is at the same time very far from granting any such thing, as appears from the passages before cited out of him, and several others referred to in the margin. And therefore you must be either obliged to make these words consistent with all those passages, (which I am sure is beyond your skill) or else to suppose, that Mr. *Locke* does not speak here absolutely, and his real thoughts, when he says, *For though I do by no means deny, that the same bodies shall be raised at the last day, yet I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith.*"

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After having carefully consulted all the passages you refer to, I cannot find, that *any skill* is required to make these words consistent with them. His design in them is to shew, that the spirit of God always expresses himself in such a manner concerning the resurrection, that a good *Christian*, who reads the Scripture with an intention to believe all, that is there revealed concerning it, may acquit himself of his duty therein, without *entering into the enquiry*, whether the dead shall have the very same bodies or no; or, that if he should think himself bound to make this enquiry, he would not find St. Paul's words much in favour of the *very same body*, or such as could be supposed intended to deliver it as an article of faith. I appeal to you, whether this is not the sum and tendency of all those passages; and what is there in any part of it inconsistent with his saying, *that he by no means denies, that the same body shall be raised, though he sees nothing to prove it to be an article of faith?* To say, that the holy spirit constantly speaks of the resurrection in such general terms, as do not determine either *for*, or *against*, the identity of the rising body, is certainly no way inconsistent with not denying that identity.

There is therefore no ground for me to *suppose*, that Mr. Locke does not here speak absolutely, and his real thoughts. You tell me, that in his *Essay* he had no occasion to deny the resurrection of the same body; and this, say you, is what he really means, when he says he does not deny it. You may remember, Sir, I told you ^a above, that you had given me reason for being positive, that Mr. Locke could not have satisfied you, that he believed the Trinity by the most absolute words he could have used. It was your dealing with him here, that I referred to, and take to be a sufficient proof of it: It is impos-

^a First Part, p. 243.

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sible to speak in terms more absolute, than those, in which he declares to the Bishop, that he does not *deny* the resurrection of the same body. It is not said with regard to any such mistakes, as you suggest, nor on any other occasion, that could admit of an equivocation. So that it is plain Mr. Locke could not satisfy you by the most absolute affirmation, that he believed any thing, which you are inclined to *suppose* he did not believe; though there is no way to be certain, that a man speaks his real thoughts, if Mr. Locke did not speak his, when he so clearly and so positively affirms, that he by no means denies the resurrection of the same body.

But that he does not grant it, you say, appears from the words he uses here to the Bishop: "I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an article of faith." For if he did not grant it to be an article of faith; he knew he need not grant it at all: no body could require his belief of it, and what he could not be required to grant or believe, he need not give himself the trouble to deny. No body indeed had a right to require his belief of it, so as to make it heresy not to believe it; but if it was prest upon him beyond its measure, he might think it worth his trouble to declare, that though he could not acknowledge it for an article of faith, yet he durst not presume to deny the truth of it, since it might be implied or obscurely delivered in the Scriptures. This then, Sir, being the plain tendency and import of Mr. Locke's words, (which I wish you had as well as I considered) they could be no sneer of his at the Bishop, as you call them; and if you did nothing to deserve it, it may be matter of wonder, that you should be so ready to apprehend a sneer from me, as you have done more than once, when no such thing was intended.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

The fourth general Defence of Mr. Locke vindicated.

I had urged, that Mr. *Locke* denies the resurrection of the same body *to be an article of faith*, because he finds it not clearly delivered in Scripture; but that this is all, that he denies of it, not offering one argument from reason against it. Upon which you say, "Thank you, good Sir: what could Mr. *Locke* do more, or worse, than to deny it to be an article of faith, or to be found in Scripture?" I will tell you, Sir, what he could have done more, and what has been done much worse. He might have argued against the *probability* of that doctrine; or urged the many difficulties, which have been raised, to represent it as *impossible*, that the rising body should consist of the same numerical particles, that were formerly united to the soul. But, instead of raising objections of that nature, he very readily declares, "that he makes no difficulty of believing, that God may, if he thinks fit, give to every one at the last day, a body consisting only of such particles, as were before vitally united to his soul." You ask again, *To what purpose does he say this, while he absolutely denies, that God has revealed he will do so?* I will tell you that too, Sir, since you seem not to know it. His purpose plainly is, to satisfy the Bishop, (and it might even have satisfied you) that it was not an overweening conceit of human reason, or any prejudices against the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, that hindered him from seeing, that it was revealed in Scripture; since he had faith enough in the power of God, to surmount all difficulties, that could be raised against it, if it was made evident, that *he* had required it to be believed. But not finding either side plainly determined in

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Scripture, he no more ventures to *deny*, than to *assert* the resurrection of the same body. If you, Sir, *cannot think, that it was either modesty, or real submission to the Scriptures, which obliged him to this conduct*; I cannot help thinking, that every body else would be at a loss for any other motive to impute it to.

But "you are sure of this, that for a man to prefer his own private interpretation of the Scriptures, to that of the universal church; and to make use of some general expressions in them, to overthrow the particular sense of them, has very little of the appearance of modesty, or submission to the Scriptures." As for the first part of this indictment, it is certain, that Mr. *Locke* frequently declares the holy Scriptures to be the only rule of his faith; and professes himself unqualified for seeking articles of faith in the judgment of the universal church. Probably he thought consulting the Scriptures themselves the *surest*, as well as the easiest way to find out what God had therein revealed: and I appeal to you, whether among the several sects of *Christians*, those, who most exclaim against *private interpretation* of Scripture, and most profess to follow the judgment of the universal church, have the most real submission to the Scripture, or have preserved their faith most uncorrupted. However, an implicit faith in any human authority whatsoever is contrary to the very spirit of the Reformation; and since the church of *England* in particular allows the Scriptures to be the last resort, by which all opinions and doctrines are to be tried; a son of hers (though of less capacity than Mr. *Locke*) may with great modesty, in obedience to the divine command of *searching the Scriptures*, make use of the understanding given him, to find out in them, what God has required of him to believe.

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To the other part of your accusation, *that he makes use of some general expressions of Scripture, to overthrow the particular sense of them*; I answer, that in adhering to that sense of Scripture, which is exprest by the general words of it, one is sure to hold an incontestible truth, (as I before observed) and *forbearing to determine* any further concerning it, as Mr. *Locke* does, is very far from *overthrowing* any particular sense, which may be deduced from the words. But whether those, who are thus cautious of affirming more than is plainly exprest; or those, who peremptorily determine to a particular sense, what the holy Spirit has left in general terms; have most of *the appearance of modesty or real submission to the Scriptures*, I leave to every one but Dr. *Holdsworth* to judge.

C H A P. II.

Concerning the opinion and authority of the ancient writers of the Christian church, as to this doctrine.

UPON my enquiry, what authority you, or the Bishop of *Worcester* had, to erect this doctrine into an article of faith? you ask of me, “whether I honestly think, that the Bishop was the first, that erected it? Or, whether I can name the time or the persons, who laid the foundation of it, till I come to *Christ* and his Apostles?” If you mean, whether I can name the persons, who were first of this opinion, I frankly own, that I cannot. I know, that such a notion was very early entertained in the church; but I am far from thinking *the opinion* even of the universal church sufficient to make any thing an article of faith; no, nor even proofs, that it is delivered in Scripture, if it is not so delivered, as to make it necessary to be by every one explicitly believed. The necessity of the Eucharist

for infants, and the doctrine of the *Millennium* were universally believed in the first ages of the church; the last of which is by some learned men, who have of late revived it, thought to have a very good foundation in the Scripture. And yet I believe you will not say, it is an article of faith; though perhaps there is as good testimony for both those doctrines in the ancient *Christian* writers, as for the resurrection of the *same body*.

I must here make an apology for using the word *ostentation*, in speaking of the testimonies brought from antiquity on this subject, which I find gave you no small offence. But it was not at all intended in the sense you understood it. What I meant by it was only, that after all that *shew* or pretension to the authority of the *Christian* church, the fathers, and the creeds, their expressions amounted to no more, than that the dead should rise with *their bodies*. In which I chiefly had regard to the *creeds*, as they are the most certain testimonies of the sense of the *Christian* church. Nor did I give you any occasion to say, that I *insulted those authorities, or braved them with the single name of Mr. Locke, though I may think it would not have been beneath their primitive simplicity*, to have exprest their faith of the resurrection in the same terms, that the holy spirit had done.

You go on to tell me, that “if I will not be so wise, as to despise things, which you presume I never read, you will be so bold with me, as to repeat the ostentation of citing some of those good people, that I may be satisfied they did not speak Mr. *Locke's* language; and you hope I will be so modest as to think, that the argument from their authority is much stronger than that from Mr. *Locke's*. And then perhaps I may find, that even this ostentation is an argument of more force than ever I can answer.”

I do not remember, Sir, that I have any where mentioned Mr. *Locke's* authority as an argument of any kind of force; and I must make bold likewise to repeat, that I cannot allow any *human authority* whatsoever to be in itself a proof of any *doctrine*, independent of the reasons brought to support it; though I am far from despising those ancient testimonies to the *truth of Christianity*. But since you are pleased to *presume, that I have never read* those venerable writers, you cannot reasonably require me to take the articles of my faith from them, but must allow me to seek them in the Scriptures, which, *you may presume*, I have read. However, it is certain (whatever I have done) that by far the greater number of *Christians*, either for want of leisure, learning, or inclination, have never read the Fathers; and since they have the same rule of faith, which the Fathers had, and by which all opinions (according to the doctrine of the church of *England*) must ultimately be tried; I see not, why they may not be as safe in consulting with sincerity, and diligence, that sacred rule itself, as in implicitly relying, first on some interpreter of the Fathers for their sense, and then on the judgment of the Fathers for the sense of Scripture; to which they can be no further bound to submit, than as it is enforced by their arguments, or as it appears to be the natural and genuine sense, upon examining the Scriptures themselves. So that this is going a great way about, to come at last, where they might at first set out. You might therefore, Sir, have spared yourself the pains of those large quotations from the *Greek and Latin Fathers*, only to satisfy me, that *they did not speak Mr. Locke's language*; since they tend no further than to shew, that those ancient writers *believed*, that the dead should be raised with the same bodies in which they died, (which is what Mr. *Locke* did *by no means deny*) but are no proof, that this opinion

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of theirs is an *article of faith*; which is what alone he did deny of it, and which we can only be assured of from Scripture.

But you produce those passages from the Fathers, to shew me, that they did express more than that the dead shall rise again with their *bodies*; for that expression, you say, as Mr. *Locke* and I use it, is *ambiguous and equivocal, and signifies only new bodies, which God shall join to the souls of men at the last day*. I believe, Sir, it would be very difficult for you, to make it appear, that we use that expression to signify *only new bodies*. Neither of us have any where said, that *God will join new bodies to the souls of men at the last day*; or have shewn any disposition to believe, that he will do so. Mr. *Locke*, on the contrary, wherever he has occasion to speak of the possibility, that the resurrection body may be composed of *some* new particles, always supposes them to be joined with the *remaining parts of the old matter*; as in his third letter^f he says, "Though the materials of our Saviour's body were not changed at his resurrection; yet it does not follow, but that the body of a man, rotten in his grave, or burnt, may, at the last day, have *several* new particles in it, and that without any inconvenience." And in the page before it, he says, "Why *with the remaining parts of a man's body*, long since dissolved, etc. — other new particles of matter, mixed with them, may not serve to make *his* body again, as well as the mixture of new and different particles with the old did in the compass of his life make *his* body; I see no reason can be given." These passages plainly shew, that by *their bodies*, he did not understand *only*, or *intirely new bodies*. Nay they perfectly speak your own sense, as my letter observed; only with this difference, that he will

^f To the Bishop of Worcester, p. 181.

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not allow a body so composed of new and old particles to be the *very same* body it was before.

But, if Mr. *Locke* did not speak the *language* of the Fathers, much less, Sir, do you speak their *sense*. It is plain, they had no notion of what you call a *vulgar sameness*; they truly and honestly believed a *real sameness*, as appears by your own quotations. But I do no more pretend to urge their authority against you, than I think it valid against Mr. *Locke*, any further than their reasonings are so; which, I cannot say, are always very conclusive.

However, you tell me, "How meanly soever I may think of their reasonings, yet, as to matter of fact, they are unanswerable witnesses of the faith and doctrine of the church of *Christ*, in the several ages, in which they wrote." But to this I can by no means agree. The only matter of fact, that appears from those ancient writers, is, that they believed the resurrection of the same body: but that is no more a proof, that it was the faith and doctrine of the church of *Christ* in those ages, than the yearly sermons on that subject at *Oxford* are proofs, that it is in this age the faith of the catholic church, or even of the church of *England*: which that it is not, you may have, I think, a demonstration of, if you please to make the same experiment, that I have done, since this debate began betwixt us; by enquiring among all I conversed with, clergy and laity, learned and unlearned indifferently, what they believed concerning the resurrection of the *same body*.

In this enquiry I have by some been answered, that they had never at all considered the question; by others, that they thought it a point not clearly revealed, and they supposed it not necessary to determine *for*, or *against* it. Most of the clergy, whom I discoursed with upon it, were of this opinion; but a very ^s eminent one in the city of *Lon-*

* Dr. Gaskarth.

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don, made no scruple to affirm, that it was ^a impossible, that our bodies, at the resurrection, should be the very same we had here; which I have since found to be the sentiment of several others. Nor have I met with any but one ^b in all my enquiry, who maintained your side of the question, which was likewise a clergyman of some note.

Now I appeal to you, Sir, whether a doctrine little considered at all by many of the members of the church, so doubtfully received by others, and contradicted by many, can be called an acknowledged article of faith? Would such doubtful answers be given on any of the established articles of faith? On the doctrines of the Trinity, of the redemption by *Christ*, of the resurrection of the dead, or of the last judgment? I dare say you will not think it possible. No one, who pretended to know his religion, could say, that he had not considered these doctrines, or that he supposed it not necessary to determine about them, or that it is impossible they should be true; at the same time maintaining, that he said nothing contrary to any acknowledged article of faith. But it is not so at all of the doctrine of the resurrection of the *same body*: those who think not of it, or doubt about it, or deny it, (which you will find make up a very considerable number) frankly own either, without the least suspicion, that they do any thing inconsistent with an article of faith. This I take to be a plain demonstration, that notwithstanding the warmth of some divines in preaching and writing in defence of this doctrine, it is not *the faith of the church of Christ* in this age; for that cannot be the faith of the church, which is not known to be such by the members of it: and therefore neither are the writings of those venerable authors you have quoted, any proof *that it was the faith and doctrine*

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of the church of Christ, in the several ages in which they wrote. They are unanswerable witnesses of nothing else but their own belief of the point; and those, who think meanly of their reasonings, or are not convinced by them, cannot be overpowered by their authority; since we have the same rule to judge by, which the Fathers had, and which alone can authoritatively determine what is, or what is not, *an article of faith*. So that in this case Mr. Locke against the Fathers, or the Fathers against Mr. Locke, will outweigh each other, only so far, as they have Scripture and reason on their side. Neither *multitude*, which you lay so much stress on, nor *personal character*, which you imagine I rely on, will have the least force in either scale.

But supposing those ancient writers to be, as you sayⁱ, *a cloud of witnesses attesting what was the faith of the church in their times*; allowing you too, what is unquestionable, that *the faith of Christians ought always to be the same*; yet who can help it, if doctrines highly revered, and generally believed in some ages of the church, are in others dropt, accounted false, or of little importance? Who can help it, if some favourite doctrines are, at some times, and by some zealots, preached up as matters of faith, and the most essential parts of religion, which at other seasons, and by cooler judgments, are looked on as matters of mere opinion, or indifference? That this has been so in several instances, ecclesiastical history does abundantly testify; and if this is the case of *the resurrection of the same body*, neither the testimony of some ancient writers, nor the zeal of some modern preachers, will be sufficient to make it an article of faith, which every one is bound explicitly to believe and profess.

CHAP. III.

Of the sense of the ancient Creeds as to this doctrine.

UPON my saying, that the creeds of the church are the only *explanations* of Scripture, that carry any authority with them, into none of which the term *same body* has been assumed; and that no private person ought to go farther in their explications, than the church in her creeds hath thought fit to do; you answer with granting, *that the creeds do carry in them the public authority of the Christian church*; but that it may well be questioned, whether they are *always explanations of Scripture*. I suppose you meant, whether they are *all* so; for what they are at *any time*, I presume, it will not be questioned they *always* are.

But whatever the creed, commonly called the *Apostles*, may be, that the *Nicene* and *Athanasian* creeds were intended for explanations of Scripture, will scarce bear a question, which was sufficient for my purpose. And as they are particular enough, I insist on their being the only explanations of Scripture, that carry any authority with them. What you say here concerning the necessity of determining the general words of Scripture, to a particular sense, and the obligation of adhering to the explanations of the ancient writers; has nothing in it, but what I have before answered, and therefore need not repeat.

The only thing now to be considered on this head is, whether the *terms* made use of in the creeds, to express the article of the resurrection, are *sufficient direction to us to understand it of the same body*, as you affirm. You ask what else can any one properly and naturally understand by *corporis* or *carnis resurrectionem*? And you appeal, even to me, whether by any of those expressions, it can be meant, that at the last day, the dead shall have *new bodies* given to them, which,

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which, you say, is Mr. *Locke's* explanation of the resurrection.

That this is no explanation of Mr. *Locke's*, tho' you so often father it upon him; and that he manifestly supposes, in several places of his writings, a body raised *from the old one*, will hereafter appear. But as to those expressions in the creeds, I believe any man may properly and naturally understand them, as intended only to signify, that the dead shall be raised to life again *with bodies*. This was a thing, which the heathen world in all their guesses about a future state, had not the least notion of, and therefore, the church might very well design to express, that we should be raised compleat men, consisting of a body as well as a spirit, without determining any thing more particular; for which purpose, the words *corporis*, or *carnis resurrectionem*, in one of the creeds seem very proper: And had it been designed, that all the members of the church should believe and declare the resurrection of the *same body*, most probably those very words would have been chosen, as least liable to be misunderstood. But instead of this, the two latter creeds express the article of the resurrection in terms yet more general than the former; one of them very conformably to a phrase of St. Paul's ^k, *Omnes homines resurgere debent cum corporibus suis*. The other in the usual words of Scripture, *resurrectionem mortuorum*. And this is a strong presumption, that the church did not intend to determine her members to that particular sense; since the terms of her latest creeds are most general on that article, tho' on others very particular.

Reply to the Defence of the first head of the Sermon, in Chap. IV.

WE are now coming to be more particular concerning the *sameness* of human *bodies*.

^k 1 Cor. xv.

SECT.

SECT. I. which you entitle *identity stated*, contains nothing but an endeavour to collect a pleasant piece of *logic*, out of my reasoning, by a very unfair representation. It would be too tedious for the reader to go over the whole of that argument again: I shall therefore only draw up here in a juster syllogism, than that you would put upon me what the real sum of it is. It must be allowed by your own concession, that in a strict mathematical sense, a body is not the same, if it does not consist of the same numerical particles.

But as the human body, whilst living here, not consisting of the same particles, is not for any considerable time the same in that strict sense:

Therefore, neither is it necessary to suppose, that the resurrection body shall be the same, *i. e.* shall consist of the same numerical particles.

I hope, Sir, you will allow this to be better *logic*, than that you had formed for me. But you tell me, that this mathematical identity *is not the identity of the resurrection body*. To which you have made me return for answer, *that Mr. Locke says, that the identity of the resurrection body must consist in the mathematical identity*. A very convincing argument, as you say, without doubt.

I wish you had been pleased to mark, in what part of my letter you found this *convincing argument*, for I can find no such there. But tho' you are so good at making arguments for me, which I should never have thought of, give me leave here to answer for myself, that if the resurrection body has not a *mathematical identity*, it may be in danger of having no identity at all, as perhaps will hereafter appear.

Your Sect. II. bears title, *Mr. Locke's Identity not approved of*.

AND here you say, I might have spared myself the trouble of telling you, that Mr. *Locke* always understands

understands the *same body*, in a strict mathematical sense; that he fixed it to this sense in his *Essay*, and constantly uses it in the same signification. "For what, say you, is all this to me? Mr. Locke was at liberty to fix his idea of identity as he pleased, and to retain it as long as he pleased; and I, or any man else, may demand the same liberty. And therefore, I can see no imaginable reason, why I may not make use of the vulgar and unphilosophical idea of the same body, in speaking of the resurrection body, as well as he makes use of the philosophical." With all my heart, Sir, make the best use of it you can; no body, that I know of, pretends to deny you that liberty.

