

fee, that these things are not plainly contained in the Scriptures; and that therefore they cannot be necessary, which the church of *Rome* allows they are not; whereas nothing less than an infallible interpreter can assure us, that they are not contrary to the *Scripture*, and consequently very dangerous.

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A  
**D E F E N C E**  
 O F  
**Mr. LOCKE'S ESSAY**  
 O F  
**Human Understanding,**

W H E R E I N

Its Principles, with reference to *Morality, Revealed Religion*, and the *Immortality of the Soul*, are considered and justified: In answer to some REMARKS on that Essay.

First printed in the Year 1702.

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To the Excellent

Mr. LOCKE.

S I R,

I Do not presume to address these papers to you as a champion in your cause; but as an offender, to make the best apology I can for a bold unlicensed undertaking. That excellence of the *Essay of Human Understanding*, which gave me courage in encountering a caviller against it, strikes me with shame and awe, when I think of coming before you; like a rash lover, that fights in defence of a lady's honour, the juster his cause is, the more reason he has to fear her resentment, for not leaving it to assert itself by its own evidence; and the more it secures him of success against his adversary, the less pretence he has to her forgiveness. But, Sir, *The Essay of Human Understanding* is a publick concern, which every one has a right and interest to defend. It came too late into the world to be received without opposition, as it might have been in the first ages of philosophy, before mens heads were prepossessed with imaginary science. At least, no doubt, if so perfect a work could have been produced so early, it would have prevented a great deal of that unintelligible jargon, and vain pretence to knowledge of things out of the reach of human understanding, which make a great part of the school learning, and disuse the mind to plain and solid truth.

But

But the great Mr. *Locke* was reserved for a citious and learned age, to *break in upon this sanctuary of vanity and ignorance*; and by setting men on considering first *the bounds of human understanding*, to help them in a close pursuit of true and useful knowledge. And is it possible for a lover of truth to be unmoved, or silently suffer any injurious insinuations of so excellent a design?

Your time, Sir, is too precious to be employed in taking notice of them. You still go on in farther designs for our advantage and improvement; and whilst you labour in that great end, to which you were destined, *the good of mankind*, it is every one's duty to be watchful for you, and zealous to secure the benefits you have already done us.

It is confessed, the vast disproportion between one of so mean abilities as the author of this defence, and the incomparable Mr. *Locke*, might with reason have deterred from the attempt. But I did not presume to consider myself in any kind of comparison with him. I only observed the adversary's strength, and thought (with reason and justice on my side) I need not be discouraged to enter the lists with him; and I am persuaded, what I have done will leave him no cause of triumph, how much soever it is unworthy of you. I wish, Sir, you may only find it enough worth your notice, to incite you to shew the world, how far it falls short of doing justice to your principles; which you may do without interrupting the great business of your life, by a work, that will be an universal benefit, and which you have given the world some right to exact of you. Who is there so capable of pursuing to a *demonstration* those reflections on the grounds of *morality*, which you have already made? Which, on the hints you have given, is impatiently expected from you by many, who lament the great need there is of it in this age. That consideration, no doubt, will animate one, who has ever shewn a careful

careful zeal for the advancement of practical religion; and I cannot but think a man so greatly qualified for such an undertaking was given in mercy to an age, in which it is more than ever wanting; for never any age abounded like this with open advocates of irreligion, upon pretended rational grounds. To silence these unhappy reasoners, by a demonstration of the obligations their nature lays upon them, is a work worthy of the excellent Mr. *Locke*; and perhaps the weakness of this defence may shew you, that those, who mean well to religion, have no little need of your instruction. In hopes of which, I have ventured to publish these papers, not without much apprehension and awe of your displeasure. But, Sir, in my offence you must perceive my zeal; and though I have not the happiness to be known to you, believe me with the profoundest respect,

S I R,

Your most humble,

and most obedient Servant.

P R E-

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# P R E F A C E.

**A**S the science of true morality is of the most universal and highest concernment to mankind, no doubt, those writers, who establish it upon the clearest, most obvious, and the most solid grounds, do the best service to religion, which has received no little prejudice, by the attempts of some well-meaning men to support it upon metaphysical notions, upon false or abstruse reasonings: And as there appears a hearty zeal for setting men right in that great concern, in all the writings of the excellent author of the *Essay of Human Understanding*, I know no philosopher before him, that has fixed morality upon so solid a foundation, as he gives many hints of in that *Essay*, wherever the subject will permit; a foundation strong enough to satisfy the wisest, and plain enough to be conceived by the weakest capacities. And yet there have not been wanting some, who have taxed that admirable *Essay* with principles prejudicial, or not sufficient to those great ends, which are evidently the main scope of all that author's works. So hard it is for men, who have been used to receive truth in a particular dress, to know her, when stript of those false colours and borrowed ornaments, with which she is too often disguised. At least, this is the worst I would think of such cavillers. The most favourable judgment, that can be

be made of them, is that they have either mistaken Mr. *Locke's* principles, or the true grounds of morality, and write out of too great a fondness of their own *hypothesis*, or ignorance of his.

But as there are no reflections so weak or ill grounded, that some or other may not be deceived by, I have met with two or three, who upon reading some remarks on the *Essay of Human Understanding* (which fell but lately into my hands) concluded it contained very dangerous principles, and without farther examination, condemned the *Essay*, having never read, or as they owned, very little considered it; on which account, several, who have a great respect for Mr. *Locke*, have wished he had leisure to answer the difficulties objected against his principles by the Remarker. But as I did not think them strong enough to need so great a hand to remove them, I persuaded myself I might do something towards it, which at first I designed only for my own satisfaction, and those few friends, who had spoke to me of them; but in examining their force, I found them so much grounded on mistakes, not only of the principles the author contends against, but of the foundation of those grand points he contends for, that it fell unavoidably in my way to make some reflections upon the *true grounds of morality*, and the danger of establishing a point of so great concern as that, and the immortality of the soul, upon false or uncertain *hypothesis*, which having been frequently attempted, and by well designing men, made me think it might not be useless to publish these papers. And I hope, whatever may tend to removing any prejudices against a book of so great use as the *Essay of Human Understanding*, will be thought of some consequence to the publick. And though I am far from pretending to have set the principles I defend in all the lustre



they are capable of, I doubt not, that I have sufficiently shewn the weakness of the objections against them, and that all impartial readers will easily perceive, that whatever is defective in this defence, can only be imputed to want of judgment in the undertaker, equal to the truth and justice of the cause.

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A  
VINDICATION  
OF AN  
ESSAY  
CONCERNING  
Human Understanding.

THIS happy for mankind, when men of an elevated genius, and uncommon penetration, have too a truly noble and beneficent nature, above any low particular ends, and resolute enough to encounter all the oppositions they must meet in an unbiaſſed ſearch of truth, from thoſe, who having with much pains imbibed the opinions of revered authors, are unwilling to unlearn all their former knowledge, to examine what they have been taught for firſt principles, not to be queſtioned, and lay aſide their ſacred *ipſe dixit*. He, who dares attempt againſt this eſta bliſhed monarchy over mens judgments, muſt be looked on as a troubleſome and dangerous innovater, and needs a mighty force of reaſon and generous courage, to break through all the prejudices of men, and free them from a willing ſlavery. To that united force we owe the excellent *Eſſay on Human Under-*

*Understanding*; and to these prejudices, all the cavils against it.

When the light of truth shines too clear and strong to be directly faced, the only shelter for those, who would not feel its force, is to seek for far fetched dangerous consequences, supposed inconsistencies with revealed truths, and mysteries of faith, deduced by a long train of arguments, which engaging in an intricate dispute shades them with some pretence, for not confessing the splendor of that truth, they cannot encounter; inconsistencies with revealed truths, when the real necessary consequence of any principles being sufficient proofs against them, how plausible soever they appear. But Mr. *Locke* has so well vindicated his *Essay* from those imputed to it by the most considerable of his opposers, that the rest could only hope to triumph in his neglect of their attempts, who by the help of some suppositions, and many mistakes, have endeavoured to draw an odium on that excellent *Essay*.

The Remarker, whom I have now under consideration, in his first letter<sup>a</sup>, desires to be informed how far all the principles of that ingenious *Essay*, taken together, will give us a sure foundation for morality, revealed religion, and a future life, which he does not find that they do. What his reasons, or rather difficulties (as he terms them) are, is my design to consider, and endeavour to satisfy. In his second remarks, he mentions an answer of Mr. *Locke's*, which I have not read, but suppose, by what he quotes out of it, that it was rather designed to shew the weakness of his objections, than to give a full answer to them, Mr. *Locke*, perhaps, thinking it sufficient to shew they required none. But I find they are still of weight with the Remarker, his second and third remarks being only enlargements upon the same heads.