But if it be nothing at all to you in what Mr. Locke places the identity of body, why have you quarrelled with him about it? He never said any thing concerning the resurrection of the same body, but in his own sense of that term; at least it is certain he never opposed your sense of it, which you call a *vulgar sameness*, that being a new explication of your own, and therefore could not fall in his way. You might then have maintained your own *vulgar and unphilosophical* idea of the identity of the resurrection body, without falling foul upon him for his philosophical idea, since, as you say, *what is this to you?* I confess in that you are in the right, for all he contends for on this subject is, that it is not an article of faith, that the resurrection body shall be the very same, (that is according to his sense) shall consist of the same numerical particles, or of *no other*, than what it was composed of during this life. And what can this be to you? Since it is nothing contrary to your *vulgar sameness*, which you maintain does not consist in the same numerical particles. I see not how there can be any dispute between you here, unless it be about the propriety of the name.

SECT.

S E C T. III.

Enquiry whether the vulgar consideration of identity is most proper to be applied to the Resurrection.

YOU begin this subject, with sagely reprehending me for making a question of what was so plain, viz. that when you said *there is an identity, by which even a river is the same*, nothing could be meant by it but the same *river*. I assure you, Sir, I had not the least doubt, that you meant the *same river*. And when I asked you *same what, Sir?* it was only to make you observe, that this was nothing to the purpose, nothing contrary to what Mr. Locke had said, whom you seemed to be opposing, tho' he had spoke of no other sameness in this dispute, but that of a *body* consisting of the same particles of matter. But if this is not the sameness you are contending for, if you will not accept of his ideas, but will stand by your own, I again ask you, why are you so much offended with him? Why is he called an heretic, for denying that to be an article of faith, which you do not yourself allow to be so? the *sameness* you would maintain, that something, *which preserves the human body distinct from all others*, being what he has said nothing about, and is of a quite different nature from that, which he denies to be an article of faith.

I am again rebuked for another wise question, I had put to you, viz. Who has obliged us to allow any sameness at all to a varying fleeting *body*? In answer to which you refer me to *common sense and common language*. And these, I own, are sufficient to determine us in the use of any terms. But I deny, that either of them has obliged us to call or suppose every *river*, even whilst it runs in its own banks, or any man's *body* from three to threescore, the *same bodies*, tho' the one is always called the *same river*,

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and the other the same man. But of their sameness as *bodies* it is plain I was enquiring.

You own, that calling men's bodies the *same* from their birth to their death, "is not done very philosophically; but it is all one for that, *you say*, it is done with very good sense, agreeably to the understanding of mankind. You told me, that any fleeting body is the same, while it is preserved distinct from all others of the same, or of a different species. And this was sufficient for your purpose, which was to account for sameness according to the common notions of men. So that I might have spared that other trifling question, *In what does this sameness consist?*"

But as *trifling* as you think this question, it is absolutely necessary to be determined, before we can judge, whether what you are here endeavouring to maintain be true or not, *viz.* That *the vulgar consideration of identity is most proper to be applied to the resurrection body*; for how shall we know this, till we are satisfied, what that, which you call a vulgar sameness, depends upon. You say, that *any fleeting body is the same while it is preserved distinct from all others*. Very well, Sir, but when such a body has by the separation and dissolution of its parts, and by their mixture with other bodies, lost that *distinction*, it may, I think, without trifling be enquired, what becomes of that *sameness*, which, you affirm, *preserved it distinct from all others*? Is it of such a nature, as to continue in being, when it no longer performs its office? Is it so permanent, as to become a principle of individuation to whatever particles of matter God shall think fit to join to it at the resurrection? Or can we know, whether it is capable of either, or not, without knowing in what this sameness consists? *It would not*, you say, *be in the least danger of being lost, for your deficiency in accounting for it*. That may be, but we shall be in some danger of not knowing, whether it is lost or no after death, or whether it will
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be found again at the resurrection, if we have no idea at all of it; that is, if we talk of it, without meaning any thing by it. I beg leave, therefore, to explain to you, upon what the vulgar notion of identity seems to be founded; that we may the better judge, whether it is *most proper*, or can at all be applied to the resurrection.

It is plain then to me, that *that* sameness, which men attribute to their own bodies, as it is not founded on any real sameness of the material substance, which we are sure varies every day; as little can it be founded on a *supposed unknown principle*, which preserves it distinct from all other. For however philosophers and metaphysicians may form their notions upon imaginary beings, the common notions of men are founded upon such sensible appearances, as are liable to vulgar observation; and which, as you say, common sense will always be sufficient for. And those sensible appearances in the case before us can, I think, be no other than this, that our own bodies, and those of other men, have continued from the first moment of their existence, or of our acquaintance with them, in the same organization of life, without having ever been shifted all at once. It is this, which gives them that, which you call a vulgar sameness. And in this participation of the same *continued life* it is, not in a *vital union with the soul*, as you alledge, that I have placed the distinction of human bodies.

But to that sense, in which you understood me, you answer, that tho' a vital union with the soul makes a human body, *yet it does not make it a human body particular to itself*. To which give me leave to reply, that if you had not been a little infected with those *fooleries* of the schools, which you seem to despise, you would not have made an objection, founded upon the *subtile* notion of *real universals*, or of one *common human nature* as really existing; for had you been convinced of this plain truth, that nothing really exists

exists but *particulars*, or *individuals*, you would easily have seen, that the so much talked of *principium individuationis* is nothing else but *existence* itself; every thing, that exists, being necessarily *particular to itself*. And tho' all human bodies have many things in common (besides that, which you observe of being united to the soul) yet each of them has a particular beginning of its existence in a determinate time and place; and so long as it continues in that *organized life*, (which depends indeed upon its union with the soul) it is by its incommunicable relation to that beginning of its existence, *distinguished from all others*. This, Sir, is no metaphysical nicety, but a plain truth, obvious to common sense; and I believe you will find, that it is in this alone, that your *vulgar sameness* consists, or on which the vulgar consideration of identity is founded; for to be *preserved distinct from all others*, and to be *preserved the same with itself*, are but different ways of expressing one and the same thing.

It is you, therefore, that *trifle* with me, when you tell me, that "the particularity and distinction of human bodies depends upon the sameness of them, or that principle of individuation, which distinguishes them from all others; and that any fleeting body is the same, while it is preserved distinct from all others." Which is just as much, as if you had said, that the distinction of human bodies depends upon the distinction of them; or that any fleeting body is the same, while it is preserved the same: An account, that will not much advance our knowledge in the question before us.

But since you have not thought fit to acquaint us, upon what the distinction or sameness of bodies depends, any farther than by telling us, that a human body is the same, while it is preserved distinct from all others; and that it is preserved distinct from all others by virtue of being the same; nor do you pretend to know, in what your *vulgar sameness* consists,

sists, that is, you know not what is meant by it: we must, therefore, either enquire whether, *we know not what* is most proper to be applied to the resurrection, or you must allow me to make that enquiry, according to the explication I have given (and I believe no other intelligible one can be given) of the real ground of what you call a *vulgar sameness*, or upon which *the vulgar consideration of identity* is founded.

You will, I suppose, grant, that when a human body is rotten in the grave, dissolved and mouldered into dust, it has then lost its *distinction* from all other bodies, and consequently it can no longer retain that *sameness*, which you say is *sufficiently* (and I must add *is only*) *known by its preserving any body distinct from all others*. How then must it be restored at the resurrection, to that vulgar sameness, which, with its distinction from other bodies, it must have inevitably lost? According to you, a mixture of old and new particles can alone give it a vulgar sameness, when restored to that sameness, or to that principle of individuation, which distinguished it from all others. But what is that sameness, or that principle of individuation? *I do not know*, say you. It is then, say I, (for it can be nothing else but) *the same existence*. But an organized body, which has once lost its distinct existence, can never be restored to the same individual existence. Nor can one and the same thing have *two beginnings* of existence. Much less is it possible for any plant, animal, or human body, whose life has been *discontinued*, and all its parts separated and dispersed, to be restored to the *same continued life*, in which, with its having never sensibly shifted all its parts, consists the identity of each. In a word, it is impossible for a human body to be restored at the resurrection, to any one particular of that, in which its supposed sameness consisted during its vital union with the soul here; so that a *vulgar sameness* is so far from being the *most proper*, that it is utterly

utterly incapable of being at all *applied to the resurrection body*.

You must therefore at last place the identity of the resurrection body in something else, either in its vital union with the same soul, independent of any sameness of the material substance; or allow it a real mathematical sameness; both which you have with great zeal discarded. Perhaps you would rather place it in the *original stamina*, supposed probable by some modern philosophers, and that indeed will be somewhat more intelligible than a body, which, you tell us, will have *such a sameness, as (notwithstanding its fleeting state) it had with itself here, from three to threescore, according to vulgar notions*: A sort of identity, which, tho' it has a real foundation during the continued life of the body here, you will, I doubt not, find upon examination to be absolutely incompatible to the resurrection body.

S E C T. IV.

Whether Mr. Locke and you differ only in words, and agree in things.

YOU needed not have wrote a section to prove, that your vulgar identity differs from Mr. *Locke's* mathematical identity; for who ever imagined, that there was any agreement between them? The words, which I had quoted from him and you, as agreeing in sense, and which you repeat as directly contrary to one another, were not brought to shew, that you agree in your notions of identity; (for about that word I own you differ) but that you agreed in your account of the *state* of the human body, both whilst living here, and at the resurrection; tho' you affirm, and Mr. *Locke* denies, that such a fleeting body is through all its variations *the same*; which is plainly a dispute about the *word*, and not the thing. But it is pleasant to observe, how hardly you are put to it, to evade any agreement between you and Mr. *Locke*, when

when I had of a sudden, it seems, found out, that you were perfectly agreed.

To what end, I beseech you, Sir, (unless that of imposing on an unwary reader) do you, after repeating your description of the varying condition of the human body, add, "Those words, one would think, should hardly be reconcileable with Mr. *Locke's* mathematical identity?" As if any body had gone about to reconcile them. In the same manner you afterwards tell me, that "You do not see what Mr. *Locke's* words are to the purpose of your agreement, except I can find an agreement between your saying, that a body may be the same by a vulgar sameness, tho' it does not for any little time consist of the same numerical particles; and Mr. *Locke's* saying, that a man has not the same body at fifty, which he had at five, because it does not consist of a mathematical sameness. Which two propositions seem to you directly to oppose and contradict one another." I grant they do so, and with all my *shrewdness* have not pretended to form an agreement between those contradictions. You cannot certainly, Sir, so far mistake my argument, as not to see, that I quoted these words from you both, and those, which you afterwards repeat concerning the resurrection body, to shew, that tho' you contradict one another in the word *sameness*; yet you agree in the nature and composition of the human body, both here, and at the resurrection. This was so plainly my meaning, that I have good reason for asking you, to what other purpose than that of imposing on a superficial reader, you could evade the argument I urged from your agreeing *in things*, by taking a great deal of pains ingeniously to shew, that you contradict one another, about the *sameness* of the human body; which was the very thing I was labouring to prove was the only difference between you, and that therefore the dispute could be only about the *word sameness*, since you were otherwise

wife perfectly agreed in your accounts of the human body.

You seem to have been so much at a loss for matter to fill up this section, that you have helped it out with two cavils very insignificant to our purpose. The first is, "that I, *who insist so much on express words*, should not, in quoting Mr. *Locke*, have given you other words than his." To this I answer, that if I insist on *express words*, it is only when the words are those of the *Holy Ghost*; and when *express words* are the very matter in question. In all other cases I think it sufficient, to keep so strictly to the sense, that no dispute of that can happen; which you cannot deny, that I have done here. Your other cavil is, upon a mistake, it seems, of mine about the *occasion* of the words I had quoted from Mr. *Locke*; which being, no more than the former, of any kind of importance to the matter in debate, I shall not trouble the reader to excuse a slip of my memory; a small degree of your favour might have let it pass unnoticed, since the *occasion* of the words was nothing at all to the point in question; the agreement between you and Mr. *Locke*; to which we now return.

After having repeated the words, which I had quoted from your Sermon, and from Mr. *Locke's* third letter to the Bishop of *Worcester*, (which I need not do here) you at last confess to me, "that at first sight there does seem to be some agreement between the sense of his words and yours." But you ask me, "whether I myself can think, that Mr. *Locke* intended in these words, to express fully and perfectly the same sense with yours, setting only aside the consideration of sameness, or identity, after I have considered with you *three things*, which you there propose to me.

"First, that what he says here is in answer to a particular objection, concerning the raising of men with the same bodies, as *Christ* was raised with the same body: And therefore is only said

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"occasionally, and to avoid the particular force of that argument, and his way of expressing himself is doubtful and uncertain, *Why such a thing may not be, I think no reason can be given.*"

To this I answer, that tho' the passage I produced, as agreeing with your notion of the resurrection body, was indeed occasioned by the argument you mention; yet this part of the answer was not peculiarly adapted to it, but might as well have been urged upon any other argument, for the necessity of the body's being raised with the same particles; and relates to all human bodies in general at the resurrection. As to the doubtfulness of the expression you cavil at, it is so far from being usually taken for a doubtful or uncertain way of expression, that I scarce know any manner of speaking esteemed more positive and absolute. To say, that one thinks *no reason can be given against a thing*, is full as strong as to say, that there is all manner of reason for it. So that what you have here said has not the least weight against Mr. *Locke's* intending fully and perfectly to express your sense.

The second consideration you propose to me is, "that the reason he gives for his position in his last words in this place, that *Whatever matter is vitally united to a man's soul is his body, as much as is that, which was united to it when he was born*, will hold good, if an entire new body were given him at the resurrection; and therefore, that the word *his* is equivocal, and is capable of being extended farther than you can allow in the resurrection body.

It may perhaps be capable of being farther extended, but it does not follow, that therefore Mr. *Locke* designed to extend it farther; and there is, on the contrary, great reason to conclude, that he did not design it, because the nature of his argument would not admit him so to do; for he reasons from the construction of the body here; that as during the whole course of a man's life, it is composed of new particles

cles continually added to the old; so he thinks no reason can be given, why new particles, *added to the remaining old*, may not serve to make his body again at the resurrection. But to have enforced this argument by such a conclusion, as you suppose him to make, *viz.* that if an *entire new body* were given a man at the resurrection, it would be as much his body, as that he had when he was born; would have been very absurd and quite inconsistent with his own reasoning. And therefore there is no ground to think, that he intended in this place to extend the word *his* farther, than you can allow in the resurrection body.

The third thing you offer to my consideration is, "That whatever agreement Mr. *Locke's* words may seem to have with yours in this place, yet in other places he drops the mixture of new and old particles in the resurrection body, and speaks of the resurrection body as of a new one to be united to the soul, which would be as much the body of the dead, as the old one would be if raised." This you say, "I know very well, and may see in the places referred to in the margin!"

I have reviewed those places very carefully, and can assure you, Sir, that there is nothing in them at all to your purpose. In page 196, upon the Bishop's urging St. *Paul's* words, *it is sown in corruption*, &c. Mr. *Locke* manifestly speaks of the body of the resurrection, in the same view and manner, as he speaks of it before the resurrection, as not in a *strict philosophical sense* the very same; affirming only, that revelation has no where declared any thing of the same body *in his Lordship's sense of the same body*, which you know was a strict philosophical sense, consisting of the same particles, which had been formerly united to the soul, and *no other*. This Mr. *Locke* says, "appears not to have been then

¹ 3d Letter, p. 196, 209, 210.

"thought

"thought of." But here is nothing, that can be called dropping the mixture of new and old particles, nor the least hint of a body *entirely new*.

In the other two pages you refer to, there is yet less to your purpose: P. 209. he says not one word about what particles the resurrection body may be made up of, whether new or old, mixed or unmixed. In answer to the Bishop's argument, *That the same material substance must be reunited to the soul, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation*; he says, "As to the propriety of the name, I think it will not be much questioned, that if *the same man* rise, who was dead, it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead; which is the language of the Scripture." An answer no way founded on the supposition of an *entire new body*, for a new body is certainly not necessary to the raising of the *same man*: But if the same man rise, this necessarily implies a *body raised*, tho' not according to the Bishop's strict notion, of the *very same particles and no other* than was before united to his soul. A denial therefore of the necessity of that sameness of the material substance, which his adversary contended for, is all that can be fairly made out of this passage.

In page 210, the last place to which you refer, in order to make it the more strongly appear, that the Bishop had no grounds to maintain, that the Scriptures had delivered it as an article of faith, that the very same bodies shall be raised; he acquaints him, that upon a strict search he had found, that the Scripture does not in express terms mention *the resurrection of the body*, as he before had taken for granted that it did; and that therefore in the next edition, he would change these words of his book, *the dead bodies of men shall rise*, into those of the Scripture, *the dead shall rise*. "Not that I question (says he) that the dead shall be raised *with bodies*;" (an expression, which it is plain he meant to signify the same with that he had used in his *Essay, the dead*

bodies of men shall rise.) But that in matters of revelation, I think it our duty, "as far as any one delivers it for revelation, to keep close to the words of Scripture; unless he will assume to himself the authority of one inspired, or make himself wiser than the Holy Spirit himself." If you had inferred from this passage, that Mr. *Locke* did not believe the dead were to rise with any bodies at all, there might have been some appearance of a ground for it, tho' he tells us he makes no question of it. But sure there is nothing here, that has any appearance of intending, or the least intimation of a body *entirely new*.

None of the places therefore, which you desire me to consider, having any weight against Mr. *Locke's* intending in the words I quoted from him, fully and perfectly, to express the same sense with yours in your Sermon; I must still maintain, that he means just as you do, that there is no necessity, that the bodies of men at the resurrection should consist of the same, or of no other particles, than those they were composed of during their lives here; but that other new particles mixed with the old might serve to make their bodies *then*, as well as the mixture of new and different particles of matter with the old, did in the compass of their lives make up their bodies *here*. His reasoning on this point is the same with yours, and I see no ground to think there is any difference between you, *setting aside the consideration of sameness*; which term you do, and he does not, apply to a body composed of new and different particles, united to the remaining old.

I must therefore be far from allowing, as you expect, "That Mr. *Locke's* meaning is, not only to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body, in his own sense of same body; but to introduce also a belief, that a new body, united to the soul at the last day, may be properly a resurrection body." On the contrary, I must assure you, Sir, that upon the most impartial examination

of his dispute with the Bishop on this subject, I am fully convinced, that he had not so much as a design to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the *same body*, even in the strict sense of it; much less to introduce a belief about a new body, which seems not to have entered into his thoughts. It is very plain to an unprejudiced reader, that he had nothing at heart in all his arguments, but that the belief of the resurrection of the very same body should not be imposed on himself or others, as an article of faith, necessary for every Christian to assent to: And that he had not the least design of introducing any particular belief concerning the materials, of which the resurrection body should be made up; but was rather earnest, that every one should be left at liberty to think of it, as best suited their different apprehensions; it not appearing to him, that the Scriptures had restrained that liberty, by determining any thing clearly and certainly concerning it.

But you have concluded, that he designed to introduce this new belief: "For which reason, you say, no doubt it is, that he rejects all sameness but his own, that which consists in the same numerical particles, the ideal identity; and when all sameness is set aside, but that which never was in nature, then of course, a new body united to the soul, notwithstanding the absurdity of words, must be the resurrection of the dead." Why of course it must be so, or why on this account, Mr. *Locke* needed to reject all sameness, but what you call his own, or the ideal identity, I confess I cannot apprehend. Tho' he requires to the sameness of a body the same numerical particles, yet since he contends, that the resurrection body may very properly and very probably consist of the old remaining particles, with some new ones added to them, this cannot of course introduce an entire new body; for I suppose you will allow, that if such a body, with a mixture of old and new particles (which is your

own notion of the resurrection body) be united to the soul at the last day, that may without absurdity be called *the resurrection of the dead*, tho' Mr. Locke and all the world should deny the sameness of such a body. Besides, supposing, that there is no such thing in nature *now* as a body, that continues to have for any little time a real mathematical identity, it does not follow, that a new body must be united to the soul at the resurrection, tho' all other sameness were set aside; for if there is such a thing in nature as a body, consisting of a certain determinate number of particles in some one point of time, suppose the point of death; what hinders, but that the very same numerical particles may be again united to the soul at the last day, and so continue unchanged, and without succession to all eternity? For the nature of human bodies *here* does not determine their nature after the resurrection. So that he needed not on this account, to have set aside all sameness; but that, which you say, *never was in nature*, since whatever the sameness of human bodies consists in *here*, they may have a real mathematical identity at the *resurrection*. Nor will his notion of identity any better serve to introduce a belief, that a new body may be united to the soul at the last day, nay much less than your *vulgar sameness*, which would rather *of course* introduce a new body, since it is impossible, as I have shewn, that the human body can have a *vulgar sameness* at the resurrection.

All, therefore, that you have here laid to Mr. Locke's charge, being without foundation; I need not go about to prove, *that the sense of your words runs equal to it all*, to shew an agreement betwixt you; since to avoid that agreement, you have run his words far beyond his meaning.

However, to make some amends for not owning an agreement with him, where there is no difference, you have all on a sudden found out, that you have no *contest* with him, where there is a real difference.

"Strictly

"Strictly speaking, *say you*, I have no contest with Mr. Locke, about the sameness of bodies: I differ from him without disputing with him, and establish a sameness, which I think proper to the sense of Scripture, without offering any thing to destroy his. And therefore if any thing falls from Mr. Locke, which seems sometimes to you to agree with my sense of same body, you ought not to imagine, that I have any contest with him about sameness, but that force of truth compelled him now and then to say the same as I do, tho' he would acknowledge no identity but his own."

What you here mean about Mr. Locke's seeming sometimes to agree with your sense of *same body*, and of your having no contest with him about sameness, I profess, I do not apprehend. He agrees with you, as I have often said, not in your sense of *same body*, but in your sense of the *resurrection body*. And I have indeed all along imagined, that both in your Sermon, and in this defence, you have not only differed from, but very much contested with, him about the *sameness of bodies*. I did really imagine, that when you said you could *by no means* agree to Mr. Locke's notion of the identity of the resurrection body, you really designed to contend against him, that it is not necessary to the *identity* of the resurrection body, that it consist of the same numerical particles. I did likewise imagine, that you offered as much as you could to destroy his notion of the identity of body, when you so frequently speak of it, as no where existing but in idea, calling it *his own*, the *ideal identity*, saying, that *it never was in nature*, &c. But it seems I ought not to imagine any thing of all this; the great displeasure you have shewn against Mr. Locke's mathematical identity, and all the hard words you have given him upon it, is, it seems, only *differing from*; you have at last no contest with him about *sameness*. Which I believe your readers will find it very difficult to imagine.

However, if you do not contend, you go on in asserting, "That while he acknowledges no sameness of bodies but his own, and thereby leaves not only room to suppose, but many clear intimations, that the dead may be raised with new bodies, which are neither the same in his own, nor in any other sense, this is not a dispute merely about words, as I haughtily think: an article of faith is concerned in it."

With all submission, Sir, whatever is concerned in it, I humbly conceive Mr. Locke is not, for he has no where said, that the dead *shall*, or that they probably *may*, be raised with entirely new bodies: and if this is not a dispute about *words*, it is about *supposes* and conjectures of *intimations*, which might never be intended. The strongest intimation you can possibly alledge from Mr. Locke, amounts to nothing more, than that it is not *absolutely necessary* to the raising of the same person, or the same man, that the very *same body* should be raised; by which he always means the same numerical particles. And let any impartial reader judge (for I must now appeal from you) whether this is a sufficient ground for you "to declare, that this management of Mr. Locke's tends to subvert the faith, and is a sly and artificial denial of the article of the resurrection. And such a denial you think deserves all the exclamations you have bestowed upon it."

Exclaim as much as you please, Sir, against a *denial of the article of the resurrection*. But when a man constantly maintains the doctrine of the resurrection to be a necessary article of faith, which you know Mr. Locke does, and only denies some particular circumstance of it to be so, such exclamations upon it are rash and injurious: And from you I indeed thought them the more unjustifiable, because you yourself so zealously contend, that the resurrection of *the same numerical particles* is not an article of faith. But I beg your pardon for the *impertinence*,

impertinence, as you civilly call it; and perhaps it was a little impertinent, to put you in mind of so plain a truth, as that you as much deny the resurrection of the same body, in Mr. Locke's sense of same body, even as he does; since it was such a truth, as you had no reason to desire should be taken notice of on this occasion.

But to avoid the reproach of so palpable an injustice, as exclaiming against a man, for what yourself no less affirm than he, you tell me, "It is gross prevarication to say, that Mr. Locke, by denying the resurrection of the same body, means only to deny, that the body shall be raised with the same numerical particles: For he sometimes means, that the dead shall be raised by having their souls united to new bodies, and therefore in no sense the same with the old. And this, you again say, I know well enough."

I know the contrary so well, Sir, that if I would use the same freedom of language that you do, I should tell you, that, notwithstanding your frequent repetition of this charge, it is a gross falsehood. Nor is it any prevarication to say, as I have often done, that Mr. Locke does not mean *so much* as to deny, that the body shall be raised with the same numerical particles: he *by no means denies the truth* of this, tho' he thinks it not so plainly revealed, as to be an article of faith. Neither does he at any time say or mean, that *the dead shall be raised by having their souls united to new bodies*, or intimate the least inclination to believe, that they shall be so raised. For which I appeal to every unprejudiced and judicious reader, who attends to the occasion, use, and obvious design of all that Mr. Locke says on this subject, throughout that controversy betwixt him and the Bishop; having already shewn, that the particular places you refer to, are nothing at all to that purpose: Nor is any thing you have said in this section, any more to the purpose,

purpose, of shewing that your difference with Mr. *Locke* is not merely about words,

S E C T. V.

Dr. Holdsworth's identity different from the Bishop of Worcester's.

I had observed, that the doctrine of the resurrection of the *same body* was maintained in such different senses, by the several assertors of it, that I was at a loss to know, in which of the senses it is an *article of faith*; and urged, that if Mr. *Locke* had owned it in your sense of *same body*, he could not have passed for orthodox with the Bishop of *Worcester*. To which you answer, "that you think this is beyond my skill to be sure of. For how can I tell, whether the Bishop might not have approved of an opinion so natural, &c." Really, Sir, I pretend not to tell how successful you might have been in bringing the Bishop over to your notion; but this I am sure of, that so long as he continued in the opinion he was of, when he engaged in that controversy, Mr. *Locke* could not have passed for orthodox with him, by owning your faith; for he very zealously maintained, that the resurrection body must be composed of *no other* particles, than what had been formerly united to the soul; and pretends to prove it too from Scripture. It was, as you know, in opposition to this, that Mr. *Locke*^m proposed the very *same* notion with yours (tho' not under the term *same body*) as most agreeable to reason, and the constitution of the body *here*, and not inconsistent with Scripture. How this relished with the Bishop, I confess, I cannot tell, because he never answered that letter. But it is sufficient for my purpose, that he did, at that time, insist on a different sense from yours.

But you say, "Tho' the Bishop does insist, that the body shall be restored out of the *same* particles,

^m 3d Letter.

" which

" which have been formerly united to the soul and
 " no other; yet a body so restored cannot be called
 " mathematically and precisely the *same* with that
 " which lived, that is, in Mr. *Locke*'s sense of *same-*
 " ness; but in your sense, a vulgar and unphiloso-
 " phical it may; and therefore if Mr. *Locke* had
 " been of the faith, which you defend, the Bishop
 " and he had not been so far asunder as I imagine."

In my apprehension, Sir, a body consisting of the *same* particles, which had been at some one time united to the soul, and no other, is the *same* body with that, which then lived, in the strictest sense possible. But supposing the Bishop's resurrection body could not be called, mathematically and precisely, the *same* with that, which lived; this would make no other agreement betwixt him, and you, but only a *verbal* one, an agreement in calling a body *the same*, which has not a mathematical sameness; but none at all in your notions of the *resurrection body*; unless to have *some other* particles mixed with the old, and to have *no other* particles mixed with them, be one and the *same* notion. It is most certain, that if Mr. *Locke* had owned the resurrection of the *same body* in your sense, the Bishop and he would have been agreed in *terms*, as no doubt all the assertors of that doctrine are, whether by the term *same body* they mean a mathematical sameness, a vulgar sameness, or what other kind of sameness you will please to call the Bishop's. But this agreement in the *term* does not hinder them from being as far asunder in their *sense*, as I have not only *imagined*, but must maintain they are.

S E C T. VI.

The Doctor's identity different from the ideas of identity commonly received.

I had farther urged, that if Mr. *Locke* had owned the resurrection of the *same body* in your *sense*, his faith

faith would least of all have stood approved to those *well-meaning men, whose learning, and labours in explaining the difficulties of the resurrection*, you had in your Sermon taxed with *impertinence*; who had raised the *dust* you there complain of, by endeavouring to bring together, all the scattered particles, that had ever, in the whole compass of a man's life, been united to his soul. By the way, Sir, it seems either you or I very ill understand raillery, that the design of mine could be so much mistaken. I do, I assure you, very seriously commend the sincerity and integrity of those good people; and all the little innocent raillery there intended was upon the ingenuity of some latter explainers, who, whilst they profess to believe the resurrection of the same body, explain the sameness of it quite away; which those *well-meaning men* did not think themselves at liberty to do. But you tell me, "That a doctrine so agreeable as yours to their own explanations of the resurrection, and which only differs from theirs, by being more express and clear, could not but have been very acceptable to them." I will not dispute with you, Sir, how successful you might have proved in bringing all the world over to your notion, if you could have proposed it to our forefathers: but it must be a stronger *charm* than that, by which you suppose me *bound over body and soul to Mr. Locke*, that can make me imagine your sense of the resurrection body *at all agreeable* to the explanations of those learned men we have been speaking of; or that it only differs from theirs by being *more express*: for as matters appear to me without a *charm*, theirs is more express than yours, and differs from it as much as the *whole* does from a *part*.

Nor can all your *rebetorick* persuade me, that the three distinct senses I mentioned *are really but one*; or "that the Bishop of Worcester, and all other learned men and catholic Christians, have as well as you, ever agreed, that the resurrection body is
" the

" the same; *not* by having the same precise number of particles, but by such an identity of parts and particles, as is sufficient to denominate it the same now, in the common opinion of men." Surely, Sir, *the labours of those learned men* you censured, in explaining the difficulties of the resurrection in their sense of it, as well as the whole tenor of the Bishop's arguments, plainly shew, that they thought the resurrection body could be no otherwise the same, than by *having all the same precise particles*, or *no other*, than what had been at some one time united to the soul: whereas you inform us, that there is no necessity of *all* or of *no other* particles to make the same body; which is allowed to be an easier way of explaining it. But that all those other learned men agree with you in *this sense*, requires (if not an uncommon assurance to affirm) a larger share of complaisance to grant, than I can at present command. For without being *bound over to Mr. Locke*, as you speak, by any other *charm* than that of common sense, and plain reason, I cannot for my life but imagine, that *all* the particles, and *not all* the particles, and that *no other* particles, and *some other* particles, are distinct and even *contrary* senses; and that the Bishop and those other learned men and catholic Christians were far enough from agreeing in your sense, a sense, which they so expressly disown.

And therefore I had reason to say, that if we are at liberty to understand the resurrection of the same body in any of the forementioned senses, or not to determine about either of them, it is plainly the *word*, and not the *thing*, that is made an article of faith. Nor am I ashamed of the *logic*, by which I infer from *thence*, that if another should enlarge the meaning of the term *same body* beyond what you have done, and maintain, it is not necessary to the sameness of the resurrection body, that it should consist of *any* of the same particles, that belonged to the old body; but that whatever particles shall then
be

be vitally united to the soul, will make it as much the same, as the body of a man at threescore is the same with that, which he had when he was born, when perhaps it has not any of the same particles; such a one, I say, must be allowed a very good believer of your article of faith. A consequence, which I drew, not from your having *enlarged the meaning* of the term same body (as you represent it, to make yourself merry with the argument) but from the stress being laid upon that *term*, in whatever sense it is understood, or whether in any determinate sense at all; so that it seems sufficient, if a man will but acknowledge the resurrection of the *same body*, whatever he means, or whether he means any thing by it, or not.

S E C T. VII.

His identity of no advantage in opposition to Mr. Locke.

I do indeed, Sir, grant, that your way of explaining the *sameness* of the resurrection body does deliver us from many difficulties raised about it; and will further assure you, that I have no objection against your account of the resurrection body; tho' I can neither allow you, that all other learned men *have ever agreed* in your notion of it; nor that your resurrection body will *have such a sameness, as men attribute to their bodies here*; nor that the resurrection of the *same body is an article of faith*: For I may believe your sense of the resurrection to be true, nay and to be an article of faith too, without acknowledging any one of those propositions.

But how favourable soever I am inclined to be to your scheme of the resurrection, I am never a whit the nearer finding out how it *delivers us from Mr. Locke's scheme* (as you call it) more than any other way of explaining it would do. I wish however you had better cleared your *conscience* of what I had *badly laid upon it*, than by repeating the injurious charge

charge of *secret infidelity*, upon an ill-founded suspicion from false allegations.

Mr. *Locke's scepticism* (which your way of explaining, was to deliver us from) I had said went no further, than not pretending to determine of what particles the resurrection body shall be composed; and being founded on the silence of Scripture, as to that point, I did not, nor do I yet see, how *your way*, or any way of explaining the sameness of the resurrection body, can *deliver us from it*. To this you answer by repeating the old charge, "That Mr. *Locke's scepticism*, or uncertainty of opinion, is manifest, not because he does not determine of what particles, &c. but because he speaks of the resurrection in such general words, as if men were to be raised from the dead, without having any body raised. Or, as if a new body given were a body raised. Or, that if the same persons appear before the judgment-seat of *Christ*, to answer for what they have done in their bodies, this would be as properly a resurrection, as if the dead were raised in their old bodies; tho', according to him, men are persons only by their souls. This, *you say*, is Mr. *Locke's scepticism*, concerning the resurrection; and you desire any impartial *Christian* to judge, whether a man, who speaks so loosely and uncertainly of this article of faith, may not be justly suspected really not to believe it at all, or to be a secret infidel in this respect.

But what would any *impartial Christian judge*, if he should find, that the facts, upon which you would ground this suspicion of *secret infidelity*, are all mistaken, or entirely misrepresented? And this is really the case. Two of the places you quote for this loose, and uncertain way of speaking, are the same, to which you before referred, to shew, that Mr. *Locke* speaks of the resurrection body as of a *new one*, and

which I have made appear were nothing to that purpose; and the other, which you quote here, I must now tell you, is to a quite *contrary* purpose. He is there defending his idea of *personal identity*, from being inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, and is so far from insinuating, *That if the same persons appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, it would be as proper a resurrection, as if the dead were raised in their old bodies*, that he uses those words of Scripture, which you have taken from thence to shew, that if the Bishop had drawn a right consequence from some supposed words of his *Essay*, he had not only said nothing *against* the resurrection of the *same body*, but had said more *for* it than his Lordship. It is indeed an argument only upon a mistake of the Bishop's. But it would have been quite inconsistent with his purpose, there to have spoke (nor does he any where else speak) as if the dead were to be raised *without having any body raised; or as if the appearance of the same persons at the judgment-seat of Christ would be properly a resurrection*. He says indeed in one of the places you refer to, that, *If the same man rise who was dead, it may very properly be called the resurrection of the dead*. But, whatever persons are, *men*, according to him, are not *men* only by their souls: the resurrection of the *same man* must with him necessarily imply a *body raised*. In short, Sir, he no where speaks with the least uncertainty of any thing, but of what precise particles the resurrection body will be composed; nor has given any manner of ground to *suspect*, that he did not sincerely and fully believe the article of the resurrection. And for this I could venture to appeal, not only to any *impartial Christian*, who has read Mr. Locke, with an attention to his view and aim in the matter he was handling; but even to any one a degree less *partial*, or *prejudiced*, than Dr.

Holdsworth. He perhaps does not see the delusion of culling out some particular sentences of an author, without any regard to the scope and design of the argument he is upon; or the unfairness of quoting them to a quite different purpose, which may give them the appearance of a sense, even *contrary* to that, which they bear in the place, where they stand. Prejudiced people always see things in a wrong light.

But supposing Mr. Locke to have spoke ever so *loosely and uncertainly* of the resurrection of the body, I cannot still find out, how your way of explaining the sameness of it, can deliver us from this *scepticism*. "How? cry you, I defy even yourself to say, that a man will be left under these uncertainties, doubts, and suspicions, who receives the faith of the resurrection of the same body, as it is now by me stated." Far be it from me, Sir, to say, that a man, who firmly believes the resurrection of the same body, as you have stated it, will be left in any doubts about it. But I suppose this is not a privilege peculiar to your way of explaining the sameness of the resurrection body. Will not those, *who receive that faith* under any other notion of it, who believe, that their bodies shall be raised with *all* the particles they ever had, or with *no other* than they at some one time consisted of here, be equally secure from doubts and uncertainties about it? And pray what advantage will either of them have of those, who believing steadfastly, that they themselves, the very *same men*, shall be raised from the dead at the last day, are satisfied with that, which the Scriptures have plainly revealed, thinking it of no importance more precisely to determine, *with what bodies they shall come?* If revelation has not delivered us from this *scepticism*, it seems no great matter, whether we are delivered from it, or not.

The second thing, which your way of explaining the resurrection body was to deliver us from, you called

called Mr. *Locke's* confounding identity and personality; which I, not understanding, could say nothing to; for it was not easy to guess your meaning to be, as you have now explained it: "The mischievous consequences, and confusions, of his applying his philosophical ideas of identity, and personality, to the resurrection. For thereby, *you say*, he endeavours to prove, not only that the resurrection of the same body is impossible to be maintained, but also, that the resurrection of persons, that is the appearance of souls, at the tribunal of *Christ*, in another life, is sufficient. And from these consequences, and confusions, the belief of the resurrection of the same body, in yours and the common sense of mankind, sets us clear."

No doubt, Sir; and so will the belief of it do, in any other sense. There is no occasion for your assistance to deliver us from disorders, which never had a being, however you come to dream of them. For that Mr. *Locke* did ever make the least attempt to prove, either that the resurrection of the same body is impossible to be maintained; or that the appearance of souls, at the tribunal of *Christ*, is sufficient; is, I am sure, impossible for you to prove; nor have you any ground for the assertion. So far is he from any such endeavour, that on several occasions he professes, as has been before observed, "That he by no means denies the resurrection of the same body; that God may, if he pleases, give to every one, at the last day, a body consisting of the same particles, which were formerly united to his soul. That he questions not, that the dead shall be raised with bodies." And in his *Essay*, "Thus we may conceive the same person at the resurrection, tho' in a body [he does not say, without a body] not exactly in parts, or make, the same." I give you here his own words. But I defy you to produce any one passage, where he asserts, or insinuates, much less endeavours to prove, that the resurrection

resurrection of the same body is impossible to be maintained; or that the appearance of souls at the tribunal of *Christ* is sufficient. So that there is no need of your explanation to set us clear from consequences, and confusions, with which we were never incumbered.

The last thing we were to be cleared from, is, Mr. *Locke's* unknown resurrection of persons: An expression I did not remember he had used. But you now quote a page in his third letter to the Bishop, where he several times says, that the same persons shall be raised, tho' it seems, as you say, "it escaped my diligent search. Now this new language, *you tell me*, would be strange in any man: but out of Mr. *Locke's* mouth, who would not allow any doctrine to be revealed in Scripture, that is not there in express words, it would be very unaccountable, if it were not plain, that he had a turn to serve by it, which was to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body."

I assure you, Sir, with the most diligent search I am capable of, I should never have been able to find any new or strange language in that page; nor could in the least have suspected, that the resurrection of the same body was intended to be set aside, or any other turn to be served by it; and therefore did not particularly advert to that expression. But certainly, Sir, this page, upon a cooler review, must make you ashamed of having quoted an author, with so little regard to his meaning, or to the subject and argument he is upon. It is page 205, the same, which you referred to just before, and which, as I told you on that occasion, is to a quite contrary purpose to that, for which you have cited it, or would here deduce from it. The subject he was upon, being to defend his idea of personal identity, from having any thing in it inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, he could not avoid speaking of the same persons being raised,

without any intention of introducing a *new language*. How absurd is it to suppose he uses that expression to serve the *turn* by it you pretend, of setting aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body, when he was labouring to prove, that there was nothing in his notions contrary to that doctrine? nay, when it is plain he uses the expression only to shew, that, according to the Bishop's own account of his sense, he was so far from having said any thing inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body, that he had proved it to a demonstration: for (as the Bishop understood him) if the same persons are raised, they must have *the same bodies*; upon which he adds, *and there can be nothing plainer, than that in the Scripture it is revealed, that the same persons shall be raised*. This, you see, is not said, to set aside the belief of the resurrection of the same body, but for an argument to his adversary, that he had really proved it.