I shall therefore examine them in their order, taking on each head the substance of what I find relating to it in all the three remarks, that the answer, lying together, may be the more clear, and the better considered, which, I hope, will be done by the Remarker without prejudice, as it was writ, with a design to satisfy him, and in a sincere love of truth, to do justice to a book, which, I think, removes the obstacles to it, and shews the method of attaining it, clearer and more effectually, and is writ in an exacter method, than any before it, to vindicate it from a defect in the foundation of certainty, in those things, which are of greatest concern to us: which I doubt not to do; it being clear to me, that whatever we can know at all, must be discoverable by Mr. *Locke's* principles; for I cannot find any other way to knowledge, or that we have any one idea not derived from sensation and reflection. But let us see, how those points may be established on them, for which the Remarker doubts their force; and first of morality, or natural religion; of which, he thus begins:

"As to morality, we think the great foundation of it is the distinction of good and evil, virtue and vice.—And I do not find, that my eyes, ears, nostrils, or any other outward senses, make any distinction of these things, as they do of colours, sounds, &c.—Nor from any ideas taken in from them, or from their reports, am I conscious, that I do, or can conclude, that there is such a distinction in the nature of things." In which words<sup>c</sup>, he says, he thought he had taken in enough to comprehend both Mr. *Locke's* principles of knowledge, *sensation and reflection*, which I should not have thought; but since he owns he designed them to do so, we will suppose both expressed, and proceed with him. "I allow, that we may infer from observation and reason, that such a

" distinction is useful to society, but both philosophers and divines, you know, make a more immutable and intrinsic distinction, which is that I cannot make out from your principles.—This I am sure of, that the distinction, suppose of gratitude and ingratitude, fidelity and infidelity, justice and injustice, and such others, is as sudden without any ratiocination, and as sensible and piercing, as the difference I feel from the scent of a rose and *assa fetida*." One would think here, he were doubting, whether upon Mr. Locke's principles we can distinguish *gratitude* from *ingratitude*, *fidelity* from *infidelity*, &c. that is, know that breaking a trust is not keeping a trust, &c. which (as all other moral virtues, as Mr. Locke has shewn<sup>d</sup>) are a collection of simple ideas, received from sensation and reflection. But since he allowed above, that *we can from observation and reason, infer such a distinction to be useful to society*, and by consequence, that we can by them perceive such a distinction, we will guess his meaning here, to be, that the perception of the *morality and immorality* of these things is as sudden, &c. *as the difference he feels from the scent of a rose, and assa fetida*; though I do not know what it is, to perceive the *morality and immorality* of these things *without any ratiocination*. *Justice and injustice*, I think, depend upon the rights of men, whether natural, or established by particular societies; and therefore to know what they are, it is necessary to know what right is, which sure requires some *reflection*. But to know, that *injustice is evil*, without any *reflection*, seems to me no more than to know, that the term *injustice* stands for something that we do not know, which is evil; unless it will be said, that we may know it to be a detaining any one's right, without knowing what right is, which will be a very insignificant knowledge. But if the Remarker

<sup>d</sup> *Es. p. 195. § 14.*

means,

means, that as soon as he knows what it is to have a right to a thing, he perceives, that to detain from a man what he has such a right to, is evil, without any farther reflection, I understand him, but see not how it can be objected against the force of Mr. Locke's principles, being only a perception of the disagreement of these two ideas, of one man's having a right to a thing, and another's having a right to take it away: but this only by the way.

Let us now consider that, for which this sudden perception without ratiocination is brought as a proof, *viz.* that the ground of the distinction of moral good and evil is in the *nature of the things themselves*, abstract from the good of society; which is that he cannot make out from Mr. Locke's principles. By which distinction in the nature of things, if he means, that without respect to men, or to society, though mankind had never been, or never been designed, justice, gratitude, fidelity, &c. had been good, and their contraries evil; I confess myself incapable of having a notion of these virtues abstract from any subject to conceive: For example, that it would have been good to be faithful to a trust, though there had never been any one to trust, or be trusted: nor do I find, that the assertors of this distinction in the nature of things have any real idea of them more abstracted than I have, which will appear in examining their particular instances. I will take that, which the Remarker gives<sup>e</sup>, being one of the most incontestable principles in morality, *That it is a wicked thing, for a man maliciously to kill his friend, or his father, or any other innocent person.* The truth of this, he says, *seems to him as clear and eternal, as any proposition in mathematics*; and it seems to me as clear, that it cannot possibly be conceived at all, either *true or false*, in itself, *i. e.* without any relation to man. I desire any one, to try, whether he can conceive

<sup>e</sup> 2 Rem. p. 26.

it to be an eternal truth, that it is a wicked thing, for a man to kill his father, or his friend, though there had never been, or designed to be, such a thing as friend, father, or man. But whether he can or not, it will still be a truth as *certain and immutable*, as any proposition in mathematics. No mathematician, that I know of, thinks it necessary to establish the immutability of this truth, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones; to affirm, that it is true, without any relation to angles or triangles. Either of these propositions are sufficiently established, if it is, and always must be true, supposing those things, to which it relates, to exist<sup>f</sup>.

But here the Remarkers's<sup>g</sup> question will be made, upon what grounds must it be so? If *good and evil*, virtue and vice, are not such in their own nature, *they must be so from the arbitrary will of God; and all things are indifferent, till he declare this, or that, to be sin, according to his pleasure*: that is, he might, if he had so pleased, have made *virtue, vice*; and *vice, virtue*: To which, I answer, that God having made man such a creature as he is, it is as impossible, that good and evil should change their respects to him, as that *pleasure* can be *pain*, and *pain pleasure*, which no one in his senses will affirm; and yet, I think, no body has supposed them to be real existences, independent

<sup>f</sup> This whole paragraph is a partial and temporary consideration of moral truths (as the opposers of Dr. Clarke do now consider them) with relation only to the present constitution of things, not to their original ground, as they exist eternally in the divine mind. An error, the author is now sensible of, and that there was no need of this for the defence of Mr. Locke's principles. If his plan led him only to speak of the immediate origin of our ideas, or how we come by our ideas of moral relations, his principles are sufficient by the reflections we make on the operations of our own minds, to lead us to the supreme mind, where all truth, and the abstract nature of all possible things, must eternally and immutably exist.

<sup>g</sup> 2 Rem. p. 22.

of any subject. And if the relation, which moral good and evil has to natural good and evil, were sufficiently observed, there would be as little dispute about the nature and reality of *virtue and vice*. Those, who think they are only notions in the mind, would be convinced they are as real as natural good and evil; all *moral good* consisting in doing, willing, or chusing, for one's self or others, whatever is a *natural good*; and all *moral evil*, in doing, willing, or chusing whatever is a *natural evil*, to one's self or others. This, I doubt not, will appear a full definition, when tried by every instance of *moral good and evil*, to all, who reflect on it; unless there are any, who do not place the perfection and imperfection, the advantages and disadvantages of the *mind*, in their account of *natural good or evil*; which I believe no rational man will own.

And as this unalterable relation makes the real and immutable nature of virtue and vice undeniable; so also from thence it is plain, *that the nature of man is the ground or reason of the law of nature; i. e.* of moral good and evil. But if the Remarker will rather have it, that the nature of these things is the reason of the nature of man, that they are essentially in the nature of God, which is the rule of his will, and according to which he formed man; let it be so, as it is unquestionable, that he cannot will any thing contrary to his nature. But however the moral attributes of God, goodness, justice, &c. are in him (who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow capacities) this I say (which Mr. Locke has observed of our idea of their infinity) that we have no idea of them, but what carries with it a respect to their objects, *the natural good or evil of his creatures*; and we could have no idea of them at all without reflection upon ourselves; for whatever is the original standard of good and evil, it is plain, we have no notion of them



them but by their conformity, or repugnancy to our reason, and with relation to our nature; and that what according to it we perceive to be good, we ascribe to the Supreme Being; for we cannot know, that the nature of God is good, before we have a notion of good. It must be then by reflecting upon our own nature, and the operations of our minds, that we come to know the nature of God; which therefore cannot be to us the rule of good and evil; unless we will argue in a circle, that by our notion of good, we know the nature of God, and by the nature of God, we know what is good.

From whence it will follow, that the nature of man, and the good of society, are to us the reason and rule of moral good and evil; and there is no danger of their being less immutable on this foundation than any other, whilst man continues a *rational and sociable creature*. If the law of nature is the product of human nature itself (as the great *Grotius* speaks) it must subsist as long as human nature; nor will this foundation make it the less sacred, since it cannot be doubted, that it is originally the will of God, whilst we own him the author of that nature, of which this law is a consequence.