Why this should be thought *strange language* in any man, I confess I do not see. As to Mr. Locke, he was indeed scrupulous of delivering any thing for *Scripture*, which was not there in *express words*: but I dare answer for him, he would not have denied any doctrine to be revealed in *Scripture*, which could be as plainly deduced from it as this, that *the same persons shall be raised*. Nor can this be strange language to any man, who reads there, *that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, &c.* or, who repeats in his creed, *that all men shall rise again with their bodies, and shall give account for their own works*. For I suppose no one questions, that those *men who are to rise*, and *we*, who are to appear before the judgment of *Christ*, are *persons*; or, that those, who are to give an account of their *own works*, and to receive according to what they have

have done in *their bodies*, must be the *same persons* who did those works; for they are expressly distinguished from their bodies. How then should it be *strange* for any man to express in words, what every one must understand, when he reads those passages? Or rather, is it not the same thing to say, that *all men* shall rise again, which is the language of the creed, and that *all persons* shall rise again? For *men* and *persons* in common use, and *Scripture language*, are synonymous terms.

I beg you, therefore, Sir, to compound with Mr. Locke upon this article; and since they are not inconsistent, nor any way tend to exclude each other, if you will not endeavour to deliver us from *his resurrection of persons*, I will give you my word, no attempt shall be made by it, to *set aside the resurrection of your same body*.

CHAP. V.

Concerning the passages of Scripture produced by Dr. Holdsworth, for the resurrection of the same body.

SECT. I.

I Had said in my letter, that it seemed a sufficient indication, that the *Scripture* had declared nothing particular about the doctrine of the resurrection of the same body, that the assertors of it have understood *the words* in different senses. By which, you suppose, I mean *the words of Scripture*; upon which you tell me, "that it is my misfortune to be mistaken, when I say, that I had shewed this." It would have been an unlucky mistake, indeed, Sir, to have imagined I had shewn a thing, which I had not so much as attempted to shew. But why would you suppose I meant *the words of Scripture*?

Was not the words *same body* a more obvious sense, though I did not repeat them? since I had just before been shewing, that the words *same body* were understood in different senses, but had not pretended to shew any such thing about *the words of Scripture*. So that the mistake happens to fall on your side; and whilst you are needlessly declaiming about interpreters, who believe the same doctrines, though they differ very often in explaining the words, which contain them; you have left my objection in full force; for it is the doctrine itself being differently explained, and *not the words of Scripture that contain it*, upon which my argument is founded.

For this reason, and because there is little real difference between Mr. *Locke's* meaning and yours, though you *presume you have made this appear to be another great mistake in me*; I told you, the contest appeared to be of very little importance. Whether it is you or I, that are mistaken in this matter, must appear by the agreement, which ^p I shewed there was between Mr. *Locke's* words and yours, and the little force there is in all ^q you have offered to take off from the reality of that agreement.

"However, you thank me, that I say now, I should not think it necessary to go along with you any farther, if it were not in defence of my great man: for at first I talked that love of truth, and concern for the interests of religion, engaged me to write; but now these are little things in comparison of my desire to support the reputation of Mr. *Locke*." No such matter, Sir; nor do I there contradict what I had at first said; a concern for truth and religion are still my motives to defend that *truly great man*. The less importance any controverted doctrine is of, or if the dis-

^p In my Letter, p. 34.

^q Reply, ch. iv. sect. iv.

pute

pute is merely about *words*, as I have shewed yours with Mr. *Locke* to be; the more truth and religion suffer by imposing it as an article of faith; and charging any one with *want of truth and modesty* for nor finding in Scripture, what is not particularly and plainly delivered there. I acquit you, therefore, of your *thanks*, and go along with you on account of this injurious treatment of Mr. *Locke*, with the same view, with which I at first professed to engage in his defence; and so much the rather, as the matter itself in contest between you, and upon which you so severely exclaim against him, appears of the less importance; because the injury done to truth and religion through him is for that very reason the greater, by making it *heresy* to speak doubtfully of doubtful things; or to be undetermined about some circumstantial of a doctrine not clearly revealed in Scripture; or not to perceive it to be delivered in a text, which may without violence bear a quite different sense.

Nothing more remains to be taken notice of in this section, but what you say concerning your not being obliged by the rule you had given in your Sermon, to confine yourself in speaking of the doctrine of the resurrection to the very words and expressions of Scripture: "Nay, *say you*, except my words differ from those of the Scripture, how can it be possible for me to explain the sense of them? Since where words are of general or uncertain meaning, it is impossible, that the repetition of them, as they stand, should explain them."

Very true, Sir, and where the words of Scripture want to be explained, words of the *same import*, that are plainer and better understood, if such can be found, may be useful to explain the true sense of them. But to give words of a *general or uncertain meaning*, a particular and determinate sense, is not to explain, but to enlarge the Scripture. If in

this doctrine of the resurrection, as it is "entirely matter of faith and revelation, the words and expressions of Scripture are, *as you say*, to direct and govern ours;" then our expressions ought to be general, as those of Scripture are: at least, if we express a more particular sense, it ought not to be delivered as the revelation itself, but as the opinions and conjectures of men concerning it. And you would certainly have better observed your own rule, if you had kept within that generality, or not imposed your sense as a doctrine of faith, though some passages of Scripture should, as you express it, lead us to think, that the *same bodies* shall rise again; which I now proceed with you to examine.

S E C T. II.

Reply to the defence of the application of the first text, produced in the Sermon for the resurrection of the same body. Rom. viii.

I do indeed, Sir, as you observe, think it very hard, and with great reason, that Mr. Locke should be charged with want of truth and modesty, for saying, *that there is no such expression in Scripture, as the resurrection of the body, where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of*, unless you had produced a text, where those very words are used, and the general resurrection undeniably spoken of. "Why so? say you. Was it not the body, which was the subject of dispute? And is it not said here, that the bodies shall be quickened? A word of the same import as raised,—it is the very same sense, and that is as bad for you as the same words." Quite otherwise, Sir; the subject of dispute was not the body, but that expression concerning it; and quickened may not be of the same import with raised, here, where the general resurrection is not certainly spoken of,

of, which you know is at least a matter of debate. I apprehend well enough, that in some cases, where the sense is the same, it is no great matter, whether the words are so or not: but in the case before us, the very words were chiefly to be attended to; because Mr. Locke was not contending, that the resurrection of the body *is not to be found in Scripture*, as you would have it thought; but only that the expressions concerning it were not such, as could make us think, that the holy spirit intended to deliver it as an article of faith, that the very same shall be raised. To which end alone he observes, that the resurrection of the *same body* is not mentioned in Scripture; and what is remarkable in the case, says he, *there is no such expression, as the resurrection of the body.*" The remark is of that particular expression; and why you change the phrase, both in your Sermon, and in the Defence (even where you pretend to repeat the words, as cited by me) you best know; but in both places, instead of *there is no such expression*, you have put, the resurrection of the body *is not mentioned in Scripture*; which perhaps better served your turn, in producing texts, as if contrary to what he had said, though that expression was not in them, of which alone he affirmed, that it was not in the Scripture, where the general resurrection is spoken of.

Besides producing a text with that very expression, I required likewise, that it should be where the general resurrection is undeniably, by which I meant so certainly or plainly spoken of, that no sincere and intelligent Christian could from the text itself, or the design and scope of the author, have any probable grounds to deny that sense, or to understand it in any other. And it was not unreasonable, much less ridiculous to require this; for nothing short of this can support the charge of gross and barefaced falsehood, as you now express yourself.

yourself. Nay I must farther say, that (if it was not ridiculous) it was very unfair in you, to urge a text in justification of that charge, which you knew Mr. *Locke* had offered several reasons to prove, is not to be understood of the resurrection at the last day.

But “when we deny that sense of the text, you tell me, we are able to give it no other meaning than a figurative; and therefore (whatever I may think) you do Mr. *Locke* no injustice in saying, that he does violence to the words, since a figured sense of the words is manifest violence, where the first and simple sense will stand good, and the secondary is not necessary or required.”

By your leave, Sir, a figurative sense of the words is not *manifest violence*, when such probable reasons are given for that sense, taken from the design of the author, or arising from the text itself, as may satisfy the judgment of a sincere enquirer. And such reasons I told you in my letter, and you know very well, Mr. *Locke* has given, why that passage of St. *Paul* is not to be understood of the resurrection at the last day, but of *quickening our mortal bodies here*, so as to make them assistant to a life of righteousness. And this should have been sufficient to secure him against that injurious charge of having, *without regard to truth or modesty*, violently thrown the words into a figurative sense, even though the sense, in which you understand them, should be the right; for a man may have a sincere regard to *truth*, who upon probable grounds mistakes it. And therefore so gross an imputation will still be unjust, though it should appear, that *the first and simple sense of that passage will stand good*. Your proofs of which, *first in general, and secondly more particularly, and at large*, we are now to consider.

Your first general proof, that those words of St. *Paul*, Rom. viii. 11. *shall quicken your mortal bodies*, are

are to be understood of the literal resurrection at the last day, is, that “supposing them to have a “metaphorical meaning, the metaphor must be “borrowed from the resurrection, according to the “Scripture notion of it; and if bodies have no “concern in the literal resurrection, they would “never have been named in the figurative resurrection.” We grant it. And what then? Will it follow, that because a metaphor is borrowed from the literal sense, therefore it cannot have a metaphorical sense? What fine logic is this! But if it does not prove the thing, that was to be proved, it is no matter for that, if it prove something else, though it be what Mr. *Locke* has never disputed. We may find, it seems, by this metaphor, “that it “is the true sense of Scripture, that the bodies of “men are to be raised at the last day; and therefore we are told, it would be but a small point “gained to Mr. *Locke*’s cause, should it appear, “that the resurrection of the body is not expressly “mentioned in Scripture.”

As small a point as it is, Sir, it is all, that Mr. *Locke*’s cause requires, who never express the least doubt, that the bodies of men are to be raised at the last day; though all your argument here is founded upon that fundamental mistake, which you carry through all this controversy, of supposing him to deny, that the *resurrection of the body* is to be found in, or can be proved from Scripture, barely from his having occasionally remarked, that there is no such *expression* there.

But that it was not with any design in prejudice of that doctrine (as you insinuate) that in his *Comment* he denies, that the text we are upon, can be understood of the resurrection at the last day, is evident from his having, in that very *Comment* upon this passage, asserted, *that God will*

certainly, at the last day, raise the bodies of all men, the wicked, as well as the righteous. For he could not intend by the interpretation of a text, to destroy a doctrine, which he maintains in the comment upon it; and which is one of his arguments, why that text cannot be meant of the general resurrection, because it is a promise to those only, who have the *spirit of Christ*; whereas the bodies of all men are to be raised. But it has often happened, unluckily for your purpose, that you have urged Mr. *Locke's* interpretation of some particular texts, as a proof, that he denied certain doctrines, when he has asserted those very doctrines, in his notes upon those very texts; as I have had occasion to observe more than once, in the first part of his vindication.

In your second general proof, that the text we are upon, must belong to the resurrection at the last day, you argue, "that the life of righteousness was no way intended by the Apostle here, seems to be clear, because one cannot suppose that, without concluding, that the *Roman* converts were yet dead in their sins. For quickening in this place is promised to them as a happiness future; and between being *dead in sins*, and *quickened unto righteousness*, there is, you think, no possible medium." You afterwards proceed to shew, from several passages in this Epistle, that the persons, to whom it was addressed, "were not dead in their sins;" and since they were already quickened to a life of righteousness, you conclude, "that the quickening promised to the *Roman* converts in this passage, *Rom. viii. 11.* was the resurrection of their bodies at the last day." This is, in short, the sum of your argument. To which I crave leave to answer:

That it is founded on a mistake of the nature of the *quickenings*, contended for in this place. We readily grant, that the persons, to whom St. *Paul* writes

writes this Epistle, were not at that time dead in their sins; they had received the faith of Christ, had been buried with him by baptism, and might reckon themselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God. But notwithstanding that they were thus renewed in the spirit of their mind, they continued still liable to be drawn into the death of sin, by the power and prevalency of their carnal appetites, that law of the members, which is continually warring against the law of the mind; and therefore the Apostle, in ch. vi. immediately after he had allowed them to account themselves alive unto God, exhorts them not to let sin reign in their mortal bodies, nor to yield their members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin. And in ch. vii. after he had been representing the great prevalency of that law of the members in the unregenerate, he encourages them with the assurance, that they might be delivered from this body of death, through Jesus Christ our Lord; and in this ch. viii. § 11. with a promise to those, who were spiritually minded, who had subjected their minds to the law of God, to quicken also their mortal bodies, by his spirit that dwelt in them, so as to make them assistant to the life of righteousness, that they might be enabled, as those who were alive from the dead, to yield their members instruments of righteousness unto God.

I appeal to you, Sir, whether the passage in debate, understood in this sense, does not receive great light from those other places in the two preceding chapters. And this takes off all the absurdity, which you suppose, of quickening men to a life of righteousness, who already have that life. For it is not, you see, a quickening of the spiritual part, which was before alive unto God; but of that gross material part, which St. *Paul* frequently speaks of, as the seat and root of the carnal appetites: and a promise to enliven those mortal bodies, by the same power, which raised the body of Christ from the dead,

dead, so that they should be no longer *hindrances*, but *helps* to them in the life of righteousness, seems greatly consonant to the scope and tendency of this, and the foregoing chapters. In the next verse, it is made a consequence of this promise, that they *were not debtors*, or were under no obligation *to live after the flesh*. And in ver. 13. there is a promise to them of a future life, *if ye through the spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live*; which has a plain reference to that promise in ver. 11. of quickening their mortal bodies, by the spirit, which dwelt in them, as what alone could enable them *to mortify the deeds of the body*. Nor does it seem at all likely, that the Apostle should interrupt his discourse, of *walking not after the flesh but after the spirit*, which he goes on with in ver. 12. to promise them a resurrection in ver. 11. when he was immediately after to close the whole (as he does with great beauty and strength) by a promise of the reward of eternal life.

The words understood in the sense Mr. Locke intended, as I have explained it, take off likewise your other objection; “that if when St. Paul says, *he that raised up Christ from the dead*, he speaks of the resurrection of Christ’s body, not of his soul; it seems very unlikely, that when he says *he shall quicken your mortal bodies*, he speaks not of the resurrection of their bodies, but of their souls.” Your objections, Sir, are frequently founded on a mistake of your adversary’s sense, as this plainly is: the quickening understood to be meant in this text is of the gross material part, which is a continual clog upon the spiritual life. I know no body so absurd as to have supposed, that when the Apostle says, *your mortal bodies*, he meant *your immortal souls*.

You now “enter into the consideration of the words more distinctly, that the dependance and connexion of them with what goes before, and follows after them, may be considered and understood.” And here you tell us, that after the words, (which you set down) from the sixth verse of the seventh chapter, “we may immediately subjoin those at the beginning of this eighth chapter.” But there is no reason to admit this, since they have a plainer connection with the very last verse of that chapter, interpreted according to the reading of the vulgar *Latin*, and of some *Greek* manuscripts; *the grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord*. And the question in the immediately preceding verse seems to require this reading, as a proper and full answer to it; *Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God through Jesus Christ our Lord*. After which very naturally follows, the first verse of the eighth chapter: *there is therefore now no condemnation to them, which are in Christ Jesus*. But on what account, you introduced this dispute, I know not; it being, I think, of no importance towards determining the sense of the 11th verse, which is our present business. I shall therefore wave it here, and proceed to some remarks on your *Paraphrase*, by which perhaps it will appear, that a man may, without being *prejudiced*, think it neither *just* nor *natural*.

TEXT.

Ver. 1. *There is therefore now no condemnation to them, which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the Flesh, but after the Spirit.*

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 1. There is therefore now no obligation upon Christians to observe the ceremonial law, and no condemnation, if they obey it not, upon condi-

PARAPHRASE.

tion, that they forsake the lusts of the flesh; and conform themselves to that purity of life, which the Gospel of *Christ* requires.

Truly Sir, at this rate of paraphrasing, *St. Paul* may be made to say what any one pleases. Is it possible for the most *unprejudiced man*, to think the first sentence of what you here give for a paraphrase, either *just or natural*? There is certainly not the least ground for it in the text, and could be inserted on no other account, than to support the supposed connection of this verse with the sixth verse of the seventh chapter; though it is a very proper deduction from the last verse of it, as I before observed. Nor is there the least appearance of its being a *return*, as you pretend, to the Apostle's former discourse, of their not being obliged to observe the ceremonial law; which he had done with at verse the 6th. At verse 7. he begins another topic, not in a digression, as you call it, but a close prosecution of the design he had all along been upon, by shewing the insufficiency of the law to deliver from sin and death, since it gave no power to overcome the carnal appetites; from the dominion of which there was no deliverance, but by the grace of God, through faith in *Jesus Christ*. With the mention of this only way to be delivered from what he had before called *the law of the members*, and *this body of death*, the seventh chapter concludes; and the beginning of the eighth goes on to assure all, who had embraced the faith of *Christ*, that they were *therefore* (because of this remedy, which the grace of God had provided) in no danger of condemnation, if they did not indulge the lusts of the flesh: not a syllable is here about *obeying the ceremonial law*. The whole discourse is closely connected, and the subject of *walking not after*

after the flesh, but *after the spirit*, pursued without interruption, as far as you have carried your paraphrase. Which I shall go on to consider only, so far as is necessary to shew, that it seems rather intended to support your own, than to give the genuine sense of *St. Paul*, by the liberties you have taken of adding, (as we have already seen) leaving out, or altering, as might best serve your purpose throughout the whole. What is most material of this kind to be here observed, is from the tenth verse, to which therefore we proceed.

TEXT.

Ver. 10. *And if Christ be in you, the body is dead, because of sin, but the spirit is life, because of righteousness.*

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 10. But if you be sincerely such (*i. e. Christians*) and are conformed to the spirit and purity of the Gospel of *Christ*; then, though your bodies suffer death, the punishment of sin; yet your spiritual part shall be happy in a blessed life for ever, as a reward of your faithful obedience.

I am persuaded, Sir, you would not have found out, either *reward or punishment* in this verse, if it had not been necessary to draw *St. Paul* from his discourse of *living after the flesh*, and *after the spirit*, of *dying to sin*, and *living to righteousness*, in order to introduce your sense of the following verse, which is the present subject of our debate. For it is plain, that the Apostle is speaking in this 10th verse, not of the *future*, but of the *present* state of those *Christians*, in whom *Christ*, or the spirit of *Christ*, dwelt: *If Christ be in you, the body is dead*, which expression is equivalent to those of *being dead to sin*, of *crucifying*

fyng the old man, and mortifying the deeds of the body, used in other places of this Epistle, particularly in the vith chapter, the first part of which will, I presume, be of greater use to explain this passage, than a paraphrase so manifestly strained from the text, and the subject the Apostle is insisting upon.

TEXT.

Ver. 11. *But if the spirit of him, that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you, he, that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies, by his spirit, that dwelleth in you.*

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 11. And since, as you are *Christians*, the blessed Spirit, who raised up your Lord *Jesus Christ* from the dead, dwelleth also in your bodies, those bodies also subject to death, and now tending to it, shall, when dead, be raised again, to possess an immortal glorious life.

Here you entirely drop the last words of this verse, *by his spirit, that dwelleth in you*, to which you have nothing, that answers, in your paraphrase: but, to make amends, there are several things in it, that have nothing in the text to answer them. And, indeed, those words were better out of the way, if we are to understand, *shall quicken your mortal bodies*, of raising their bodies, when dead. For, however the spirit of God may be concerned in raising the bodies of the dead, it cannot be conceived, that this is to be effected by virtue of the spirit's dwelling in them, *whilst living*, which the quickening, in the text, was to be. And, therefore, it seems, you thought fit not to take notice of words, which, according to your interpretation of the text, there was no use for.

But those words are of the utmost importance in the sense, which I have given of this passage, as a promise so to quicken their mortal bodies, that they might

might be enabled to yield their members, as living instruments to righteousness; for this could only be effected by the dwelling of the spirit of God in them: which whoever considers, and compares this with the two preceding and two following verses, and with the other places referred to above, will, I doubt not, find a beauty and harmony in this way of explaining it, which is quite lost in the other. Besides that in your way, the Apostle is guilty of an unusual tautology, promising them the reward of a future life, no less than three times in the compass of four verses, in the 10th, 11th, and 13th, which, if the sense I am contending for be admitted, is only done at the close of this discourse, in v 13. And this seems no inconsiderable objection to your way of interpreting that passage. But to go on:

TEXT.

Ver. 12. *Therefore, brethren, we are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh;*

PARAPHRASE.

Ver. 12. Wherefore, *Christian brethren*, as you have any concern for the eternal welfare, both of your souls and bodies, remember these obligations to forsake all habits of sin and sensual lusts.