If then, in Mr. *Locke's* way, we can perceive what is conformable, or not, to our own nature, which cannot be doubted; if by reflecting on ourselves, we can come to know there must be a Supreme Being, the source of all others, which he has admirably shewn<sup>b</sup>; we have a sacred and immutable foundation for natural religion, on his principles; this being a plain and infallible inference, that the Author of our being does require those things of us, to which he has suited our nature, and visibly annexed our happiness, which he has made the necessary motive of all our actions. For it is inconsistent with that divine wisdom, which we see has

<sup>b</sup> *Es. B. iv. c. x.*

fitted

fitted all other things to their proper and certain end, to have formed us after such a manner, that if we employ those faculties, which he has given us, we cannot but judge, that such things are fit to be done, and others to be avoided, and this to no end at all. Much less can we suppose he has designed us to act contrary to the necessary motives of our actions, and judgment of our minds; it being a flat contradiction, that infinite wisdom and power should form any of his works so disproportionate to their end.

It will not be much from the purpose here, to take notice of the folly of those men, who think to weaken the authority of religion, by calling it a politic contrivance, established for the good of government or society; which is as much as to say, it is the less obligatory, because it is necessary. Whereasthat very thing shews it to be our indispensable duty, and of divine authority, without any revelation; since the divine workmanship, *human nature*, could not subsist without it. If they could prove it unpolitic or destructive to society, it would be much more for their purpose; for such a religion must necessarily be false; nothing can be a *law to nature*, which of direct consequence would *destroy nature*.

But if any one thinks it better established on the nature of God, I have shewn how we come to the knowledge of it in Mr. *Locke's* way, by ascribing to him whatever by its conformity to our nature we perceive to be good; because we see, that we cannot admit any imperfection in the Supreme Being, without a contradiction (which I shall shew in Mr. *Locke's* way, when I come to the next head) and having by the *effect* found out the *cause*, we may then conclude the nature of God to be the arch-type of ours, because we cannot suppose the most perfect Being can will any thing contrary to his own nature; for if he could, the rule of that will must be something less perfect than

than himself, (for whatever is most perfect is God) and therefore to will any thing contrary to his own nature, would be an imperfection in him, which to admit in the most perfect being, is a contradiction. Thus (when I have more fully shewn, how we come by the idea of perfection in the Supreme Being) the Remarker may perceive, that we can, in Mr. *Locke's* way, arrive to the original notion of intrinsic holiness,<sup>1</sup> into which 'tis ultimately resolved, which he is so much concerned to find; and that I hope will reconcile him to Mr. *Locke's* principles.

And if he will attentively examine his own without prepossession, if he will trace his idea of God, and of moral good and evil, to their first source, I believe he will find he has no other principle of knowledge than Mr. *Locke*; and that the mistake lies, in that being taught truths after they are discovered, and finding them agreeable to our reason, we immediately assent to them, without reflecting, how they were first found out, and are apt to conclude those things, which we find first in our knowledge, to be the first principles of knowledge; tho' they were proceeded to by many steps and degrees, and were the last established in the discovery.

But the Remarker will object, that Mr. *Locke* does not establish morality upon the nature of man, and the nature of God, <sup>2</sup> but seems to ground his demonstration upon future punishments and rewards, and upon the arbitrary will of the law-giver; and he does not think these the first grounds of good and evil. To which I answer, first, supposing it were so, the question is not what Mr. *Locke* thinks, but what may be proved from his principles. <sup>3</sup> But secondly, I say, that Mr. *Locke* does ground his demonstration upon the nature of God and man, as will plainly appear by his express words, which are these. <sup>4</sup> "The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, goodness,

<sup>1</sup> 2 Rem p. 2. <sup>2</sup> 2 R. p. 2. <sup>3</sup> 2 R. p. 4. <sup>4</sup> Eff. B. iv. c. 3. §. 18.

" and

" and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and  
 " on whom we depend, and the idea of ourselves,  
 " as understanding rational creatures, being such,  
 " as are clear in us, would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of  
 " our duty and rules of action, as might place  
 " morality among the sciences capable of demonstration." Nothing can be clearer than this; and in all those places, which the Remarker quotes out of Mr. *Locke*, where he seems to establish morality upon the will of God, and rewards and punishments, he is speaking of it, as it has the force of a law; and the Remarker cannot deny, whatever he thinks, the first grounds of good and evil; or however clearly we may see the nature of these things, we may approve or condemn them; but they can only have the force of a law to us, considered as the will of the Supreme Being, who can, and certainly will, reward the compliance with, and punish the deviation from that rule, which he has made knowable to us by the light of nature<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Some, who had lately read this defence, have thought, that the author's sentiments, on the grounds of moral obligation, were different when this was wrote, from what they now appear to be in some late pieces. But the author thinks there is no real difference: the grounds of moral obligation are not here discussed at all; the notion of founding morality on arbitrary will is carefully rejected; and the nature of God, or the divine understanding, and the nature of man, all along supposed to be the true grounds of it. New terms have been since introduced into these subjects; we talk now of essential differences, nature, relation, truth, and fitness of things: but the meaning is the very same; for all these are to be sought for in the nature of God, or of man. But Mr. *Locke* is here defended in establishing morality on the will of God, and rewards and punishments considered, as it has the force of a law; there I suppose lies the apparent difference, tho' there is none in reality. The author still agrees to that proposition; for strictly and properly speaking a law implies authority and sanctions; and though we say the law of reason, and the law of nature, this is in a less proper sense, importing, that they are as effectual grounds of obligation, as if they were real laws, but they oblige us, not as dependent, but as reasonable beings; in the same manner as the Supreme Being, who is subject to no laws, and accountable

But that we can only know these things to be his will by their conformity to our nature, and that therefore they cannot be arbitrary, I have before shewn; and that he will punish or reward us according to our obedience or disobedience to it, is a consequence of his nature. So that, tho' Mr. Locke says, that the will of God, rewards and punishments, can only give morality the force of a law; that does not make them the *first grounds* of good and evil, since by his principles, to know what the will of God is (antecedently to revelation) we must know what is good by the conformity it has to our nature, by which we come to know the nature of God, which therefore may be to him the first ground or rule of good; tho' *the will of God, &c.* can only enforce it as a law.

I cannot here omit to take notice of a question the Remarker asks on this subject: ° How, pray you, upon these principles, do you preserve the distinction (that good old distinction, which it may be you despise) of *Bonum Utile*, and *Honestum*? In your way, either the parts are coincident, or *Bonum Utile* is superior to *Bonum Honestum*. I'm afraid the Remarker will have hard thoughts of me, if I should say I do not like his good old distinction, and that I think the parts are coincident. I know not whether he will have a better opinion of me, when I tell him, I do not mean it in the way, which he injuriously insinuates to be Mr. Locke's; but that nothing can be truly profitable, that is not honest. However, not to cavil about words, this am I sure of, that there is no ground for the Remarker's reflection on those principles, which he is dissatisfied with, viz. "That

accountable to none, obliges himself to do always what he perceives to be right and fit to be done. In this light the author has all along considered the grounds of moral obligation; and this I presume is not inconsistent with allowing, that the will of God, rewards and punishments, can only give morality the force of a law.

° 2 Rem. p. 25.

" moral

" morally good and evil is the conformity or disagreement of our actions to the divine law; which  
 " P Mr. Locke says is the only true touch-stone of  
 " moral rectitude; and that by comparing them to  
 " this law, men judge of the most considerable  
 " moral good or evil of their actions, that is, whether as duties or sins, they are like to procure  
 " them happiness or misery from the hands of the  
 " Almighty." Upon these principles *Bonum Utile* can never be superior to *Bonum Honestum*, in Mr. Locke's way, till the Remarker can shew him some moral evil, that is not contrary to the divine law; or a way to escape the hands of the Almighty, when we disobey him.

What has been said, will be sufficient to answer all that the Remarker has said directly on this point: but what further concerns it, of *natural consequence*, and the proofs of the *moral attributes of God*, will be considered in their order; which leads us to the second head, of which the Remarker.

¶ As to revealed religion, my difficulty is only this, how it can be proved from your principles, that the author of the revelation is veracious; and p. 7. to establish the certainty of revealed religion, we must know the moral attributes of the divine nature, such as goodness, justice, holiness, and particularly veracity. Now these I am not able to deduce from your principles. You have proved very well an eternal all-powerful and all-knowing being: but, &c. The Remarker, it seems, does not find what Mr. Locke says, after he has very well proved an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; ¶ That from this idea, duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. The Remarker is not able to do it, tho', to help him, Mr. Locke says, he may be ashamed to have raised such a doubt as this, viz. whether an infinitely powerful and wise being be veracious, or no, unless he concludes lying to be no mark of weakness, and

¶ Eff. B. ii. c. 28. ¶ 1st Rem. p. 6. ¶ Eff. B. iv. c. 10. § 6. folly.