Ver. 13. *For if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die; but if ye, through the spirit, do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.*

Ver. 13. And that, if ye live under the dominion of the law, which forbids all sin, but assists you to subdue none, and indulge in all the sins, which that law forbids,

you must certainly bring death and destruction upon yourselves: but if, by the assistance of the spirit of grace, ye conform your lives to the purity of the Gospel, ye shall, both in body and soul, obtain and enjoy a never ending life.

I believe, it would be difficult for any one to give a reason, why, *to live after the flesh*, should signify, in the 12th verse, indulging *habits of sin and sensual lusts*; and, in the 13th verse, should mean *living under the dominion of the law*, as you there turn that phrase. For though, *being in the flesh*, is sometimes used by the Apostle in this last sense; yet certain it is, that in this place, whatever the sense of the phrase is, it must be the same in both verses, the one being consequential to the other; which, I think, nothing can make more plain, than setting them together. *We are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh; for, if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.* If, in the first of these sentences we are to understand, *the habits of sin and sensual lusts*, as you interpret it, there is not the least ground, from the text, for giving a different sense to the same words immediately following them. But it might be of use for your purpose, that the Apostle should not seem to be steadily pursuing the same subject; and so, the danger of living *under the dominion of the law* must be brought in here, though he had done with that point long before. Your bringing in too the *eternal welfare*, and the *never ending life of the body*, in these two verses, could only be thought on, to make a seeming relation in them, to that resurrection of the body in the 11th verse, which you would, at any rate, support; for there is not one word, that regards the future state of the *body*, in either of them. May it not, likewise, be supposed, that if some turn had not been to be served, these words, *if ye — do mortify the deeds of the body*, in the 13th verse, would not have been explained by, *if ye conform your lives to the purity of the Gospel?* but rather by, *if ye deny, or subdue your sensual lusts, or carnal appetites*; which certainly answers much better to the phrase and sense of the text. But that phrase has, perhaps, too near a relation

lation to the promise, in the 11th verse, of *quicken- ing their mortal bodies*, as understood in Mr. *Locke's* sense; and, therefore, it might be convenient to lose sight of it, lest it should give some light to that passage. And, indeed, your whole paraphrase is so affectedly distant from the turn of thought, and manner of expression, of St. *Paul*, that one may easily guess whose sense it was calculated to deliver.

But it is time now to quit a point, that required not so long a debate, as you have run it into. As for what you have urged afterwards, against understanding the words under enquiry, in a figurative sense; I believe, enough has been said, in my remarks on your paraphrase, to be a full answer to it, and, therefore, I need not go over the particulars. The figurative sense is sufficiently defended for our purpose, if reasons are given for it, taken from the scope and connection of the Apostle's discourse, which Mr. *Locke* has done; and I have shewn, that your objections against it are founded on a mistake of his sense; and your own chiefly supported by a paraphrase, manifestly strained to serve that purpose; as any attentive reader may observe, in more places than I have marked. Let but yours be compared with Mr. *Locke's* paraphrase on this viiith chapter to the *Romans*, and, I dare answer for it, no unbiassed judge will find any thing in *his*, like those deviations from the text, which I have pointed to in *yours*; nor the least appearance of *straining St. Paul to serve a turn*, notwithstanding your groundless reproach.

I think it needless, likewise, to examine your large animadversions, upon the reasons Mr. *Locke* offers in his *Comment*, why the text before us should not be understood of the resurrection of the last day; as it is of no importance at all to the doctrine itself, which is abundantly attested in Scripture, whe-

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ther this text belongs to it, or not. It suffices, that the grounds, upon which he thinks it does not, are strong enough to acquit him from the charge of want of *truth and modesty*, in that assertion, which this text was brought to confute; as, I doubt not, must appear by what has been said on the subject. And, on the other hand, your arguments for the literal sense of the words, are not so plain and convincing, even with the help of your extraordinary paraphrase, but that an humble and sincere man might still dissent from you; and, therefore, not of force enough to support so gross an imputation, from which Mr. *Locke* may well stand acquitted, whatever the true sense of this text may be, which you have so much laboured to clear.

If you was not in some measure sensible of this, it would be hard to find a reason for your endeavouring to put that fallacy upon us, which I have all along observed, of supposing Mr. *Locke* to deny, not only that there is any such *expression*, but that there is any such *thing*, as the resurrection of the body in Scripture; with which view, no doubt (for sure it cannot be by chance) you always alter his words, on this point; and here particularly at the close of this section, you justify the injurious charge complained of, *as he denies, that the resurrection of the body is in the Scripture*. But that is what Mr. *Locke* never did deny; on the contrary, he frequently asserts, from Scripture, that the bodies of men shall be raised, as we shall have occasion hereafter more expressly to shew, by which the injustice of your gross treatment of him will further appear.

S E C T. III.

Reply to the Defence of the second text produced in the Sermon, Phil. iii 21.

YOU begin your *Defence* of the application of this text, with telling me, as you had done before, "That it is unreasonable and unjust to insist upon the very words, if the doctrine and sense we contend about, is in, or may be inferred from, the Scripture." But, Sir, it is not a *doctrine* we are contending about here: these texts were brought in opposition to what Mr. *Locke* had asserted, which was not, *that the resurrection of the body was not to be found in Scripture*, as you again represent it, but that there is no such *expression* there. From whence he infers nothing against the *doctrine* of the resurrection of the body, as you would have it thought: all he argues is, that if the *sameness* of it was to be an *article of faith*, the expressions concerning it would have been more exact and particular. And, therefore, I must be so stiff, as again to tell you, that nothing but producing a text with that very expression, *the resurrection of the body*, can be any thing to the purpose against Mr. *Locke's* assertion.

However, we will consider this text, so far as I have concerned myself in the sense of it, or as it is brought in proof of the resurrection of the *same* body. I had owned, in my letter, that the *change* here spoken of was to be at the resurrection of the dead; and, therefore, you needed not ask, "if I can deny it." But I left it to be considered, whether it related at all to the bodies of those, who were to be raised from the dead, that expression being used in another place*, of those who were *not*

S E C T.

* 1 Cor. xv. 51.

to die. To this doubt you have given a large solution, which I think not unexceptionable; but, waving that point, as I had no design to insist on it; granting, that the change spoken of, in the text before us, which was to be at the time of the resurrection, was also to be of those, who were raised from the dead; what will follow from thence? Why “then (*you say*) it is plain here is another text of “St. Paul, which asserts the resurrection of the “body.” No such matter, Sir; here is a text, indeed, where mention is made of the body at the resurrection; and no one denies, that there are many, which do the same, but not in such a manner, as to be contrary to what Mr. Locke asserted. Nor yet so as to be any proof, that the very same body shall be raised: for with whatever bodies the dead are raised, whether precisely the same, or not, they will equally be capable of being *changed* from *vile* to *glorious bodies*.

I had, therefore, good reason to say, that this text was oddly chosen, for an *express mention of the resurrection of the body*, or for a proof of the sameness of it; since that expression is not in it, and since our bodies may be changed, without being raised, as the Apostle elsewhere expressly says they shall: and those bodies of the dead, that are raised incorruptible and immortal, may certainly be not the less properly said to be changed, for not being exactly the same they were before. So that you have scarce *spoiled me for a wit, upon the use of the word change*, so far as a pun has any pretension to it; and, if you could afford to laugh at it, you might have spared your grave man’s advice to one, who seemed cautious enough, not to be in danger of being much troubled with such flights.

But you are almost tempted to be witty yourself, upon the word *surprize*, which I happened to use, upon your bringing this text as a proof of the resurrection of the *same body*. “I must be a per-

“son

“son very liable to be surprized (*you say*) if the “proof of the resurrection of the body, from this “text, is capable of surprizing me.” Here, according to custom, instead of the *same body*, you put only *the resurrection of the body*, as if I denied, that this text could be any proof of the resurrection of the *body*; which, I must again assure you, is far from either Mr. Locke’s or my purpose. You then ask, “if I ever saw it produced against this doctrine?” No, really, Sir; nor even against the resurrection of the *same body*. But a text may be very surprizingly brought in proof of a doctrine, that never was, nor could be, produced against it, if it make neither for one side, nor the other, which I take to be the case here. In short, without being over liable to it, one may be allowed some surprize at your choice of this text, either against Mr. Locke’s assertion, or for the resurrection of the *same body*. Mr. Locke says, there is no such expression in Scripture as the resurrection of the body. “This (*say you*) is spoke without either truth or modesty, “for the Apostle says here, that our bodies shall “be *changed*. And this is also a plain proof of “the resurrection of the *same body*, for a body, that “is *changed*, must needs be *the same*.” These are arguments somewhat extraordinary, which, therefore, might give a little surprize.

And now, I fear, you will be in some danger of being surprized too: You insist still, “that the “alteration of the qualities, modes, and affections “of any body, proves it to be the *same body*, since, “if it is not the same, it must be a new body; “and a new body is not a body changed, but “a body entirely different, and another. And, “when I can prove this not to be true, you have “told me before-hand, I shall say something surprizing.” So I warn you to be on your guard.

The difference of qualities, modes, and affections is that alone, which constitutes the different kinds

of bodies; so that the alteration of the qualities, modes, *etc.* of any body, will be so far from proving it to be the same, that it unquestionably proves it to be a new *kind* of body. For example; should the qualities, modes, and affections of a worm be changed into those of a bird, no one would say this was the same body, whatever particles of matter composed it. On the other hand, suppose, at the resurrection such a change of the material substance, as you allow of, to make your vulgar sameness, which, though it does not make a body *entirely different, and another*, is yet inconsistent with the *precise sameness* of it. This, no doubt, you will grant, cannot make it the less capable of being *changed* from a *vile* to a *glorious* body; and if *the want of an exact sameness* cannot hinder it from being changed, the change mentioned in the text cannot prove it to be exactly the *same*. So that here you may find a *new kind of body*, though not *entirely different, and another*; and a body *changed*, that is not the *very same*.

And as this text can be no proof of the sameness of the resurrection body; neither is it contrary to any thing, that Mr. *Locke* has advanced; for, as I before said, he never denied, that our bodies shall be *changed* at the resurrection. To this you answer, "Though, perhaps, Mr. *Locke* did never deny in words at length, that our bodies should be changed at the resurrection; yet this is a necessary consequence, that, if he denied the resurrection of the body, he denied, that our bodies should be changed at the resurrection." But what if he did in words at length *assert*, that our bodies shall be changed at the resurrection? Will it not then be as necessary a consequence, that he did likewise acknowledge the resurrection of the body? And that he does, in words at length, *assert* both, you may, if you please, see in his note on 1 Cor. xv. 42. where he thus expresses himself:

Flesh

Flesh and blood (as St Paul tells us) cannot inherit the Kingdom of God; and, therefore, to fit believers for that kingdom, those, who are alive at Christ's coming, shall be changed in the twinkling of an eye; and those, that are in their graves, shall be changed likewise, at the instant of their being RAISED. I presume, Sir, these words could not escape your notice in reading Mr. *Locke's Comments*: how then could you possibly charge him with denying the resurrection of the body, or that it is to be found in Scripture? The injustice of which, from this passage alone, must so fully appear.

S E C T. IV.

Answer to the defence of the third text produced in the Sermon, 1 Cor. xv. 53.

If I unjustly charged you, Sir, with taking no notice in your Sermon, of Mr. *Locke's* arguments; I must now do you the justice to own, that you have made ample amends since, for that supposed deficiency, by your large defence of what you had there said against the *Comment*.

I shall not enter into the dispute, whether the words *corruptible* and *mortal* in this text ought to have body for their substantive; or whether they are neuters absolute, and to be understood of persons. Though I cannot but observe, that this sense is every whit as agreeable as the other to the scope and tendency of the writer, which, you say, "is rather to be attended to, than the exactness of words." I must likewise observe, upon what false grounds you accuse Mr. *Locke* of wilfully disguising the sense of these words to deceive his readers. To which purpose you say, "It is observable, that when Mr. *Locke* tells us, that the words *corruptible* and *mortal* are neuters absolute, he leaves out the word *this*, which the

"Apostle

“Apostle joins with them; and it was necessary,
 “that he should do so, to induce his readers to believe, that the words corruptible and mortal
 “could possibly represent the dead; for when the
 “word *this* is added to them, they are manifestly
 “incapable of so indeterminate a sense.”

It is very true, that Mr. *Locke* does not set down the word *this* at the beginning of his note upon the words in question, when he speaks only of the grammatical construction of them: but it is as true, Sir, that he inserts it afterwards, in the very same note, when he gives the sense of the place. *That then*, says he, *which is meant here being this, that this mortal man shall put on immortality, and this corruptible man incorruptibility, &c.* His omission, therefore, of the word *this*, in one part of his note, since he has it in another, could not be with any design of imposing on an unwary reader, unless such, as are so unwary, as to read notes by halves. That you are one of this sort, is indeed the most favourable construction, that can be put upon your unjust conclusions from this, and many other of Mr. *Locke's* notes.

Your very next charge against him, of *inconsistency with himself*, is founded on the same conduct, of taking notice of one part of this same note, and not considering the latter part of it, which might have helped you to see, that there is no contradiction in what he says at the beginning of it, to what he had said in his note on *Rom. viii. 11.*

You observe, that in his note on that place, “he is very positive, that the word *mortal* is no
 “where in the *New Testament* attributed to any
 “thing void of life: how then, say you, can it
 “possibly here represent the dead?” You know very well, Sir, that Mr. *Locke* does not take this expression, *the dead*, to signify in Scripture *the bodies of the dead*. And if you had read out this note, you might have seen, that when he says *mortal* here

here stands to represent the *dead*, he means the *persons* of the dead; for a little after this, follow those words, which I just now quoted, *that then, which is meant here, being this, that this mortal man must put on immortality, &c.* I cannot say, that you take no notice of this, for you have said a great deal against understanding that verse of personality; but it seems, you did not care to consider, that Mr. *Locke* understood it so: there was no inconsistency in his saying, *mortal here stands to represent the dead*, with what he had said on *Rom. viii. 11*; for the persons of the dead are not *void of life*, though it is not till the resurrection, that *this mortal man, must put on immortality*.

The next thing you take notice of, is Mr. *Locke's* note upon § 43. of this chapter, where he says, *the time, that man is in this world affixed to this earth, is his being sown, and not when being dead he is put into the grave*. In opposing this interpretation of his, you are very large; but I shall be as brief in discussing it, both because it does not appear, that he *builds much* upon it, as ² you pretend; and because the question in debate certainly does not much depend upon this interpretation, as you yourself own; for “if it were granted, you say, “yet he cannot, as he hoped, get clear of the resurrection of the body by it.” Neither am I so well satisfied with Mr. *Locke's* notion of this matter, as to engage in the defence of it; though I question not in the least, that the reasons he gives for it, were such as truly weighed with him. And those, who observe human nature, will find it nothing strange, to see men of good understandings, and honest minds, fond of some peculiar notion, which others cannot view in the same light.

I agree with you, that the want of an exact correspondence between the burial of a dead body,

and the sowing of quick seed in the earth, to which St. Paul alludes, is no good proof, that he does not by the figure of *sowing* intend to represent the putting a dead body into the ground; for it is particularly observable, that the eastern writers form their figures and comparisons upon the smallest agreement in any one point; of which there are many instances in the most eminent of the Greek poets, and not a few among the sacred penmen. I shall, therefore, have no dispute with you in relation to this text, but so far, as in discoursing upon it you have *mistaken*, or manifestly *wronged* Mr. Locke. And for this I find occasion at your first entrance on the subject.

After having asked, "what proof he brings to support an interpretation so very uncommon?" you answer, "why, that he tells us is St. Paul's own words, yet he gives us no particular words from St. Paul, but only says in his own, for *dead things are not sown, seeds are sown being alive, and die not till after they are sown.*" These words, it seems, you understand Mr. Locke to have given us for St. Paul's, and thereupon you say, "the sense of these words may indeed be deduced from those at *§ 36.* But Mr. Locke would not allow other people to say, that a consequence from St. Paul's words was St. Paul's words; and he ought not to have better usage in this place than he gives." I assure you, Sir, he has no need of it in this place, or any other; for he is far from giving a consequence from the words of St. Paul, for St. Paul's words. You will find, on a review, that this censure of yours is only founded on a hasty misinterpretation of his meaning. *The time (he says) of man's being sown, is not when being dead he is put into the grave, as is evident from St. Paul's own words.* But what are the words of St. Paul, from which he thinks this evident? Not those

those, which immediately follow, as you understood him to mean, for they are plainly his own reasoning upon St. Paul's words, that is upon the expression of *sowing*, and those words in *§ 36.* *That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die.* Which being well enough known, he might think it needless to set them down, but infers from them, that the Apostle does not mean the putting our dead bodies into the grave, *because* (as he argues) *dead things are not sown, &c.* These are indeed his own words, nor were they at all intended to be given us for St. Paul's, as you misapprehend.

You begun your remarks on this note with a *mistake*, which may be excusable; but the *wrong* you do Mr. Locke, at the conclusion of them, is too manifest, and has been too often repeated, to pass for an oversight. "After all, say you, if Mr. Locke's imagination here, that men are sown in to this life, were granted, yet he cannot, as he hoped, get clear of the resurrection of the body by it." I am weary of being forced to complain so often of the *injustice* of charging Mr. Locke with having any *hope or design to get clear of the resurrection of the body*; which was so far from his purpose, as has appeared by several instances of his, expressly asserting, that *God will raise the bodies of all men at the last day.* But I must now say, that it is even *ridiculous here*, to suppose any such design, when you have his notes before you on this chapter, in some of which he largely and unexceptionably insists on that doctrine. Let his interpretation of two or three verses in it be as *uncommon*, or even as *wrong* as you please; how absurd is it to impute his giving them that sense to a design of overthrowing, what he establishes in his notes on many more places of the same chapter? That he could not design here, *to get clear of the resurrection of the body*, let the following extract witness for him. In his note on *§ 42*, he thus

dis-

discourses: *St. Paul's reasoning stands thus: Men alive are flesh and blood, the dead in the graves are but the remains of corrupted flesh and blood, but flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither corruption inherit incorruption, i. e. immortality: therefore, to make all those, who are Christ's, capable to enter into his eternal kingdom of life, as well those of them who are alive, as those of them who are raised from the dead, shall, in the twinkling of an eye, be all changed, and their corruptible shall put on incorruption, and their mortal shall put on immortality: and thus God gives them the victory over death through their Lord Jesus Christ.* In another part of the same note, he says: *This victory over death does, according to the Apostle, belong to all those, whose corruptible bodies have put on incorruption.* These passages undeniably prove, that Mr. Locke asserted *the resurrection of the body*, if any words can be strong or plain enough to evince it. And I suppose, Sir, this is not the first time you have met with them, though you suffer yourself confidently to affirm, that "he invented that expression, "that men are sown into life, to ease himself of "the incumbrance of supposing, that it is the "dead body, which is sown in dishonour, that is "to be raised in glory." As if you did not know, that notwithstanding the time he allots for this sowing, instead of easing himself from that incumbrance, he, throughout this note, *supposes* corruptible bodies, the remains of corrupted flesh and blood raised from their graves, to put on incorruption. Since then, it is plain, he did not advance the notion of *mens being sown into this world*, to serve that turn by it, which you pretend, it is but equitable to believe, that he was led into it by *St. Paul's* manner of expression, and his own reasoning upon the nature of things sown. To this, he appeals in that note, and thinks any one, who considers it, will find reason from thence so to under-

stand

stand *St. Paul.* Which we may at least allow him to do, tho' we cannot agree with him in that sense. And after all, the sowing of men into the world is not so foreign from Scripture language, but that he might find other texts to confirm his taking *St. Paul's* words in that sense; for why may not the Apostle be supposed to use the same metaphor to express the peopling of the world, which the prophet *Jeremiah*, uses to signify encreasing the numbers of the Jewish people? *I will sow the house of Israel, and the house of Judah, with the seed of man*^b. The figure may be thought as properly applied to the whole of mankind, as to a part; and there are other places in the prophets, where sowing, and not sowing, are used for peopling, or dispeopling a particular nation. And if Mr. Locke should be allowed this sense, there would be no getting clear of the resurrection of the body by it, as you very justly argue; for still the body must have a share in the sowing, dying, and being quickened. You ought not, therefore, to have supposed, that this interpretation was invented for a purpose, which you own it could no way effect.

Before you leave this chapter, you resolve to consider one note more of Mr. Locke's, for several reasons: it is upon § 35. *But some man will say, How are the dead raised up? And with what body do they come?* Mr. Locke observes, that *these words contain two questions; first, How comes it to pass, that dead men are raised to life again? Secondly, With what body shall they return to life? To both these be distinctly answers, first, That those, who are raised to an heavenly state, shall have other bodies. Secondly, That it is fit men should die, death being no improper way to the attaining other bodies.* Upon this note you ask, "How comes it to pass, that these words, *How are "the dead raised?* should be interpreted, *Why are*

^b Jerem. xxxi. 27.

“ dead men raised to life again? &c. How can they
 “ be thought, truly and properly, to import more
 “ than this; how can it be possible for any power
 “ to raise the dead?” Mr. *Locke* has told you, Sir, in this note, that it was St. *Paul*’s answer, that let him into his sense of that question: *If, says he, St. Paul may be allowed to know what he says, his words must be understood to contain those questions, by the answers, which he gives to them.* But according to your usual candour in judging of his designs, you roundly affirm, that “ he thought it most proper
 “ here to alter the state of the question, because he
 “ intended to alter the state of the doctrine, concerning the resurrection.” Whether he has altered that or not, will hereafter appear: however, you may observe as well as he, that St. *Paul*’s answer does not seem to relate at all to any doubts about the power of God to raise the dead, but refers to his common manner of dealing, in producing the fruits of the earth, for the propriety of men’s dying to live again.

The other question, *With what bodies do they come?* you say, “ Mr. *Locke* indeed allows to stand
 “ as it does in the text, but you are sure he
 “ gives an answer to it, which the Apostle nowhere
 “ authorised him to make, that the dead shall have
 “ other bodies. Nor does he dare to refer to the
 “ words, in which the Apostle teaches such doctrine.” I believe, Sir, you may find, that in another place he refers to many words of St. *Paul*, as seeming to teach this doctrine, particularly those, which are the immediate answer to this question, *That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body, that shall be, but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him.* But you tell us, that “ these comparisons, taken from the
 “ sowing of seed, &c. which he seems to think
 “ make for his doctrine, cannot be suppose to imply, that the dead shall have other bodies, but

“ Vid. 3d Letter.

“ that

“ that their old bodies at the resurrection shall be
 “ given to them again, more glorious, and beautiful, and durable, than they were before. The
 “ allusion must not be supposed to hold in all
 “ points.”

It is granted, Sir, that allusions are not to hold in all points. But when any particular circumstance is insisted on, or pointed at in an allusion, that circumstance must hold in the thing compared to it, as the chief matter intended to be explained, or illustrated by it. And therefore, when it is taken notice of in the allusion, that that which is sowed, *is not that body that shall be*, we cannot but be led to think, that *so also* that, which is laid in the grave, *is not that body, that shall be after the resurrection.* And supposing those comparisons, which St. *Paul* uses on this occasion, to imply only, that our bodies at the resurrection shall be differently constituted, and have entirely different qualities, from what they had here; this, as I observed elsewhere, makes them a new kind of bodies; and this is just what Mr. *Locke* means here by *other and better bodies*, which he says the dead shall have at the resurrection. If you doubt, that by *other bodies*, he means bodies differently qualified, you need only look back to what I have lately quoted from his note on § 42. of this chapter, consistently with which the note we are upon must be understood; for it is not to be supposed, that he intended to deliver a doctrine here, contrary to what he asserts so soon after. That therefore, which he means by other bodies on § 35. must be the same, of which on § 42. he says, *Those that are in their graves shall be changed, at the instant of their being raised.* In that note you will find, that Mr. *Locke*’s other bodies are bodies raised from the dead, and changed from corruptible mortal flesh and blood, to spiritual incorruptible immortal bodies. “ These, you say, are not *other* bodies, but the old
 “ bodies of the dead given them again more glorious,
 “ ours,
 Vol. I.

ous, &c." And here arises another dispute merely about words, viz. Whether bodies so changed, as to have all their qualities entirely different from what they had before, may be most properly called *the same* or *other bodies*.

I must here take notice of an observation you make at the beginning of the subject we are upon, "That this note opens all the mystery, at once, of "Mr. Locke's doctrine of the resurrection." But you have now seen, Sir, that *his mystery* is no other than St. Paul's mystery, that *we shall all be changed*. And you may likewise see, that all the changes he describes of bodies at the resurrection, being only of their qualities, and not at all of the material substance, there is no inconsistency in his saying here, that those, who are raised, shall have *other bodies*, meaning bodies, that have quite different qualities; with his affirming to the Bishop, that he does by no means deny, that the *same* bodies shall be raised. These seemingly contrary propositions may very well agree together, as they relate to the body in different respects. And tho' Mr. Locke disputes indeed *with all his might* against imposing that doctrine as an article of faith, there is no *shuffling*, as you term it, when it is affirmed, that he does not deny it. "But it clearly appears, you say, that he "does not believe it; and from his note upon this "place, it is manifest he declares the contrary." To this, what I have just now said is a sufficient answer, yet I shall add here, that from several notes of his upon other places, it rather appears, that he is much more inclined to believe, that the *same* bodies shall be raised than the contrary; tho' so wonderfully changed at the instant of their being raised, that they may well be called different, or other kind of bodies, whatever materials they are composed of.

It is nothing strange, therefore, which you tell me, "That Mr. Locke was once under the same "conviction

"conviction with others, concerning the nature of "the resurrection, and the sense of this chapter, "and in his *Reasonableness of Christianity*, thus expresses himself: *These frail mortal bodies shall be "changed into spiritual immortal bodies at the resurrection, when this mortal shall have put on immortality.*" But it is very strange you should not see, that he still continued under the same conviction, and expresses himself to the very same purpose, but more full and particular, in his note on y 42. to which I have so often referred. How you could overlook this, when you was criticising upon his comment on this chapter, is not easy to imagine. But I begin now to be persuaded, that by some chance or other, you must certainly have slipped that note; for it is yet more difficult to imagine, that, if you had read it, you could have allowed yourself to write a large book to persuade the world, that Mr. Locke did not believe the resurrection of the body, or acknowledge, that it is to be found in Scripture; when you must have found, in that note alone, a full refutation of the whole purpose of your book.

Perhaps you may think, that Mr. Locke's mentioning frail mortal bodies to be changed into spiritual immortal bodies, shews him to have been under other convictions, than when he interpreted the text we have been upon, by *this corruptible man must put on incorruption, and this mortal man must put on immortality.* But this interpretation alters nothing of the doctrine of the resurrection, which is the reason I have not entered into any debate about the sense of this text. It is still by the changes of the body, that *this corruptible man, must put on incorruption, &c.* Accordingly Mr. Locke, in his comment on this chapter, represents the dead bodies raised from their graves, to be the subject of all the changes mentioned in it, as you have seen, and expresses

340 *Vindication of the Controversy concerning*
pressly speaks of *corruptible bodies*, that have put on
incorruption.

And therefore, if he avoided answering the Bishop, when he urged this text against him, it could not be for the reason you alledge, *viz.* "Because he knew he had once allowed himself the Bishop's sense of the words," for there is nothing in his former words, as you have quoted them, contrary to the sense, which he still allowed. But that does not amount to the Bishop's, who proposes as *an article of faith*, that the resurrection body must consist of the same particles, which were once vitally united to the soul, without the addition of any other. This Mr. Locke contends is not clearly enough revealed, to be an article of faith. And if the text last mentioned, was (what you pretend) *as clear as the light* against him in this, I presume it is as clear against you, who no more allow this to be an article of faith, than Mr. Locke does. And thus we have done with his and your notes on this chapter.

S E C T. V.

Reply to the objections against Mr. Locke's state of the resurrection.

THE only passage of Mr. Locke's, that I find considered in this section, is his answer to this argument of the Bishop's: *That the same material substance must be reunited to the soul, or else it cannot be called a resurrection, but a renovation.* In your Sermon, you had urged the same argument, with the addition of this consideration: "That the soul dieth not; and that if the body alone die, it must be the raising of that body to life again, by which the dead man can in any proper sense be said to be raised." And what I had objected to this in my letter, employs the greatest part of your animadversions here. I had said, that as a man consists of body and soul, the man dies, not by the body alone,

alone, but by a *separation* of the soul from the body. "Well, say you, what is this to the purpose? The question asked remains still to be answered; when the soul and body of a man are thus separated, do they both lose their existence, action, and perception? Or is it the body only, which is lost to all sense of life?" This you conclude I must say; whereupon you again draw up the argument just now set down from the Sermon, "If the body alone die," &c. To all which give me leave to reply, that tho' we have good grounds, both from reason and Scripture, to believe, that when the soul is separated from the body, it is in a state of *perception and action*; yet it must be granted, that whatever kind of life it exists in, it is lost to, or ceases to live, the *human life*; and therefore, if, after such a separation, the soul, the same conscious principle, is again united to a human body, it may with sufficient propriety be said, that the man is raised from the dead, without knowing or considering, whether the body, to which that soul is united, be the very same material substance, with which it was joined before, or not.

You tell us, that "the strict Scripture notion of dying will help us best to the Scripture notion of rising again: But in the strict Scripture notion of dying, the soul, you say, has no concern." And this you prove from our Lord's denying, *Matth. x. 28.* that *any man can kill the soul*, from whence you argue, that, "When at any time in Scripture, a man, who consists of body and soul, is said to die, or to be killed, we know, that in the strictness of Scripture language, we ought to understand that saying only of his body." But pray, Sir, how does it follow, that because no man can kill the soul, nor can it be said to die, that therefore the soul has no concern in the strict Scripture notion of dying? It is certain the soul has a great concern in the real nature of death, and in the common apprehensions of men about it, to which the Scripture is generally

accommodated. For I ask you, whether upon hearing of a friend's death, or in apprehending our own, we think of nothing but the body's being lost to all sense of life? Do we not consider our friend as having left, or ourselves as going to leave, our habitation in the body? And if this is the true notion of dying, then a separation of the soul from the body must be the strict Scripture notion of dying; and so we may conclude, contrary to you, that when in Scripture a man is said to die, or to be killed, we ought to understand that saying not of his body only, but of the separation of his soul from the body; in which most properly and essentially the death of the *man* consists. "The soul *indeed* having always lived, cannot, *as you urge*, "be said to be raised from the dead;" yet the *man* may, who was properly dead, by ceasing to live the human life.

But "the same man, *you say*, does not rise from "the dead, except he rises with the same body, "for the same body is as necessary to make the "same man, as the same soul." This seems a very bold affirmation. The same soul, the same conscious principle, is so absolutely necessary to make the same man, that if we suppose another thinking substance, we entirely lose all idea of the sameness of the man: but it is not so as to the material substance, for we make no question of the sameness of the *man*, though we are sure the material part of him changes continually. How then can we be certain, that the same body is as necessary to make the same man at the resurrection, as the same soul is? It is sufficient to us, according to our notions here, that the same thinking being continues united to a body, which has never been shifted all at once. This it is, which makes up our idea of the same man, and the same human body. But it must not be supposed, that the *real identity* of either consists in this; for if it did, it would be im-

impossible, that the same man could be raised from the dead, because it implies a contradiction, (as I have upon another occasion observed) that any being should be restored to the same *continued life*, which it has once *discontinued* to live: or that a body, which was once entirely put off at death, and all its parts dispersed, should be restored to an *uninterrupted* succession of particles united in the same organized life.

If then the real identity of the man, or that which constitutes the *same man* at the resurrection, must be something else than that, in which we place the sameness of the man in this life; it may be demanded, in what that sameness of the body consists, which you say "is as necessary to make the same "man as the same soul?" The same particles of matter you will not allow to be necessary at the resurrection, because not necessary to the sameness of the man *here*. An uninterrupted succession of particles, united by a participation of the same continued life, which is necessary *here*, cannot possibly be restored at the resurrection: how then is the resurrection body to be the same? To this you are ready to answer, according to your account of vulgar sameness, "that those parts of the old matter, which it pleases God to restore to life at "the resurrection, will be sufficient, whatever "new particles may be added, to make the body "raised as much the same with that which died, "as that was whilst it lived, for any little part of "time, the same with itself." But Sir, the sameness, that the body had with itself *here*, did not consist in its having some old remaining parts, to which new particles were continually added; though that is indeed the *constitution* of the body here, *notwithstanding* which it is always reputed the same: but to place the sameness of it in this mixture of old and new particles, would carry the absurdity with it of supposing the sameness of a thing to con-

sist in its variations, or in its not being the same. The vulgar notion of the sameness of a human body has indeed no regard at all to the particles, which compose it, whether new or old; inasmuch, that if it could be proved to a demonstration, that a man's body at fourscore had not in it any one particle of the same matter, which it consisted of at four, it would still retain a vulgar sameness, so long as it continued in the same organized life, without shifting all its parts at once. On this, Sir, I believe you must be convinced your vulgar sameness is founded, and to this it is plain, the body cannot be restored at the resurrection.

However, a body consisting of part of the old matter, with some new particles added to it, is that same body, which you require to be reunited to the soul, to make the *same man*. Now against this Mr. Locke has said nothing, otherwise than as you have made it to agree in terms with that same body, which he contends is not *an article of faith*. For he could not design to oppose your notion of the resurrection body under that term, since it is neither the same in his sense, nor in the Bishop's, nor has that sameness, which belongs to human bodies in the common apprehensions of men. But in whatsoever we place the sameness of the body here, we cannot from thence with any certainty determine, what body will be necessary to the identity of the *man* at the resurrection. Perhaps a body strictly the same with that, which died, in a mathematical sense, may be requisite; and therefore Mr. Locke does by no means deny, that the same bodies in that sense shall be raised: and in affirming, that the *same man*, who was dead, must rise again, he implies, that whatever body is necessary to make the same man, that of consequence must be raised at the last day, though it is not clearly revealed of what particles it shall be composed. But so far as the Scripture directs he has ventured, as you have

seen,

seen to describe it, viz. ^d *that it shall be a body changed from flesh and blood, from corruptible, mortal, to a spiritual, incorruptible, immortal body*. These are the *new kind of bodies*, which he says all the saints shall be in at the resurrection, (for of new bodies in any other sense he nowhere speaks) and united to such *new bodies*, bodies, that have so far put off their old imperfections, as to become quite other bodies than they were. I hope you will allow, that without any "affront to common sense, or defiance to the common ways of "speaking among men," the same *men* may be raised to immortality, the corruptible part of them having thus put on incorruption.

And by this time I hope too you are convinced, that your dispute with Mr. Locke on this subject is merely about words, since he fully asserts all that you contend for at the resurrection, except the term *same body*, which can with no propriety be in any sense applied to that body, which you *both* think proper to the resurrection.

S E C T. VI.

Whether any real difference in Scripture betwixt the dead, and the bodies of the dead.

I might now put an end to this long reply, having sufficiently cleared Mr. Locke from hereby on this article, and confuted your groundless pretence, that he denied, or did not believe, *the resurrection of the body*. But as there is great stress laid on both sides, upon the subject of this section, by you in maintaining the *sameness* of that body (whatever is meant by it) to be an article of faith; and by Mr. Locke in denying it to be so in the sense he understood it; I shall consider, as briefly as I

^d Notes on 1 Cor. xv.

can,

can, whether he upon good grounds affirms, that St. Paul plainly distinguishes between the dead, and the bodies of the dead; or whether it be true, as you say, that this distinction is only *verbal*; and that the expression of the resurrection of the *dead*, which is constantly used in Scripture, is always to be understood of the *body*.

I pass over the two or three first passages of this section, because I have said enough on the last, to serve for an answer to all the reasoning contained in them; and for your citations from the Old Testament, I am no way concerned to examine them here. The particular text Mr. Locke instances in, is the only occasion of our debate on this point, and abundantly sufficient to determine it. 1 Cor. xv. 35. *How are the dead raised? and with what body do they come?* You had said in your Sermon before, and you now tell it me again, "that the distinction even here, between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, is only verbal." And truly, Sir, you may tell me this as often as you please, without ever being able to persuade me to believe it, whilst the sense of the text is evidently against you. For if there is no real distinction in it, there will be no avoiding that disagreeable sense Mr. Locke mentions, *viz. with what bodies do the dead bodies come?* But in that sense, which you say, and which I grant, is a very natural and proper sense, *viz. "with what kind of bodies, or with a body how qualified, do the dead come?"* a real distinction between the dead and the bodies of the dead is manifestly preserved. I see, indeed, that in your paraphrase of the words, *that distinction is lost*; but I see too, that the sense of the text is lost with it, according to your peculiar art of paraphrasing. Your words run thus, "the dead bodies of men, when they are raised to life again, what qualities shall they be endued with?" Does not any one see, that there is something express in St. Paul's question, even according to your own interpretation

tation of it, just before mentioned, which is not at all signified in yours, as you have now turned it? Both of them, it is true, are enquiries concerning the qualities, that bodies shall have at the resurrection; but St. Paul does besides, and distinct from the body, expressly mention *the dead*, which are to be raised, and then enquires with what kind of *bodies* those dead shall come. Your paraphrase shews, indeed, that the Apostle might have stated the question, concerning the nature and qualities of the resurrection body, as you have turned it for him, so as not to distinguish between the dead, and the bodies of the dead; and so probably he would have done, if he had not intended such a distinction. But the matter of fact is otherwise; he has so really and plainly distinguished them in this text, as if it had been his purpose to make it observed, that bodies are not the only subjects of the resurrection; for it is impossible, without quite altering the question, or making a very absurd sense of it, to understand by the *dead*—here, nothing more than *dead bodies*. *How are the dead raised? And with what body do they, i. e. the dead come?* Certainly the dead (as was observed in my letter) are as manifestly distinguished from their bodies in this text, as they are artfully dropped in your paraphrase. If you will not allow this to be something "offered in point of reason, that may deserve to be considered; it is easy (in your own smart language) to sit still, and yawn, and say, "the paraphrase is just, it is natural, it is not strained, nothing can be meant here but dead bodies;" and try who will take your word for it against the plain evidence of St. Paul's.

To confirm what you contend for, "that by the dead is always in Scripture meant the dead bodies," you observe, that it is impossible to

avoid speaking personally of a dead body in any language; upon which you produce several instances in Scripture, where dead bodies are thus personally spoken of. And it is not to be denied, that this manner of speaking is common to all languages: but it does not follow, that because dead bodies are usually spoken of personally, therefore whenever *persons* are exprest, *bodies* are always meant. There is certainly a real distinction in nature betwixt the persons of the dead, and their bodies; and when the Scripture mentions both distinctly, expressing the relation of one to the other, as in the text before us, there can be no room for a pretence, that the *dead* there signifies only *dead bodies*. Your grand argument, *that nothing is dead but the body*, must be defeated in this case, where the man or person is plainly spoken of under that appellation *the dead*, and enquiry made with what kind of body dead men shall come at the resurrection. What reason can there be to suppose, that no distinction is intended here between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, but that of *words*, unless you would persuade us, that nothing really exists of the dead but their bodies? For if there is a real foundation for a real distinction, why should it not be intended, when it is exprest?

S E C T. VII.

Reply to the considerations, on a large passage quoted by me from Mr. Locke's third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester.

WERE I to go closely along with you, I should be led to take notice of so many inconsiderable matters, and fall into such frequent repetitions, as must be tiresome to myself, as well as the reader. I therefore pass over your pieces of wit upon me as a *pains-taker*; and refer you to what

what I had said before, in apology for my writing so much on a controversy, which I think of little importance to be determined. I might indeed answer the greatest part of this section in the same way, by references to what has been said above, there being scarce any thing in it, that has not been already obviated.

In following Mr. *Locke's* observations, upon the xvth chapter of 1 *Cor.* as I had set them before you out of his third Letter to the Bishop, you again object the three texts, which have been lately considered, against his assertion, *that the spirit of God keeps always to this phrase in the New Testament of raising, quickening, resurrection of the dead, &c. and that the body is not mentioned to this purpose.* Enough has been already said on those texts to shew, that they contain nothing contrary to what Mr. *Locke* asserts. But I must here take notice, that the last of them, *this corruptible shall put on incorruption, and this mortal shall put on immortality*, is very unfairly brought in opposition to him, since it is expressly excepted by him in the very place you quote; where his words are, *the body is not mentioned but in answer to the question, with what bodies the dead who are raised shall come?* Now as that text is part of the answer to this question, it is included in Mr. *Locke's* exception. But that this might not appear, you have fairly dropped the exception, and make him say absolutely, *that the body is not mentioned to this purpose*; which it seems was fitter for your purpose.

From the general manner of expression in Scripture, Mr. *Locke* infers, *that a good Christian may do his duty in believing all that is revealed to him concerning the resurrection, without entering into the enquiry, whether the dead shall have the very same bodies, or no.* This conclusion you say is *false*, because you pretend to have proved, that those general expressions of "*raising, quickening, re-*"
"surrec-

"*urrection of the dead*, ought to be understood "only of the resurrection of the body." But supposing you had proved this, Mr. *Locke's* conclusion might still be true, for a good Christian may understand those expressions to signify the resurrection of the body, without finding himself obliged to enquire, whether the *very same* body shall be raised, or no.