*folly.* \* As I find in his words repeated by the Remarker, which he complains of, *as misrepresenting, and perverting his sense; the question is not* (says he) *whether God be veracious, but whether, according to your principles, he can be proved to be so.* Answ. But the question is, *whether an infinitely powerful and wise being is veracious or no;* for such a being Mr. Locke has *very well proved*, as the Remarker owns: so that the doubt must be, whether, as such, he must be *veracious*; for the Remarker allows *veracity* to be a consequence of *infinite power and wisdom.* The veracity of God is proved by Mr. Locke's principles; and this is an absurd question, whether the veracity of God can be proved from his principles, if *falsehood* is allowed to be a *mark of weakness and folly*; for then it cannot possibly be admitted in a being, which he has proved of *infinite wisdom and power*; and I know no better way of proving any thing, than by proving principles, upon which it cannot be denied without a contradiction; so that Mr. Locke has not *perverted* the Remarker's sense; for he cannot avoid this dilemma, either he concludes falsehood to be a *mark of weakness and folly*, or he does not: if not, then Mr. Locke has rightly represented his sense; if he does, then this is an absurd question, whether one, who has proved an infinitely powerful and wise Being, can prove he is not false.

But this is not sufficient for the Remarker: he is *not able to deduce* one attribute from another. Let us see then what is his way to know the moral attributes of God, which, he tells us, is this, *he ascribes veracity to God, because it is a perfection.* But from what grounds does he conclude, that whatever is a perfection must be in God? Will he say, that it is a principle imprinted on the mind, without any reflection; that is, we clearly see, that God must be perfect, we don't know why: or will he not rather say, that the want of any perfection would imply

\* 2d. Rem p. 3.

either

either that he does not know what is best, or cannot attain it, and therefore is inconsistent with infinite wisdom and power? Or that to suppose there may be a being of greater perfection than the supreme source of all being, is a gross contradiction? I believe, if he reflects attentively on the progress of the mind in the knowledge of God, he will find perfection is not first in our notion of him, (as an ingenious author has shewn<sup>†</sup>) but that having discovered a first being, the source of all others, and what attributes we must necessarily ascribe to him, as such, we perceive, that to admit any imperfection in him would be a contradiction to our first necessary conceptions of him; which Mr. Locke has established in his way, and tells us, that from them all his other attributes will easily be deduced.

But this will not satisfy the Remarker, unless Mr. Locke tells us, *what is to be understood by perfection in his way; how it is derived from the senses; and how it includes veracity*\*. The Remarker is very apt to forget, that Mr. Locke has another principle of knowledge, which he calls *reflection*; or he thinks it insignificant. Perhaps it may be so as to his purpose; but happening to be serviceable in the present enquiry, I take leave to remind him of it, that we may consider how far it will help us to the idea of perfection.

But first, I observe, that we have no adequate idea of perfection; but perceiving in ourselves some *powers and faculties*, as of *knowing, willing, moving*, &c. and of particular actions, and general abstract ideas; that some are congruous, and others repugnant to each other, and to our reason; we know, that some things are better than others; and from every thing about us, and within us, we may learn, that the vastly greater part of them escape the extent of our power, knowledge, and goodness; from whence we conclude, these things may be far more extensive,

† Norris Reason and Religion.

\* 1st. Rem. p. 8.



even to all that can exist. And the highest possible degree of these, which we find it better to have, than to be without, that we call perfection; which to have an adequate idea of, we must comprehend the existence of an infinite spirit. But we cannot add any thing to make up this idea, which we do not find in ourselves; only the degrees, which we perceive must be ascribed, far beyond our measures, to that Being, from which we received all our powers and faculties, and by whose wisdom, power, and goodness, all things exist; for perfection is only the highest degree, or the best manner of possible existence; and that the eternal source of all being must exist in the most perfect manner possible, cannot be doubted; for there cannot be a greater absurdity, than to suppose there may be a more perfect being, than the eternal source of all Being. Thus we see how the idea of perfection, such as we have, may be derived from *sensation and reflection*; and any one, who considers it, will find, that he has no positive idea of it, and that there is nothing in that idea, which he has, but what the objects without him, or the faculties he perceives in himself, have furnished him with; and that therefore it is needless to seek for any other original of it.

Having now got the idea of perfection, in Mr. Locke's way, and found, that it must necessarily be ascribed to the eternal source of all being, we must next consider the other part of the Remarker's question, *how it includes veracity*, which he is the more concerned to know, because he says, *not only the truth of revelation, but also of our faculties in other things, depends upon the veracity of their author*<sup>w</sup>. And here he must give me leave to ask him, upon what grounds veracity is to him a perfection? He will not say, because God is veracious (tho' the nature of God is to him the rule of good) for he ascribes veracity to God, because it is a perfection, and he

<sup>w</sup> 1st. Rem. p. 8.

does.

does not approve of arguing in a circle. He must then know, that veracity is a perfection from some other rule; and here I am afraid he will be involved in a great difficulty; for *the truth of our faculties*, he says, *depends upon the veracity of their author*: but before he can know the veracity of their author, he must be sure, that veracity is a perfection, since it is only as such he does, or it can be ascribed to him. Now by whatsoever means he perceives it to be so, how can he be certain, that the faculty, by which he receives that information, does not deceive him? for unless he is certain, that veracity is a perfection, he cannot be certain, that God is veracious, nor therefore of the truth of his faculties. He must then remain in doubt, whether God is veracious, unless he can know it without the help of his faculties, that is, without the power or capacity of knowing it; or he must suppose the truth of his faculties without any proof. If that is not a first principle not to be doubted of, I see no defence against an incurable scepticism: we cannot argue for, or against any thing, and the Remarker cannot know, that his position is true, *viz.* That the truth of our faculties depends upon the veracity of their author, since he must take it upon the credit of those faculties. Let him doubt the truth of his faculties as much as he will, if he affirms any one thing, in that one he must believe them upon their own evidence; and since he could not trust them in other things, till he was certain of the veracity of their author; whatever principle he establishes that certainty upon, he must rely upon the evidence of his faculties for the truth of that principle, which he tells us is this, *that veracity is a perfection, and consequently must belong to the nature of God*<sup>x</sup>. For which propositions we may therefore conclude, he was contented to suppose the truth of his faculties; and he cannot deny Mr. Locke the same

<sup>x</sup> 1st. Rem. p. 7. 2d Rem. p. 18.

E 2

privilege

privilege, till he can show him some way to knowledge without their help.

In the mean time there can be but two ways of knowing, that veracity is a perfection: either it is an innate principle, originally imprinted on the mind; (which I shall not endeavour to confute, Mr. Locke having done it sufficiently, nor is it needful to my purpose.) Let that be the Remarker's way of knowledge, if he pleases, since he must no less rely upon the truth of his faculties in that way than any other, it being impossible for God himself to make any impression on us, without giving us a faculty whereby to receive it. But let us see, whether it is discoverable in the other way, which must be Mr. Locke's of *sensation and reflection*. I suppose the Remarker does not doubt, that in this way we can distinguish truth from falsehood, *i. e.* know, that things are as they are; appear, as they appear; and that doing a thing differs from not doing it; that an apple, for example, is not a horse; that pain is not pleasure; and that performing our promise is not breaking it; or that representing things as they are, or as they appear to us, and performing our promise, *i. e.* veracity, is more agreeable to our nature, and beneficial to mankind, than the contrary; which how far *to us* the rule of good and evil, I have before shewn, and shall only add here, that if in Mr. Locke's way we can know, that what is beneficial to mankind, is better than what is destructive to it; that happiness is better than misery, that power and knowledge is better than impotence and ignorance; if we may trust our faculties in discerning truths, as sensible to us as our own existence; it cannot be doubted, that in his way we can be assured, that veracity is a perfection, till some other reason of falsehood can be imagined, than ignorance, impotence, or willing evil for its own sake, which cannot be conceived possible; to chuse or prefer evil, as evil, being no less a contradiction, than to judge that to be best, which we know to be worst.

And

And the Remarker could not have been at a loss how to deduce this, and all the other moral attributes of God, from Mr. Locke's principles, if he had carefully considered his discourse of our idea of God, where he shews, that it is *made up of the simple idea we have received from sensation and reflection, by putting together all the qualities and powers, which we experiment in ourselves, and find it better to have, than to be without, and enlarging every one of them with our idea of infinity*; to which place I refer the Remarker. And if he can by *reflection* find veracity, justice, and goodness, among the things, that it is *better to have than to be without*, I hope (with what I have said) it will help him to deduce those attributes of God from Mr. Locke's principles; which will satisfy him, that they give us a sure foundation for *natural and revealed religion*; by which we have a full assurance of a future state; the Remarker's third head of enquiries, which we are next to consider.

That the immortality of the soul is only highly probable by the light of nature, none can deny, who believes that Apostle, by whom we are told, *that life and immortality is brought to light by Jesus Christ through the gospel*. Why then is it objected against Mr. Locke's principles, that they give us no certainty of the immortality of the soul without revelation? By what other way can we be certain of any thing, that is only highly probable by the light of nature? Which is all that can be proved by any principles; and so far Mr. Locke's will go, as I doubt not to make appear. But farther I shall shew, that there is nothing in his principles, which at all weakens the main proofs of a future state; so that if they are thought to amount to demonstration, they have no less force and evidence, upon his principles, which will leave no pretence on this account against them; as will plainly appear in examining the Remarker's objections.

y B. ii. c. 23. § 33, 34.

E 3

You

<sup>z</sup> You suppose (says he) that the soul may be sometimes absolutely without thoughts, of one kind or other; and also, that God may, if he pleases (for any thing we know by the light of nature) give, or have given, to some systems of matter a power to conceive and think. Upon these two suppositions, I could not make out any certain proof of the immortality of the soul, and am apt to think it cannot be done.

As to the first of these objections, I confess I do not see of what consequence it is at all to the proofs of the immortality of the soul. Do they depend upon the contrary supposition, that the soul *always thinks*? If they do, proofs upon a supposition have a very unsure foundation. But let it be granted, that it is ever so clearly proved, that thinking is necessary to the soul's existence, that can no more prove, that it shall always exist, than it proves, that it has always existed; it being as possible for that omnipotence, which from nothing gave the soul a *being*, to deprive it of that *being* in the midst of its most vigorous reflections, as in an utter suspension of all thought. If then this proposition, *that the soul always thinks*, does not prove, that it is immortal, the contrary supposition takes not away any proof of it; for it is no less easy to conceive, that a *being*, which has the power of thinking with some intervals of cessation from thought, that has existed here for some time in a capacity of happiness or misery, may be continued in, or restored to the same state, in a future life, than that a *being*, which always thinks, may be continued in the same state. But to do the Remarker all the justice, and give him all the satisfaction I can, I shall examine the substance of what he objected against Mr. Locke's assertion, without entering farther into the dispute, than may serve to shew, whether it is of any consequence for, or against, the immortality of the soul.

<sup>z</sup> 1st. Rem. p. 8.

Mr.

Mr. Locke says, men do not think in sound sleep; and his reason is, because they are not conscious of it, and it is a contradiction to say a man thinks, but is not conscious of it; thinking consisting in that very thing of our being conscious of it. Upon which supposition, the Remarker cannot make out any certain proof of the immortality of the soul.

I suppose Mr. Locke did not design it a proof of the immortality of the soul: but let us see, whether it weakens any proof of it, which the Remarker should have shewn, but instead of that proposes difficulties, which that supposition involves him in, and begins with this notable one, *I wonder how you can observe, that your soul sometimes does not think; for when you do observe it, you think: if a man could think, and not think, at the same time, he might be able to make this observation.* This reversed may be an argument of some force indeed; but to conclude, that my soul does not always think, 'tis sufficient to know, that there has some time past, in which I was not conscious, that I thought; unless we will allow, that the soul may think, when the man does not, which is plainly to make them two persons, as Mr. Locke has shewn <sup>a</sup> p. 44. and 45. in which the Remarker says he does not understand what that discourse about the identity or non-identity of the same man, sleeping and waking, and about Castor and Pollux, aims at, and tends to<sup>b</sup>. A discourse about the non-identity of the same man would, I confess, be very hard to understand; but I find no such in that place, or any other of Mr. Locke's Essay: he does not trifle at that rate, as to talk of the same man's not being the same man. He says indeed, that *if the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking and enjoyments apart, which the man is not at all conscious of; his soul, when he sleeps, and the man consisting of body and soul, when he is waking, are two persons.* And he further illustrates the same thing in his discourse of

<sup>a</sup> Essay of Human Understanding.

<sup>b</sup> 1st. Rem. p. 12.

E 4

Castor



*Castor and Pollux*, which, if it be thought absurd to assert, 'tis not hard to find what that discourse aims at, *v. g.* to shew, that such an absurdity will follow from this supposition, that the soul thinks, when the man is not conscious of it. But whatever that discourse aims at, of what consequence can it be to the immortality of the soul, supposing it *does not* always think? That the Remarker says nothing of. But it will not be improper here to take notice of an inference he draws from it in his second Remarks; that Mr. Locke does not think the soul a *permanent substance* distinct from the body. *This* (says he) *seems to be the supposition you go upon, when you question, whether a man waking and sleeping without thoughts be the same man. If there be still the same soul, the same permanent substance, I see no room for that question, or doubt, which you make.* Here the question is again turned, not only from the same *person* to the same *man*, but to sleeping *without* thoughts, from sleeping *with* thoughts, that he is *not* conscious of; which are very different cases as to this question, tho' much the same indeed, as to the thing itself; but that the Remarker won't allow. But perhaps he takes the *soul*, *man*, and *person*, to signify the same thing, and so they may to him: every man has the liberty to make his own words stand for what idea he pleases; but when he argues against the opinion of another, he must consider in what sense those terms are used by that other, and in that sense oppose him; otherwise he fights with his own notions, and not his, whom he seems to dispute with. And 'tis impossible to read Mr. Locke's *Essay* with the least attention, and not know, that he does not use those three terms in one and the same signification; which if the Remarker had considered, he could not have so much mistaken Mr. Locke, or found such difficulties in his discourse. If Mr. Locke had understood by the *soul*, *man*, and *person*, the same thing, he would never have made such a question, whether the *soul* thinking

thinking apart, what the *man* is not at all conscious of, were not a *distinct person*, from the *man*; which would be just the same thing, as to ask, whether the soul thinking apart, what the soul is not conscious of, be not a distinct soul from the soul: But understanding by *person*, as he does, *self consciousness*, and by *man* the *soul and body united*, he may question, whether the *same soul*, the *same permanent substance*, thinking *apart from the body* in sound sleep, what the waking *man* is not conscious of, whether that *incommunicable consciousness* does not make the *soul*, and the *man* consisting of body and soul, two distinct persons; *personal identity*, according to him, consisting in the *same consciousness*, and not in the *same substance*: for whatever substance there is, without *consciousness* there is no *person*. *Consciousness* therefore, and not *substance*, making a *person*, the same consciousness must make the same person, whether in the same, or in different substances; and no farther than the same consciousness extends, can there be the same person: but wherever there are *two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses*, there are two distinct *persons*, though in the same substance.

But farther, not only Mr. Locke's question may be made, supposing the soul a *distinct permanent substance*, but he could not make it upon any other supposition with the least sense, to his purpose, which is to confute this opinion, that the *soul* thinks, in sound sleep, when the *man* is not conscious of it. Now what manner of argument, I pray, would this make?

If the soul thinks, when the man is not conscious of it, the *soul* and the *man* are two *persons*.

But the soul not being a permanent substance, may make two persons. *Ergo*, the soul *cannot* think, when the man does not, because that makes them two persons; the sum of which is, the soul *cannot* think apart, because it *can*.

But if this assertion, that the soul and the man are two persons, implies, that it is not a permanent



nent substance, let those look to it, who say, that the *soul* thinks, when the *man* is not conscious of it, since it is only a consequence of that supposition; but can no way concern Mr. *Locke*, who denies that supposition. But the Remarker is to be excused for making an inference so inconsistent with the design of that discourse, since he confesses he does not understand what it tends to, and perhaps only ventured at a shrewd guess to provoke a clearer account. And indeed, the best construction I can make of the Remarker's writing against Mr. *Locke's Essay*, is, that he understands very little of it; so groundless are the difficulties he makes, and his consequences so wrong. This I am sure, no man that means well, if he understands any thing of what Mr. *Locke* says upon this subject, *that men think not always*, can from thence infer, that he does not think the soul a permanent substance; for it is plain, all the difficulties he finds in supposing the soul does always think, arise only from its being in a sleeping, and waking man, the same permanent substance. Why else does he find it *so very hard to be conceived, that the soul in a sleeping man should this moment be busy a thinking; and the next moment in a waking man, not remember, nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts*? Why, does he think it strange, *if the soul has ideas of its own, that it derived not from sensation or reflection, that it should never, in its private thinking, retain any of them, the very moment it wakes out of them; and then make the man glad with new discoveries*? Or why does he call it an *absurdity*, to make the *soul* and the *man* two persons? There is nothing strange or absurd in all this, if the soul in a sleeping and waking man be not the same permanent substance.