Mr. *Locke* observes, that St. *Paul* did not seem much to encourage such an enquiry, by the appellation he gives to those that make it. To which you return for an answer, that the harsh word *Thou fool* is not used by the Apostle to forbid our believing the rising, and the dying body to be the same. I grant it. But what then? might not the Apostle discourage an enquiry about it, intending neither to forbid, nor to require, our believing the rising and the dying body to be the same?

Upon Mr. *Locke's* farther observation, *that by the remainder of St. Paul's answer, a man will not find the determination to be much in favour of the very same body, unless the being told, that the body sown is not that body that shall be, be the way to deliver this as an article of faith*; and acquainting us, *that the body raised is as different from that, which was laid down, as the flesh of men is from the flesh of beasts, &c.* upon this you say, "it is manifest, that he misrepresents, and perverts the sense of the Apostle, whose purpose it is to shew, not that the body raised is a different body from that which was laid down, but only that it shall differ as much in beauty and glory, &c. A body, that is not flesh and blood, may be formed of a body, that was flesh and blood, and differ from it, not as to the essence of a body, but only as to immortality and glory."

And what is there in all this, contrary to any thing Mr. *Locke* says? It is you, that misrepresent and pervert his sense, when you suppose him to maintain,

maintain, that the body raised differs from that, which was laid down, as to the *essence of a body*. All the differences he describes are plainly those of forms and qualities; the difference of a corruptible body from an incorruptible, &c. You say, a body, that is not flesh and blood, may be formed out of a body that was flesh and blood. And you have seen Mr. *Locke's* doctrine to be, that the resurrection body shall be so formed, in those words, which I have before quoted from his note on *1st 42.* of this chapter, *viz. The dead in their graves are but the remains of corrupted flesh and blood; but flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God: therefore, those, that are in their graves, shall be changed at the instant of their being raised, and their corruptible shall put on incorruption.*

You go on to tell us, "that the bodies of men, of beasts, of fishes, and of birds, differ only in their forms and qualities." And this we grant. It is therefore (as was observed above) the difference of their forms and qualities, that makes each of them a different kind of body from the other; and this has been already urged to shew, that the great difference of qualities, which St. *Paul* informs us the body raised shall have, entirely opposite to those, which belonged to the body laid down, makes that so much a different kind of body from the other, that Mr. *Locke* might, with great propriety, call it a *new kind* of body, or another body, without intending to deny, that it was formed from the old one; as it is manifest he did not by his notes on this discourse of St. *Paul's*. Nor is the conclusion, which he draws from his observations upon it, in his third Letter, any thing contrary to this: all that he infers from it is, that a discourse, in which the differences betwixt the rising and the dying body are only mentioned, and all the comparisons in it made only to illustrate those differences, could not easily be thought intended by the

Apostle to deliver as *an article of faith*, that the *very same body* should be raised, without the addition of any one particle of matter; which was what the Bishop did not allow to his *same body*. As to this point we know you contend, that there may be an addition of several new particles of matter to that *heavenly, spiritual, powerful, immortal, incorruptible body*, which you say is *undeniably the same* with that, which the Apostle speaks of as *earthly, animal, weak, mortal, and corruptible*. So that the only difference between you will here again appear to be, that Mr. Locke does not with you account a body, which may neither consist of precisely the same particles of matter, nor has any of the same qualities, which belonged to the body laid down, to be the *very same body* with it: and that he does not with you take St. Paul's describing the great difference between them, to be a *full declaration and proof*, that they are the *very same*.

The paragraph, with which you conclude this section, must lead your readers to suppose, that Mr. Locke would allow no proof from Scripture, of the resurrection of the same body, but *express words*. To which purpose you say: "Though Mr. Locke demands those plain and express words to be found there, yet plain and express sense is certainly as good. Can that man be said to be a good Christian, who will receive nothing for an article of faith, but what is in express words delivered in Scripture? Are all acknowledged articles of faith so delivered? If the answer to these questions be easy, Mr. Locke's call for express words of Scripture is evasive and absurd."

Whatever may be the answer to those questions, I must take the liberty to answer you, that Mr. Locke makes no such demand for express words, as could give you any just occasion for this kind of expostulation. There are indeed three places in his third Letter to the Bishop, where he mentions

express

express words, but in none of them after such a manner as amounts to a *call* for them. The first passage is only occasional^f, upon the Bishop's saying, that he did not see how St. Paul could more *expressly* affirm the identity of this body with that after the resurrection, than he did in the text he had just quoted. Upon which Mr. Locke says to this purpose, that St. Paul would certainly have *more expressly affirmed it*, if he had said in *express words*, that the *same bodies* should be raised. The next passage is a little after this, which I shall set down at large, because it plainly shews, that he did not insist upon express words, as the only proof he would admit, of the resurrection of the same body. *With submission* (says he) *your Lordship has neither produced express words of Scripture for it, nor so proved that to be the meaning of any of the words of Scripture, which you have produced for it, that a man, who sincerely endeavours to understand the Scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe as expressly, that the same bodies of the dead, in your Lordship's sense, shall be raised, as that the dead shall be raised.*

Here, you see, he requires proofs of the *meaning* of other words of Scripture, and speaks of that as equivalent to express words. And in all other places, when any texts were produced from Scripture for this doctrine, he never objected the want of express words, but examined the *sense* of them, to judge whether the doctrine could be deduced from them or not. So that, if you had proved it to be the plain *sense* of Scripture, neither Mr. Locke nor I would contend with you for *express words*.

^f Third Letter, p. 197.

S E C T. VIII.

Concerning two passages of Scripture produced in the Sermon, not considered in my letter.

IT not being my purpose (for the reasons I gave in my Letter,) to go on with you in every particular of your enquiry, into the sense of Scripture, on the subject we are upon; two of the texts by you produced I there took no notice of; the reason of which, you here again tell me (for, according to your usual candour, mine are not to be believed) you “shall presume to be, that Mr. Locke can supply me with no pertinent answer to “them.” A reflection, which though you are so fond of repeating, I think too inconsiderable to deserve an answer. But now, that I have so fully shewn, how little real difference there is betwixt what Mr. Locke and you have asserted, concerning the resurrection body; how little real ground for any contest between you; I might well be excused from any farther considerations on texts relating to that subject. Yet since you would not leave this enquiry, without putting me in mind of my former omission, I will endeavour to repair it, by considering here how far those passages, which were left unanswered, prove the resurrection of the same body, in that sense, in which Mr. Locke denies it to be an article of faith.

The first is *John v. 28, 29. The hour is coming, in the which all that are in their graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth.* The other, *Rev. xx. 13. The sea shall give up the dead which are in it, and death and bades shall give up the dead which are in them.* Upon these texts it is urged in the Sermon, “Why this particular mention of the abode of the dead; if “not to assure us, that the same body, which died, “and was lodged somewhere in the repositories of

“nature,

“nature, should be called into life again; and to “prevent all pretence of making any distinction, “more than that of words, between the dead and “the bodies of the dead.”

And here I will observe, that I needed not to have avoided taking notice of the first of these passages, for want of something from Mr. Locke to help me out; for tho’ part of what he says upon it, is peculiarly adapted to the Bishop’s manner of arguing, yet all his answer is not so. To the text itself he says: *If the thing here intended by our Saviour were to propose it as an article of faith, necessary to be believed by every one, that the very same bodies of the dead should be raised, would not any one be apt to think, that the words should have been, all the bodies, that are in the graves, rather than all who are in the graves, which must denote persons, and not precisely bodies.*

To this I suppose you will answer, that it is usual in Scripture, to speak personally of dead bodies; and that the mention of the graves shews, that bodies, which alone are in the grave, must be meant. But tho’ it is true, that there is nothing really deposited in the grave but the body; yet as we know no other abode of the dead, the Holy Spirit not having thought fit to reveal to us where the soul resides during its separate state; it is frequent in Scripture, as well as in common language, to speak of the grave, as if it were the repository of the whole man: And it is not to be thought, that our Lord, in delivering the doctrine of the resurrection, should leave the persons of the dead entirely out of consideration, or intend to give no idea of any part of the man but the body only: on the contrary it is unavoidable when he says, *All who are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth*, for us to think of the whole man, the soul and body united, which therefore our Lord must intend, when he uses that phrase, *shall hear his voice, &c.* Nor will the mention of the grave serve to prevent all pretence of making

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making any real distinction between the dead, and the bodies of the dead, unless you would persuade us, that the body *alone* is to *hear* the voice of *Christ*, and *come forth*, at the resurrection.

The other passage in *Rev. xx. 13.* will less serve to prevent this distinction. The dead, which are said to be *in death and in hades*, may more probably denote the *souls* of men, than their bodies; for *hades*, you know, is used by ancient writers, for the place of separate spirits; and I am apt to think it ought almost always to be so understood in Scripture, as in that place of the *Psalms*, *Thou shalt not leave my soul in hades, neither shalt thou suffer thine holy one to see corruption.* A prophecy, that the soul of the *Messiah* should not continue long in its separate state, nor his body be corrupted in the grave. But to return to the text we are upon. The mention therein of *death*, as a *place* or *person* delivering up the dead that are in it, and in the next verse *death and hades* being said to cast into the lake of fire, in short the entire manner of the expression, shews the passage to be written, (as indeed the whole book of *Revelations* is) in that pompous highly figurative style, so common to the Eastern languages, and especially to prophetic writings; and in such kind of figurative discourses, the particular phrases are not much to be attended to. Nothing can be proved from them, but the general design of the prophecy, which here is elegantly to declare, that all the dead, in whatever place their souls or bodies were repositied, must come forth from their several mansions, to appear at the last judgment; from whence we may conclude, that there shall be a body raised. But I do not see how it can from thence be proved, that every man shall be raised with a body *consisting of the same particles of matter, and no other*, which were united to his soul in his former life, the only sense of *same body*, which Mr. *Locke* has denied

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to be an article of faith. However, if it proves this, it proves more than you allow to be true, at least what you contend is not necessary to be believed. The mention here of the *grave*, the *sea*, of *death*, and *hades*, are accommodations to our ignorance of the abode of the dead, but must be supposed to include the place of separate spirits, if these Scriptures intend to declare, that the souls of men are to have any share in the general judgment; which, in your great zeal for the same body, I hope you will not deny. Nay this whole chapter leads us much more to a notion of the *souls* of men coming to be judged, than of their *bodies*. In *Y 4*, the souls of the martyrs are mentioned separately, as living and reigning with *Christ*; and yet this is expressly called, *the first resurrection*, tho' you so strenuously maintain, that there can be no resurrection, but that of the same body.

CHAP. VI.

Concerning proofs for the resurrection of the same body, from supposed congruities in the nature of God and man.

SECT. I.

Of the congruity from the nature of God.

I Objected to your argument of a congruity to the justice of God, that those *very bodies*, in which mens actions were done, should be punished or rewarded; that it did not seem very well suited to your notion of the identity of the resurrection body; because, as I apprehend, no reason can be given, why the justice of God should not require, that *all* the particles of matter, as well as any *part* of them, which were joined with the soul in its good or bad actions here, should be joined with it in reward

or punishment hereafter. To this you answer, that "the argument is not in the least improperly suited to your notion of the sameness of the resurrection body; for if a human body be truly and properly the same, after the resurrection, with that, which lived before, which consists, not of all the particles, which were ever united to the soul in this life, but only of as many of them, as would at any time in this life be sufficient to have it vulgarly called the same, which is the notion of identity stated in the Sermon; then it certainly represents all that unconscious matter, which was ever joined to the soul in the good or evil actions of this life. And if it represents the human body, under all these several circumstances of variation, and of guilt or goodness in this life, then it certainly cannot be disagreeable to the divine justice, to punish or reward it with the soul, in the other life."

I must first observe, that this reasoning is unfortunately founded on a mistaken supposition; for it is not true, as I have before remarked, that a human body is *vulgarly called the same*, on account of its having any number of the same particles, of which it was at first composed; but solely on account of its *participation of the same continued life*, to which it is impossible for it to be restored at the resurrection: And, therefore, a human body cannot *then* be *truly and properly* the same with that, which lived before, by a vulgar sameness. So that if it has not a mathematical sameness with it, it will be incapable of representing the former body by virtue of a vulgar sameness; or of being, *on that account*, a proper subject of the rewards or punishments supposed due to it.

But secondly, supposing that a body, which consists not of *all* the same particles, may *truly and properly represent* all that unconscious matter, which was ever united to the soul; yet I see not how it can

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be agreeable to any justice, that we have a notion of, to reward or punish an individual by, or as a *representative*. It is allowed, indeed, that nations or bodies politic may be, and have been, both by divine and human justice, punished and rewarded in their *representatives*; that is, when those nations did not consist of *all*, or perhaps *any* of the same individuals, which composed them, when the actions, for which they were punished or rewarded, were performed: But these dispensations are always intended for example, or terror to the persons themselves, on whom they fall, and to their posterity. But with what views an individual should, at the great and final retribution, be punished or rewarded *in* or as a *representative*, is not easy to be apprehended.

However, as this regards the body only, it may not be *inconsistent* with justice; for to say the truth, when we speak of punishing or rewarding the body, we speak improperly, and according to vulgar apprehensions, but not at all according to the reality and nature of things; the *unconscious matter* being utterly incapable of happiness or misery, of reward or punishment. And therefore, when you say, "It is certain the body is often punished by God, for the sake and sins of the soul in this life," you can only mean, that the soul is often punished here, *in, and by the body*. And in this sense, (the only sense in which it is true) it is certainly, as you observe, most agreeable to divine justice, that it should be so punished; for tho' God might punish the soul immediately, without the intervention of the body, yet such punishment would neither be suitable to the nature of the creature, which had sinned; nor in most cases to the nature of the sins committed.

But you ask, "Will any man say, that it cannot be agreeable to divine justice, to punish the body in this life, except it consists of the very same precise number of particles, in which the sin was committed?" How ridiculous is this! As ridicu-

lous as you please, Sir, for I know no body it concerns, unless you would think fit to say it, to be consistent with your yourself. But for those, who see not the congruity you talk of, they think, that it is the punishment or reward of *the man* only, about which justice is concerned; and that since the body is in reality incapable of, because insensible of either, justice cannot be supposed to have any other regard to it, than as it is the necessary instrument of punishing or rewarding the man; in order to which it seems of no importance at all, that his body should consist of the same precise number of particles, which composed it when his actions were done; because, whatever particles may be added, or be deficient, they will be equally unconscious of the consequence of those actions. And for this reason they do not see, how the *justice* of God can at all be concerned in the sameness of the resurrection body. You argue indeed, that "the man cannot be said, to be punished or rewarded, except his body, as well as his soul, be punished or rewarded." By which if you mean, that the body must, as well as the soul, be *conscious* of those rewards and punishments, (without which no being can in reality be punished or rewarded) you reason according to vulgar apprehensions, or common ways of speaking; tho' when we are considering what is agreeable to the divine justice, the reality and nature of things, which justice alone regards, ought with great exactness to be attended to. But if your meaning be, that the *man* cannot be said to be punished or rewarded, except the soul be punished or rewarded *in and by the body*; this, as I have said, is strictly true; but it is a truth, which will not support the conclusion you would establish: it will not follow, that it must be the very same body, in which the actions were done; for justice can have no regard to the unconscious matter, farther than as it is a necessary instrument of punishing or rewarding the man; and whether the man cannot be punished or rewarded,

rewarded, unless it be in and by the very same body, may at least be made a question.

You tell me a little lower, that "I do and must allow, that by the rules of divine justice, the unconscious matter may be joined with the soul in reward or punishment, as God at first blessed, and afterwards cursed the ground, out of which *Adam* was formed, for his sake and sin." But if you mean this in any other sense than I have above explained, I neither must nor do allow it. The earth was indeed blessed for the sake, and cursed for the sin of *Adam*; and great alterations, no doubt, passed upon it, in consequence of that curse: but the *punishment* fell upon *Adam* only and his posterity. The earth was neither more happy before, nor more miserable after the curse, and therefore can with no propriety be said to be *punished* by it. Nor can I see what congruity there can be in the nature of God to require, that some part of the same *unconscious matter*, that was instrumental to the souls of men in their actions here, should be joined with them in their punishment or reward hereafter.

The argument, which you make use of, to prove, that this congruity requires only a vulgar sameness, taken from experience of the divine forbearance, and from the example of human justice, which punishes a man at fifty for a murder he committed at twenty, tho' his body cannot possibly then have any other than a *vulgar sameness* with that, in which the fact was committed; this practice, I say, proves rather that there is no such congruity, as you have imagined, for the divine justice regards not vulgar apprehensions. But if there is any such congruity in the nature of God, as makes the same body necessary to the punishment or reward of the man, in a future state, it must, on all accounts before observed, require a *real mathematical*, and not a *vulgar sameness*.

S E C T. II.

Of the congruity from the nature of Man.

FROM a certain congruity, which the soul of man seems to have with *matter*, you infer in your Sermon, that "It is highly probable it should have a congruity with that matter, the body, in which it lived, and from which it was separated by death," &c. As to a congruity of the soul with matter in *general*, to which your mark of * reference seemed to relate, it was to that I told you, Mr. *Locke* had said nothing contrary in *any manner*: but I could by no means pretend, that what he had said, was not contrary to the inference in your Sermon, when I quoted the very words, that contain a manifest contrariety to it; as Mr. *Locke's* question confessedly does. *It would be hard*, he says, *to determine, if that should be demanded, what greater congruity the soul hath with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it has with particles of matter, which it was never united to.*

To this the sum of your answer is, that the soul of man, being intended by God for an *embodied state*, and to prepare itself according to the actions done in the body, for happiness or misery in a future life; and many of those virtues, for which eternal happiness is promised, consisting in *the sufferings and mortifications of the body, and the appetites of it, in the language of Scripture*; and many of those sins, which are threatened with eternal miseries, consisting in *gratifying the lusts and sensual desires* of the body: it must therefore seem most congruous, that the soul should be reunited to that body, in which it so prepared itself, rather than to any other; and that it should be rewarded or punished in that body, whose *mortifications* gave birth to those *virtues*, or the in-

* Sermon, p. 17.

dulgence

dulgence to whose *lusts and appetites* gave birth to those *sins*, for which it is to be for ever punished or rewarded.

There might indeed be some weight in this argument, if the body was at all *conscious* of those mortifications, or indulgences, those sins, or virtues, which are performed in, and by means of it. But tho' the body's being instrumental to such good or bad actions is a sufficient foundation for common language to ascribe them to it; and that the language of Scripture is usually accommodated to vulgar notions and ways of speaking; yet when we look for the congruity of one thing with another, it must be drawn from the *real nature* of those things. And since, properly speaking, the body has no real desires, lusts, or appetites, tho' an occasion of raising them in the soul; nor is indeed capable of reward or punishment; from whence can such a congruity, as you contend for, result? It is a topic, which may serve to work upon the passions, and adorn a rhetorical declamation, but will scarce bear the test of strict reasoning. Neither is there any thing in experience to confirm it. The soul, during its abode here, seems to have no hankering after any part of that matter, which was once united to it, but is now so no longer. If a leg or an arm be lost, tho' it is extremely sensible of the pain of parting, and grieved to find its body maimed, it has afterwards no concern for the disunited parts; and could a new leg or arm be vitally united to it, would, for any thing that appears to us, be as well satisfied with them, as with the old ones. Whether the soul will be thus indifferent to what body it may be united at the resurrection, is what we can know nothing of with any certainty. And therefore arguments from congruity will be far enough from *strong confirmations* (as you call them) of the resurrection of the same body, if those from Scripture are not strong enough of themselves to support the doctrine; and, if

if they are, they will have no need of such *confirmations*, as you confess would be nothing but *imagination* without them, and consequently can give no solid support to them.

However, if there is reason to think, that the soul has a congruity with any particles of matter, which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer; it is an argument (as I observed in my letter) which seems but ill-suited to your account of the sameness of the resurrection body. For what reasons can such a congruity be established upon, which will not equally conclude, that the soul has a congruity with *all* the particles of matter, that were ever united to it, as with that *part* of them, which you think sufficient to make up your same body? To this question of mine you next apply your answer, that "the reasons you have given, are taken " from moral, and not the natural congruities of the " soul. And therefore, since the body at the resurrection is the same with that, which lived and " died, not by having all the particles, which were " ever united to it, but only by such, as are sufficient at any time in this life, to have it thought " vulgarly to be the same: all the congruities of " the soul, which require, that it should be joined " with the body in its eternal rewards and punishments, will only determine it to *this* body, *this* " body alone being always thought to be the mortified body of the virtuous, and the indulged body " of the vicious."