I hope what has been said, is sufficient to help the Remarker's understanding in that discourse of Mr. *Locke's*, which so much puzzled him; and

<sup>c</sup> *Es. p. 45.*

<sup>d</sup> *Page 47.*

<sup>e</sup> *Page 46.*

then

then I am certain he cannot apprehend it of any consequence to the immortality of the soul, supposing it *does not think, when the man is not conscious of it*. I now proceed to his second difficulty.

*I do not understand* (says he) *how the soul, if she be at any time utterly without thoughts, what it is, that produces the first thought again, at the end of that unthinking interval*<sup>f</sup>. And what then? Must we therefore conclude it cannot be done? If that be a good argument, we must deny the most common and visible operations in nature. Do you understand *how* your soul thinks at all? *How* it passes from one thought to another? *How* it preserves its treasure of ideas, to produce them at pleasure on occasions? And recollects those it had not in a long time reflected on? *How* it moves your body, or is affected by it? These are operations, which I suppose you are not so sceptical as to doubt of; nor yet pretend to understand how they are done: and since we are certain, that the soul is affected with all the considerable changes of the body, that it is sick, and in pain, and unable to perform its functions, according as the body is disordered; since we so sensibly perceive it to become drowsy, when the body is so; so many degrees abated of its action, even to very near not thinking at all, from that intenseness and vigour of thought it had, and recovers, when the body is refreshed with sleep; whatever is the cause of these effects, whether some immediate connexion between them, or an arbitrary law of their union; where is the difficulty to conceive, that the same cause, which lulls it almost, should lay it quite to rest, and awaken it again with the body?

But upon this supposition (says the Remarker) *that all our thoughts perish in sound sleep, we seem to have a new soul every morning*<sup>g</sup>. That is a pretty conceit indeed, but how does this seem? Thus, as he

<sup>f</sup> 1st Rem. p. 9.

<sup>g</sup> 2d Rem. p. 17.

explains

explains himself; if a body cease to move, and come to perfect rest, the motion it had cannot be restored, but a new motion may be produced. If all cogitation be extinct, all our ideas are extinct, so far as they are cogitations, and seated in the soul: so we must have them new impressed, we are, as it were, new born, and begin the world again. The force of which argument lies thus: cogitation in the soul answering to motion in the body; as the same motion cannot be restored, but a new motion may be produced; so the same cogitations cannot be restored, but new cogitations must be produced. Ergo, we seem to have a new soul every morning. This may be a good consequence, when the Remarker has proved, that every new motion makes, or seems to make a new body. In the mean time, all I can infer from this parallel, is, that my thoughts to-day are not the same numerical thoughts I had yesterday; which, I believe, no body supposes they are, though they did not suspect they had a new soul with every new thought.

But if the Remarker thinks, that if all our thoughts cease in sound sleep, all our ideas are extinct, and must be new impressed; I desire him to consider, when a sleeping or waking man thinks, what becomes of all those ideas, which he does not actually perceive in his own mind; for the mind is capable of taking notice but of very few at once: must not all the rest by this argument be extinct? And so we must have them new impressed; and are, as it were, new born, whenever we have any ideas, which we have not always actually perceived, *i. e.* every time we pass from one thought to another. This is a sure consequence, if, when all our thoughts cease, all our ideas must be new impressed, unless a man could actually perceive all the ideas he ever had at once; for his having only one thought in his mind can no more keep any other there, or excite any other, that it has no connexion with, than  
if

if he had no thought at all. I am thinking, for example, in my sleep, of a horse; his beauty, strength, and usefulness: does this thought preserve in my mind the idea of a church, of happiness or misery? Or can it help me to any of them, when I have occasion for them? If not, then these ideas must be new impressed, when I awake; but if they remain in the soul, when I was only thinking of a horse, wherever they are bestowed, it may be presumed, there is room for that one idea more without thrusting out another to give it place; and when that one is among them, I see no more reason, why they must be all new impressed, than that the others must have been new impressed, when I only thought of that one; unless it be supposed, that the soul has always just one idea more than there is place for in the repository of its ideas; and if that happen to crowd in, before another has got out, they will all be stifled together, or fly away for air.

But here the Remarker interposes, *If you say the ideas remain in the soul, and need only a new excitation; why then, say I, may not infants have innate ideas (which you so much oppose) that want only objects and occasions to excite and actuate them, with a fit disposition of the brain<sup>h</sup>?* By what hath been said, it will appear, that this argument gains no force from Mr. Locke's opinion, that the soul does not always think; since if the soul does always think, it can perceive but very few ideas at once; so that the same consequence will follow from a man's having only one thought, as from his having no thought at all; whether all his other ideas must be new impressed, or remain in the soul, and need only a new excitation. This objection therefore would have been as much to the purpose in any other place: the Remarker might have asked, if when a man thinks only upon one object, there remain

<sup>h</sup> 2d Rem. p. 17.

ideas in the soul, which he does not perceive to be there; why may not infants have *innate ideas*, that want only occasions to excite them? This then, having no particular relation to the question in dispute, requires no answer here: but that the Remarker may not think he has entangled Mr. *Locke* with his own principles, I desire him to consider, if these are parallel cases, how comes it, that when objects or occasions excite these ideas in children, they do not perceive, that they were in their minds before; but consider them as things new, and till then absolutely unknown to them? But when ideas are excited in a man, which he has before received by sensation or reflection, he considers them as things he is acquainted with, and clearly perceives they have been in his mind before. Why does not every thing appear equally new to a man, which he has, or has not known before, as every idea does, the first time it is excited in him? But since it is certain, that the mind does perceive when any ideas are excited in it, that were there before; and that every idea appears new to it the first time it is excited; this can be no argument, that because the soul is capable of retaining the ideas it has received by sensation or reflection; that it can record them for its use, and recollect them at pleasure; therefore, it may have innate ideas, though it never perceives, that it had them, not even when they are excited in it; for this makes the cases so far from being the same, that it is one of the greatest arguments against *innate ideas*, that the mind does always perceive, when the ideas, which are excited in it, were there before. Besides, how can it be conceived, that *innate ideas* should need any objects to excite them; and that the mind should never excite any of them in itself without those objects; as it often does excite in itself the ideas it received by sensation, or reflection, without the presence of those objects, by which it first received them. Why then

then are such objects necessary to excite *innate ideas*, since the mind has a power of exciting ideas in itself, without the presence of any object? When the Remarker has shewn the reason of this considerable difference, and proved, that it does not hinder them from being parallel cases; then we may conclude against Mr. *Locke*, that since the soul can retain the ideas it has received, and excite them at pleasure, though it do not always perceive them, therefore it may have ideas, which it never did perceive, nor can excite in itself, nor, when they are excited, perceive, that it ever had them before; and then he can have nothing to say for himself, but must let us enjoy our *unperceivable ideas*, and be as much the better, and wiser for them, as we can.

But still the soul may be sometimes without any thought, and yet (for any thing we have heard) not endanger its immortality. Let us consider the Remarker's next difficulty.

Besides (says he) *I am utterly at a loss, how to frame any idea of a dead soul, or of a spirit without life or thoughts*<sup>i</sup>. How a dead soul comes in here, I do not know. Can there be no life, where there is no thought? I confess, that I have hitherto thought, that insects and plants have life, though I did not suppose, that they do always think. He goes on: *What is the soul, when she does not think? She must be actually something, if she exist. She must then have some properties, whereby she is distinguished from nothing, and from matter.* And again, in the second Remark, *You say the soul has no extension, nor at certain fits any cogitation. What can the soul be then but a certain power acting in the body, when the body is prepared for the exercise of it; and ceasing to act, when the body is indisposed*<sup>k</sup>? To which I answer, that it is true, we have no idea of the soul but by her operations; but that is no more a reason to

<sup>i</sup> 1st Rem. p. 9. 2d R. p. 16. <sup>k</sup> Page 14.



conclude, that she is nothing when she does not operate, than when she does, since we are equally ignorant what the soul is, when we do think, as when we do not. I ask what is the soul when she does think? Is she a real permanent substance? What then are her peculiar properties, whereby she is distinguished from other substances? If it be said the power of thinking; I ask, whether she has any other properties to distinguish her from nothing, and from matter? If not, then nothing, or matter, may have the power of thinking. This is plain, if the soul has no essential properties distinct from matter, whereby she alone is capable of the power of thinking, there can be no reason, why matter may not have that power. If it be said she has other essential properties, without which she could not have the power of thinking, when the Remarker has found out what those properties are, he will then know what the soul is, when she does not think; for whatever that substance is, that has the power of thinking, there is no reason to doubt, that it remains the same, when it ceases from that action, any more than there is to doubt, that a body in motion, and at rest, is the same substance; for we have no clearer idea of the substance of body, than we have of the substance of spirit, as Mr. Locke has shewn<sup>1</sup>; which excellent discourse alone one would have thought sufficient to prevent the least insinuation, that he does not think the soul a real permanent substance.

There is much more reason to conclude, that those do not think the soul a real permanent substance, who make this question, If the soul has no extension, nor at certain fits any cogitation, what can the soul be then, but a certain power acting in the body, when the body is prepared, &c. For from what other reason can they make it? If the soul be really something else than a certain power

<sup>1</sup> Essay B. ii. c. 23.

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acting in the body, what can hinder it from being the same thing, when it does not act? But if it must be nothing, when it is not in action, *What then can the soul be, but a certain power acting in the body, when the body is prepared for the exercise of it, and ceasing to be when the body is indisposed?* But (to retort the Remarker's words) *whether that be a superior divine power distinct from matter, as a vis movens, or a power fastened, I know not how, to the body, or upon such and such systems of matter; whether I say of these two suppositions better agrees with this doctrine, I cannot certainly tell; but either of them destroys the immortality of the soul, upon the dissolution of the body.* I leave the reader to judge, which is most concerned in this consequence, Mr. Locke, who says, that it is not necessary to the existence of the soul, that it should be always in action; which would be absurd to say, if it be not a *distinct permanent substance*; or the Remarker, who thinks the soul cannot exist, when it is not in action; which there is no ground to think, if it be a *real permanent substance*.

The vanity of men seems to be the great reason, why they have so readily supposed, without any proof, that the soul does always think; for having no idea of it, but by its operations, we are unwilling to perceive our own ignorance, and loath to part with the only idea we have of that dear thing which we call self. On this account the Remarker seems offended with Mr. Locke. *Why (says he) do you affirm or introduce a new and unintelligible state of the soul, whereof neither you, nor others, can have any conception*<sup>m</sup>? And why is this complained of, but that men are willing to believe they know more than they do? Or how else could they think a state of thinking, without being conscious of it, more intelligible, than a state of not thinking at all? Or how could they conclude thinking, which is the action

<sup>m</sup> 2d Rem. p. 16.

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of the soul, necessary to the existence of the soul itself, if they did not make our knowledge the measure of things, and our not having an idea of a thing, sufficient to exclude it from being? I proceed now to the Remarker's last difficulty.

Then after all (says he) *what security can we have upon this supposition, that we shall not fall into this sleep at death, and so continue without life or thought<sup>a</sup>?* What I have said in the beginning of my discourse upon this head, might serve for an answer to this objection; but the Remarker, by repeating it, page 12. seeming to lay a great weight on it, I shall consider it more particularly.

And first (as I observed before) if our security of a future state depends upon this, *that the soul always thinks*, it has a very unsure foundation; for there is no pretence of a proof, that the soul does always think; and there are great probabilities, that it does not think in sound sleep (as Mr. Locke has shewn.) But if the proofs of a future state do not depend upon the soul's always thinking, the contrary supposition cannot lessen our security of it; and that they do not depend upon it, I think needs not be proved, no body, that I know of, did ever offer this proposition, *that the soul does always think*, as a proof of its immortality. And the reasons we have to expect a future state are of such a nature, that they can receive no force from it, nor lose any by the contrary supposition. The Remarker on another occasion tells Mr. Locke, the grounds of our expectation of *future punishments and rewards* are, that *there is a presage of them from natural conscience*; and that *they are deducible from the nature of God, if we allow him moral attributes<sup>o</sup>*. Now it is evident, that neither of these two grounds can lose any of their force upon this supposition, that the soul does not think in sound sleep, and will not they secure us, that we shall not continue

<sup>a</sup> 1st Rem. p. 9.      <sup>o</sup> 3d Rem. p. 13.

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in this sleep after death? If not, why does the Remarker mention them as proofs of a future state? But if they do prove it, why does he say, he *could make out no certain proof of the immortality of the soul, upon this supposition, that it is sometimes without thoughts*? Since those proofs he mentions remain in their full force, notwithstanding this supposition. Thus having shewn, that all the consequences the Remarker draws from Mr. Locke's supposition are without grounds, I may with assurance conclude, that it is of no consequence to the immortality of the soul, nor does at all weaken any proof of it.

I cannot here forbear taking notice, how little service they do to religion, who establish the main principles of it upon such an uncertain foundation, as the nature of a thing, of which we are so very ignorant, as we certainly are, of *what the soul is*. Her operations we have clear ideas of; and therefore from our capacity of discerning and chusing good or evil; and from the power, wisdom, and goodness of God, which we may certainly know to belong to his nature; we have very good arguments, and great probabilities of a future state of punishments and rewards; such as no considering man can deny, and within every ones understanding. But when the soul's immortality is said to depend upon such suppositions as this, *that the soul always thinks*, or that it is *immaterial*; what can the consequence be, but to make men think they have very little assurance of a future life, when they find themselves so much in the dark as to those principles, upon which it is established, that the greatest proofs of them are drawn from our ignorance? As that we cannot *conceive how* matter should be capable of such and such powers as we perceive in the soul; or (as the Remarker objects) *what the soul is, when she is without thoughts*.

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But could the immateriality of the soul be proved to be as certain, as it is highly probable, it can never be of good consequence, and may be dangerous, to make that the main proof of its immortality; for this is an argument of no use to the generality of mankind, who want either leisure, or capacity, for such nice speculations; and if they are convinced on other grounds, that the soul is immortal, it is no great matter, whether they think it immaterial, or no. But if they are persuaded, that it cannot be immortal, if it is not immaterial, 'tis easy to see of how ill consequence that must be, if the proofs of the soul's immateriality should not happen to convince them; as it often falls out by the different cast of mens heads, that the same arguments, that are very strong and persuasive to one man, have no force at all with another, especially in abstract reflections. Those, therefore, who are zealous for truth, should endeavour to establish it upon the plainest, and clearest principles, and such as are most adapted to common apprehensions. This is not the only instance, in which I have observed, that truth does not suffer less from those, who would maintain it upon false or uncertain grounds, than from those, who openly oppose it. I have known several, who have been carefully enough instructed in their duty, who yet for want of being taught at first, or applying themselves to consider the true grounds of it, have been easily argued out of their good notions, though some of them persons of no mean capacity; for if the foundation fail, the best superstructure will fall, though strong and immoveable, when established upon its proper grounds. And this does not only happen, when the foundation is in itself weak or uncertain, but when truths are taught upon principles, which, though true, and solid in themselves, are not the ground or reason of those truths; which some have done out of a good design of rendering the

the truths they teach the more sacred. But every thing stands firmest on its own foundation: and I believe, if it were rightly considered, it would appear, that the reasons of all moral truths are plain and clear, and within the reach of the lowest apprehensions. These things, which I have only hinted at, are of great consequence to be thoroughly considered by all, who have the instruction of others under their care, that they may not think they sufficiently acquit themselves of their duty by inculcating good maxims, when their negligence, or *mistaken zeal* in teaching the grounds of them, may at least give too great advantage to those, who make it their business to corrupt the *principles*, as well as the *practice* of their companions, which are but too many in this libertine age.

This being a matter of so universal concern, I hope I shall be excused, if I have led the reader a little out of the way for it. We now return to the Remarker, who, after he has repeated his last difficulty, *i. e. If the soul be sometimes without thoughts, why may she not be so, thoughtless, and senseless, after death?* he adds, *it is some comfort, indeed, that we shall at length return to life at the resurrection: but I know not how you explain that; nor how far you allow us to be the same men, and the same persons then that we are now.* This is a great comfort indeed, and I suppose the Remarker here designed to make Mr. Locke amend for all the faults he has imputed to his principles, by owning, that they afford us this comfort; but I cannot guess what *that* is which he knows not *how* Mr. Locke explains. Mr. Locke never attempted, that I know of, to explain *how* we shall return to life, which *that* seems to refer to, nor how far we shall then be the same *men*; and he needed not have told him, that he knows not now he explains a thing, which he has not explained at all. But Mr. Locke has very clearly explained how far he allows us to be the same *persons*,

sions, consciousness according to him, as far as it is extended, makes the same person, in which, he says, is founded all the right, and justice, of reward, and punishment, happiness, and misery<sup>p</sup>. And thus, he says, we may without any difficulty conceive at the resurrection, the same person, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same he had here, the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it<sup>q</sup>. Which may be sufficient to satisfy the Remarker how St. Peter at the resurrection will be the same<sup>r</sup>; and how Mr. Locke conceives the resurrection, as far as is revealed of it, and to all its ends and purposes, which is our happiness, or misery. Further than this he does not pretend, nor are we concerned to know; and I think, in a matter, which can only be known by revelation, no man ought to determine, or enquire farther than the Holy Spirit has thought fit to reveal. Mr. Locke knows too well the vanity and presumption of such an attempt, to offer at it. "It is enough" (*says he*) that every "one shall appear before the judgment seat of Christ, to receive according to what he had done in his former life; but in what sort of body he shall appear, or of what particles made up, the Scripture having said nothing, but that it shall be a spiritual body raised in incorruption, it is not for me to determine." The Remarker must be contented<sup>t</sup> to walk in the dark as to these things, though he says he does not love it, since there is no way to have farther light in them than the Scripture has given. And if he thinks Mr. Locke's doctrine of the soul obscure, because he does not pretend to be certain by his natural faculties, of things, which they cannot certainly discover (a way to knowledge, which some are very fond of) I believe Mr. Locke will be content not to be understood by him, rather than write what he does

<sup>p</sup> Ess. B. ii. c. 27. <sup>q</sup> Ibid § 15. <sup>r</sup> Vid. 2d Rem. p. 15.  
<sup>s</sup> Reply to the Bishop of Worcester, p. 182. <sup>t</sup> 2d Rem. p. 15.  
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not understand himself, to appear intelligible to others.