These extraordinary reasons will, no doubt, have their weight with persons of quick apprehensions and lively imaginations; but I confess myself so dull, as to have no notion of *moral* congruities of the soul, which can require it to be joined, in rewards and punishments, with a being incapable of *moral relations*, of vice or virtue, of rewards or punishments; as the unconscious matter certainly is. Neither can I conceive, why the soul should be determined to

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its body at the resurrection, on account of its being *vulgarly thought* to be the same (supposing that could be the case of the resurrection body.) If there are any congruities of the soul, which will determine it to that body, in which it lived before, they will much more probably result from *natural*, than *moral* relations: besides that, as I have shewn, a *vulgar sameness* is utterly incompatible to the resurrection body. So that upon the whole, my *idle fears* are in danger of remaining upon me; for I do not see, that you have " ordered your affairs on this nice occasion, " much better than I dreamt of." I am still *afraid* (which with you, it seems, is the same as to be *confident*) that you must either require a real mathematical sameness to the resurrection body, or relinquish your argument from the congruities in the nature of God, and of man. But this will be no great matter, since it is an argument, which you own will not prove your doctrine, if it be not sufficiently proved without it.

S E C T. III.

TO your third section you have prefixed this title, "No resurrection without the resurrection of the " same body." And you say in it, that you are very sincere, when you tell me, that you cannot " understand the one without the other." But I have already endeavoured to help your understanding in this; and as you here produce no argument, but what I have before answered, either on this point, or against Mr. Locke's assertion, *that the resurrection of the dead, is the only language of Scripture*; I need not repeat what has been sufficiently insisted on. Let us proceed therefore, to consider your fourth section, in which

S E C T. IV.

Mr. Locke's doctrine of the resurrection is falsely stated.

IT having been urged by him, *that the resurrection of the dead is the only language of Scripture*:
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and you, it seems, thinking, "that this implies "no more, than that persons once dead shall live "again," took the liberty in your Sermon, to set down this proposition as Mr. *Locke's* words; tho' it contains neither his words, nor his sense; which I looked upon, as too unfair dealing, to be passed by wholly unobserved. You now pretend to justify it, by asking, whether, "tho' he has not those very words, "he may not have words, which bear that sense? "or at least may not that proposition be clearly and "justly deduced from his words? In either of these "cases, you say, your putting, *So Mr. Locke*, in "your margin, can be no unjust reference." To which give me leave to reply, that a person so liable as Dr. *Holdsworth* to misinterpret Mr. *Locke's* words, and to find implications in them, which he neither intended, nor saw, has no right to give his own interpretations, for Mr. *Locke's* words: Nor indeed is it allowable for any man, in any case, to set down his own consequences as another's words; for at that rate an author may be made to say, what is far enough from his thoughts; as is the case now before us.

That Mr. *Locke* was far from thinking, that the doctrine of the *resurrection of the dead*, the doctrine of Scripture, implies no more, than that *persons once dead shall live again*, is manifest from many places, which I have occasionally quoted from him. And what you have produced in proof, that Mr. *Locke's* doctrine implies only a *new life*, which you here again sum up, I have elsewhere shewn to be either mistakes of his words, by carrying them beyond his meaning, *imaginary insinuations*, or *false imputations*, of denying, what he never denied or opposed. For instance, when he says, that men shall have *other bodies* at the resurrection; that the body raised is *different* from that, which was laid down; these expressions, as I have urged, ought in equity to be understood agreeably to those passages, where he so plainly
speaks

speaks of the great *changes*, which shall pass upon the bodies of men at the resurrection. As for all those places, which you here again refer to in your margin, for his *insinuations*, that a body entirely *new* may be a resurrection body, there is not one syllable in any of them in the least to that purpose. And for what you farther charge him with, that "he every where constantly disputes against the resurrection of the "body," I have frequently assured you, that it is an *unjust imputation*; that he no where disputes against *the resurrection of the body*, tho' he affirms, that there is no such *expression* in Scripture. You say, that the Bishop told him, as you do, that his doctrine implies only a *new life*, and not a resurrection; "but he "makes no proper answer to him, only insisting "positively, without any reason, in the words cited "before." And what *proper* answer, I beseech you, could be given to the objection? The Bishop says, *unless the same material substance is raised, it cannot be called a resurrection*: Yes says Mr. *Locke*, *If the same man rise, who was dead*, it may. Or what reason need to be given for this? It is a proposition, that requires no proof; nor could he suppose it would be questioned, that the *same man* might be raised, tho' his body did not consist of the same numerical particles, that composed it here; since the Bishop had, in that very argument, *allowed the same man under several changes of matter*. For if a man may be the same in this life, under *several changes of matter*, why may he not be the same man at the resurrection, tho' there should be great changes in the material substance? And if the *same man* thus rise, who *was dead*, this is evidently a *proper resurrection*.

You now leave Mr. *Locke* for a while to engage with me, who it seems have displeased you, by "having learned to speak the same language with "him;" for [tho' I say, that those, who own the resurrection of the dead, mean more by it, than that persons dying in this world *do still live in another*;
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yet you observe, that when I come to explain what I understand by the resurrection of the dead, all the account I give of it is, "that the rising must be understood of that which died, *not meaning the body*," but the same *species*, a creature consisting of soul and body the *same man*, must be raised at the last day." And you would be glad to know, how this resurrection of the dead implies any thing more, than that *persons* dying in this world *do still live in another*. I should be as glad to inform you, Sir, and I hope by this time have given you to apprehend, that when a *man* dies in this world, he does *not* still live in another. The soul, it is true, exists in a separate state, but the *man* notwithstanding is dead; and when the *man* is said to be raised from the dead, this must imply something more, than that the soul still lives in another world. We cannot indeed mean by this, that the *body alone* shall be raised, unless the body alone makes the *man*.

But you tell me, that when I speak of a creature consisting of soul and body, I speak of the "species" only, of human nature considered abstractedly, "not of particular men, the individuals of that species, who are the only proper subjects of the resurrection." This had been indeed nothing to the purpose; but I think my words gave you no ground for such a misapprehension of my sense; for tho' I say, the *same species*, I immediately add a creature consisting of body and soul, the *same man*, *must be raised*; which seems to me clearly enough to express an individual of the human species. I assure you, Sir, I am not so profound a metaphysician, as to apprehend *abstract ideas* to be real entities; or to think of raising the human species otherwise than by individuals, unless in our imaginations.

But you say, when I speak of the *same man*, I cannot by Mr. Locke's doctrine mean the same particular man, consisting of the same soul, and the same body; and if I mean, that the same soul, and another

another or new body must be raised at the last day, "What does this imply more, than that a person, who died in this world, shall live again in another and new body in a future state?" To this I answer, first, that by Mr. Locke's doctrine, I *can* and *do* mean the *same particular man*, consisting of the same soul, and of such a body, as is not inconsistent with his identity; but whether a body precisely the same is necessary to the sameness of the man, I do, no more than he, pretend to determine. Secondly, I must take notice, that you have here so altered your terms, as entirely changes the state of the question; for instead of persons dying in this world *do still live in another*, you have here put, *shall live again in a future state*. You likewise use the terms *man* and *person* indifferently, substituting one for the other, tho' they stand in this controversy for very different ideas; according to which it is true, that a *person* dying in this world *does still live in another*, but it is not true of a *man*. And tho' those, who own the resurrection of the dead, must, as I asserted, mean more, than that *persons* dying in this world *do still live in another*; yet they may mean nothing more, than that *men*, once dead, *shall live again in a future state*, (as you here express it) for that is a proper resurrection; since what is once dead, can no way live again, but by being raised from the dead.

I had added, that those, who believe this, must believe something more, than that an *unembodied spirit*, such as is the soul, when separated from the body, continues to live elsewhere. This you grant. But say you, "What then? the Sermon does not mention an unembodied spirit; but affirms, that they, who deny any resurrection, do yet believe, that persons dying in this world *do still live in another*." And there are some who believe this, not of unembodied spirit, but of souls united to other new and heavenly bodies, who yet expressly deny the resurrection of the dead."

It may be so, Sir, and pray what then? what is this those, who *expressly own* the resurrection of the dead? Those, who *deny it*, may indulge their imagination as they please; but I must tell you once again, that those, who *own it*, must believe something more, than that the soul, whether *in* or *out* of a body, *continues to live* in another world; for the resurrection they believe in, is not to be till the last day; and is a resurrection of that, which till then was dead, that is of the man; and those, who affirm, that the *same man*, who was dead, shall rise again, must imply, that he shall rise with such a body, as is not inconsistent with his identity.

But you add, "Tho' I believe, therefore, something more than they do, who barely believe the separate existence of the soul, yet while I believe, with Mr. *Locke*, that at the last day, the souls of men shall be united with other and new bodies, I only believe, that they enter upon a new life in a new body, and I have lost and denied the resurrection."

I beg, Sir, you will give me leave to know best what I myself believe; and I am very positive and very sincere in assuring you, that I firmly believe, that the *very same men*, who were once dead, shall rise again at the last day; tho' I do not precisely determine, *with what bodies those dead shall come*. And therefore, I do not mean, *that the souls of men shall be united in other and new bodies* in your sense, because I do not know, how far the sameness of the material substance may then be requisite to the sameness of the *man*. Nor has Mr. *Locke* or I excluded even a mathematical sameness from the resurrection body, revelation not being clear concerning it. Thus far indeed the Scriptures seem plainly *to lead us to think*, that from a natural, corruptible, mortal, shall be raised a spiritual, incorruptible, immortal body; but so differently constituted and qualified, that the body laid down is no more

more *that body that shall be*, than a grain of corn sown is the same with that, which is produced from it. And how it will follow, that those, who thus *believe and expressly confess* the resurrection of the dead, *have lost and denied the resurrection*, because some, who *expressly deny* the resurrection, do yet believe, that souls united to other and new bodies *still live* in another world, I am at a loss to understand. Sure I am, that one may very steadfastly believe the resurrection of the dead, and of the body, without determining of what particles of matter the resurrection body shall be made up; tho' you have no other real ground but our not doing this, for charging Mr. *Locke*, or me, with having lost and denied that important article.

'Tis truly *pleasant*, Sir, (I must retort) to see you set down your own implications from Mr. *Locke's* doctrine, and then tell me, you can "allow, that I speak proper enough, when I call this Mr. *Locke's* faith, viz. That persons dying in this world still live in another; since you are sure you have largely proved, that it is not the *Christian*." You may dispose of it then, Sir, where else you please, for I have largely enough shewn, that it is not Mr. *Locke's*. That faith, which I told you, was his, is *that the same man, who was dead, shall rise again at the last day*. This is indeed implied in the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, the language of Scripture; and if that is an article of the *Christian* faith, (as sure it must, if the Scriptures are the rule of it) then Mr. *Locke's* faith is the same with the *Christian*, and in maintaining it, we neither *must*, nor may give up, the article of the resurrection. Nor, I think (as pleasant as you would make it) is there the least impropriety, or opposition to the *Christian* faith supposed, in calling any particular man's belief of it, *his faith*.

CHAP. VII.

Reply to the defence of the fifth enquiry of the Sermon.

IN this last enquiry, "By what fault of men or times, the doctrine of the resurrection is disputed or denied," I took Mr. *Locke* to be as little concerned as in the fourth, (which I entirely passed over.) But you it seems intended, that most of it should be applied to him; and now pretend to have made it undeniably appear, that he was guilty of all that heavy charge, from which I had acquitted him; "Of sinister designs in interpreting Scripture, of being tinctured with false and depraved opinions, denying those articles of our faith, the blessed Trinity, the divinity of our Saviour, the satisfaction our blessed Lord had paid for our sins, and the unity and communion of the church, which, *you say*, you have proved upon him, in the beginning of your defence." But I hope the impartial reader is satisfied, that all your proofs fall very short of your pretensions; prove indeed nothing, but a mind evidently prejudiced against all Mr. *Locke* says. And where you suffer it to be so warmly transported, as farther to assume, "That therefore, if he was not an atheist or a deist, he was at least a free-thinker, in the ill-acceptation of that word;" you must excuse me, if I am moved to say, it is a *scandalous slander*, unworthy of an answer! Nor does it need one, since Mr. *Locke's* sincere piety, and reverence for the sacred Scriptures, are sufficiently known to be his defence against so gross a calumny.

I may likewise, with good assurance, acquit him of having *denied* those great and important articles, just mentioned; since you, with all your zeal and prejudice about you, with all your resolution to make

make a heretic of him, with all the pains you have been at to ransack and scrape together, whatever you imagined had a tendency that way; even you have not been able to produce one passage, where he denies any one of those articles; but have been indebted to conjectures of his private thoughts, insinuations, consequences, and implications, upon fallacious grounds, with such like, for all that you call proofs, that he denied them. As to the article of the satisfaction in particular, it has been made plainly appear from his writings, that tho' he has not used the word, he was so far from denying, that he fully asserted the doctrine. And tho' he did indeed deny the resurrection of the *same body*, in the Bishop of *Worcester's* sense, to be an *article of faith*, yet you see I have even ventured to say, that he did not deny the *truth* of that doctrine. You tell me, that I may *with as good assurance* say this, as that he did not deny those other articles; and in that I agree with you, but with this difference, that he has denied nothing at all of those others, as of this last he has denied, that it is so plainly delivered in Scripture, as to be made an article of faith.

In your next paragraph, I am haughtily reprimanded for having said, that I could not, without *indignation*, see the resurrection of the *same body* ranked with the most important articles of the *Christian* faith; an expression, which you think too *hot*, and that perhaps so heated you, that you could not censure it with common decency. *Insolence, impudence, detested malice, and arrogance*, are terms indeed too *hot* for arguments of reason and religion. Besides, Sir, when you tell me, that "a man, who defends only an uncommon and new opinion, ought to do it with modesty; but a man, who defends an heresy, with whatever indignation he may see himself opposed, ought in prudence to let no such hot expressions drop from him;" you

should have considered, that I did not look upon the opinion I was defending as either *new* or *uncommon*, much less as an heresy: Nor was the indignation raised for seeing *myself* opposed, (for I could not be opposed, before I had declared my sentiments) but for seeing a *question of curiosity* equalled with articles of faith. And that expression may perhaps, by cooler judges, be thought no transgression against prudence, or modesty, even on a less occasion.

“ But I go on, as you tell me, in this heat very magisterially to draw up a summary view of this doctrine of the resurrection of the same body: “ As if I had proved, or were capable of proving, “ any one of the characters, which I there give of “ it to be true.” I profess, Sir, I see nothing *magisterial*, or any marks of *heat* in that summary; but I now *humbly* beg leave to tell you very *coolly*, that I am much mistaken, if I have not proved every one of the characters I there gave of it to be true. *That it is doubtful in its meaning, and variously understood*, has, I think, been made appear, by producing three or four different, nay contrary senses of it. *That it is not determined clearly by the Scriptures*, I have likewise endeavoured to shew. And I believe it would be hard for you to say, which of the senses of *same body* the Scriptures have clearly determined for the resurrection body. Tho’ you tell us, that “ it is partly delivered to us in the express words, “ and partly deduced from the clear and natural “ sense of the Scriptures;” you will scarcely pretend to determine, whether it is a body consisting of precisely the same particles, and no other; or that has only what you call a vulgar sameness, or what other kind of sameness is thus delivered in, or deduced from Scripture; and how the resurrection of the *same body* can be there *clearly* delivered, if neither those words are there, nor any *determinate sense* of those words, is beyond my comprehension.

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From this the other characters will follow of course, as well as from the nature of the doctrine; for if it is not clearly determined in Scripture, it must be, because it is *of little importance to be delivered, and that all the great ends of religion in the article of the resurrection are sufficiently secured without it*. But the most, that the Scriptures seem to have *clearly* intimated, is, that there shall be *a body raised from the old one*; and this is not sufficient to make it an article of faith, that the body raised shall be the *very same* with that, which was laid down.

Those, who in the earliest times asserted this doctrine, understood by it, that all the same particles of matter, that had been once united to the soul, should be collected again, to make up the resurrection body; and this was believing in reality *the resurrection of the same body*. But difficulties having been started upon this doctrine in succeeding ages, several suppositions have been made to avoid them; as that there may be an *original stamina*, which containing all the solid parts and vessels of the body may continue unchanged; or an insensible *seminal principle*, like that, which is observed to be in every grain of corn, which at the resurrection may unfold itself in its proper form; or, as you have now supposed, that a precise sameness of particles is not necessary, but only a *vulgar sameness*. By any of these *suppositions*, (for they are not pretended to be any thing more) the difficulties are indeed removed, and probable hypotheses proposed; but those, who account for the resurrection of the *same body* by any of these explanations, whilst they zealously contend for the *word*, have lost the *thing*; for a body formed by any of these ways, tho’ it is properly *a body raised from that*, which was formerly united to the soul, yet it is not that very same visible and sensible body, in which it lived, and which was deposited in the grave. Let it be likewise observed,

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that those, who do ever so firmly believe any of those suppositions, are just in the same uncertainty, that Mr. *Locke* was, of what *particles of matter* the resurrection body shall consist: And that he did, as much as they, believe, that it should be, tho' a new kind of body, yet formed or raised from the old one, changed from the remains of flesh and blood, corrupted in the grave, as has been made evident from his notes on 1 *Cor.* xv. 44.

And therefore, when you say, "That whatever high flown opinion I, and some friends of his, may entertain of him, yet while he obstinately denied the resurrection of the body, and of the same body, and seems to be in such an uncertainty of mind concerning it; you will have the resolution to think, that he was an heretic in the article of the resurrection, and might possibly entirely disbelieve it:" When you tell us this, I say, you must allow us to admire more the strength of your resolution, than that of your reason or candour. For he was so far from obstinately denying the resurrection of the body, that he no where ever denied it at all; and whilst he denied the identity of the resurrection body to be an *article of faith*, he believed the same things of it, that others do, who maintain it; which has been plainly shewn in these papers. Nor was he in any uncertainty concerning it, but of that, which you yourself own is not necessary to be known, or to be believed; and which therefore you might allow me to call a *question of curiosity*. For tho' you say, that the resurrection of the *same body* is not such, "but a truth revealed by God in the Scriptures, and consequently a necessary article of the *Christian faith*:" yet you do not pretend, nay you absolutely deny, that God has revealed what *precise particles of matter* that *same body* shall consist of; which (as I have fully made appear)

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is all that Mr. *Locke* denies to be an *article of faith*, or that I have called a *question of curiosity*.

And now, Sir, that I have gone through all the particulars of your arguments and objections, upon the whole it plainly appears, that neither Mr. *Locke*, nor I, have opposed an *article of faith*; and that all the heavy charge against him of *heresy* in the doctrine of the resurrection, and against me of being scandalously engaged in defence of notorious *heresy*, is founded solely on a contention about words. This I indeed think in itself not worth dispute; and yet have (as you observed before, and may more justly now) disputed a great deal about it. But my reason for so doing I had told you in my letter: it is not the importance of the question, *whether the body raised shall be the very same, or not*, (which would bear little dispute, if all parties were agreed in the sense of the term *same body*) but the vast importance of not submitting to have a word imposed, as a doctrine of faith, which seems to carry such a determinate sense with it, as even the most zealous maintainers of the doctrine confess is not determined in Scripture. By which imposition, those, who understand the term *same body*, to signify the same numerical particles, (as it ought to be, and was understood by the first assertors of the doctrine) and in that sense alone, deny it to be an article of faith, will fall under the charge of heresy, for not believing what the modern assertors of *same body*, who have given a different sense to the word, freely own is not necessary to be believed; tho' they will by no means part with the term. Thus many sincere *Christians* will be condemned with Mr. *Locke*, for *heretics* and *infidels* in the article of the resurrection, who never suspected themselves liable to such a charge, who firmly believe *the resurrection of the dead*, and all that the Scriptures have declared, concerning *the body, with which they shall come*.

If

If after all that has been said, you are still resolute not to be convinced, that this is doing a *great wrong*; yet my pains will not be wholly lost, if others, more open to conviction, perceive the injustice and groundlessness of your accusations. However I am as much resolved as you, that you shall have no more trouble of this nature from,

Rev. Sir,

Your, &c.

REMARKS

UPON SOME

Writers in the Controversy

CONCERNING THE

Foundation of MORAL VIRTUE

AND

MORAL OBLIGATION;

Particularly the

Translator of Archbishop King's *Origin of Evil*,

AND THE

Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*.

To which are prefixed,

Some *Cursory Thoughts* on the Controversies concerning *necessary Existence, The Reality and Infinity of Space, The Extension and Place of Spirits*, and on Dr. *Watts's Notion of Substance*.

First printed in the Year 1743.