The Remarker<sup>v</sup> next proceeds to the second supposition, which he thinks weakens the proofs of the immortality of the soul, viz. *That God may give, or have given, for any thing we know, to some systems of matter, a power to perceive, and think.* And here one would expect he should have shewn how this supposition weakens the proofs of the soul's immortality; but all his objections are against the probability of the supposition, and to shew the difficulties of conceiving how matter should have such a power; which he enlarges upon in his third remark, and has several pages to that purpose, for what reason I know not, since Mr. Locke allows it to be highly probable, that the soul is immaterial, but where he is speaking of demonstration, only says, that it is not impossible, for any thing we know, that God may give, or have given, to some systems of matter, disposed as he sees fit, a power to perceive and think. But my design being only to vindicate Mr. Locke's principles from the dangerous consequences imputed to them by the Remarker, I shall not enter into that dispute; and I think Mr. Locke has said enough, in his last additions, to silence the triumph of such sort of arguments, drawn from the unconceiveableness of something in one hypothesis, which cannot be a proof of the contrary opinion, in which there are things altogether as inexplicable, and as far remote from our comprehension. All the demonstration we can have from such difficulties, is of the weakness and scantiness of our knowledge, which should not make us forward in determining positively on either side, much less to establish the immortality of the soul on so uncertain a foundation; which is a consideration I have before insisted on, and I cannot but think Mr. Locke has done much more service to religion

<sup>v</sup> 1st Rem. p. 13.



in that discourse, *B. iii. c. 4.* where, after he had said, that he "sees no contradiction in it, that Omnipotency should give to certain systems of matter a power to perceive and think, though it be most highly probable, that the soul is immaterial;" he adds, that "if our faculties cannot arrive to demonstrative certainty about it, we need not think it strange: all the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident, that he, who made us at first begin to subsist here, sensible, intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state in another world<sup>w</sup>, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life; and therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some over zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul have been forward to make the world believe." These are Mr. Locke's words; and I appeal to all unbiassed men, whether he does not better secure the belief of a future state, by establishing it on such grounds, as give an equal assurance of it, whether the soul is immaterial, or no; than those, who take pains to persuade men, that a future state is less certain, if the soul is not immaterial.

But besides the uncertainty and danger of this argument, which I have before taken notice of, the uselessness of it, to the generality of mankind, sufficiently shews, that it cannot be the foundation of the belief of a future state. That it is not so to the Eastern Pagans at this day, we have the evidence of a <sup>x</sup> judicious author, both from the information of the missionaries, who have been longest among them, and his own conversation with them,

<sup>w</sup> Vide the 4th edit.

<sup>x</sup> *Louberé du Royaume de Siam.*

who

who tell us, that they believe the immortality of the soul, but have no notion of its immateriality; and that they only suppose it of a matter subtil enough to escape being seen or handled. And that many of the old philosophers, who expected a future state, had no thoughts of the soul's being immaterial, any one must observe, who has read them with attention. And I believe, if well examined, it will appear, that those among them, who had a notion of the soul's being immaterial, did not believe its immortality upon that foundation, but only sought an explication, how the soul by its own nature might be capable of that immortality; which they found great reason to hope for, on other grounds much more firm and persuasive.

But what is yet more considerable, were this proof of the soul's immortality as certain and as universally received, as any self-evident proposition, it would not at all serve to the chief end of our assurance of the soul's immortality, *viz.* The expectation of rewards and punishments in a future state according to our doings in this life; without which 'tis no matter, whether we think the soul immortal or no. And this we could never have by the most attentive consideration, and the clearest knowledge of what kind of substance the soul is. It must be established on far different grounds, such as the consideration of ourselves as rational and free creatures, of which we have an intuitive, infallible perception; and of an omnipotent Being, from whom we are, and on whom we depend, of which we have a demonstrative knowledge within every one's understanding to whom it is proposed. And if the consequences drawn from them are not sufficient to assure men of a future state of rewards and punishments, as the clearest proofs of the soul's immortality can signify nothing without them, so neither can they add any force to them, and therefore are of no use to the great ends of morality and religion. For suppose

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to convince an intelligent heathen, who thought the soul material, and doubted of a future state of rewards and punishments, arguments were used to prove the soul in its own nature undissoluble, and that therefore it must remain after death; he might then reasonably enquire in what state it remains, how he may be sure, that it is in a state of rewards and punishments, and that it does not return to the universal soul, of which it may be an effluence; or inform the next parcel of matter it finds fitted for it, as some philosophers have thought. This, it is plain, must be still in doubt to him, notwithstanding those proofs of the soul's immortality; and arguments of another nature must be used to satisfy him in this point, whatever may be most proper to work on his understanding. Suppose those I have before hinted at; That 'tis reasonable to think that the *wise and just* Author of our being, having made us capable of *happiness and misery*, and given us faculties of discerning and chusing *good or evil*, designed we should be accountable for our actions, and *happy or miserable*, according as they are conformable, or not, to that law, which he has established in our very natures, that his will might be certainly known to us; and since it is visibly not so, in the ordinary course of his providence, but all things happen alike to the righteous and the wicked, in this world, 'tis most consonant to reason to think this is only a state of probation, and that the dispensation of rewards and punishments is reserved for a future life; there being no other way to reconcile the partial distribution of things here to that order which we know is agreeable to the divine will, by the conformity it has to our reason, which is a ray of his own wisdom. We will suppose the heathen convinced by these arguments, or others to the same purpose; that he owns it is highly reasonable to conclude there must be a future state of rewards and punishments; but he does not so well digest the soul's being immaterial; he has no notion

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of a substance without any extension. Suppose then the Remarker should tell him, as he does Mr. *Locke*, if the soul is not *immaterial*, there can be no certain proof that it is immortal. And I desire him to take this dilemma for the heathen's answer: Either the arguments, by which I have been convinced, that there will be punishments and rewards in a future state, are proofs of it, or they are not; if not, then tho' the soul should be immortal, I have no assurance that it will be in a state of rewards or punishments; and if they are proofs of a future state, then a future state is equally certain, tho' the soul be not immaterial, since that does not make it less consonant to the justice and wisdom of God, nor less within his power. I believe the Remarker will find he has no way to solve this dilemma, but must either give up the certainty of rewards and punishments, or the necessity of thinking the soul is immaterial, to prove a future state; and I defy him to establish the belief of rewards and punishments in a future state on any arguments, that will not be equally conclusive, whether the soul is immaterial or not.

This then is evident, that Mr. *Locke's* supposition, that God may have given (for any thing we know) to some systems of matter a power to perceive, and think; does not at all weaken any proof of the soul's immortality, that can be of use to the great ends of religion, for which alone we are concerned to know, that the soul is immortal. And perhaps the insignificancy, as to those ends, of our knowing what kind of substance the soul is, may be the reason we are left so much in the dark about it. Our wise Maker has proportioned our faculties only to our necessities, and has made his will known to us by a light of nature clear enough to render any one inexcusable, who does not follow it; tho' the full assurance of an eternal retribution is only given us by *Jesus Christ, who has brought life, and immortality, to light, through the Gospel*, which I have already shewn, that

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Mr. *Locke's* principles give us a sure foundation for, both of natural and revealed religion. So that I think no more remains to clear the Remarker's difficulties; his doubts of *natural conscience*, (which is the chief subject of his third Remark) being easily resolved from what has been already said. But the Remarker being a little unlucky at drawing inferences from Mr. *Locke's* principles, I will give him some help in his enquiry what *natural conscience* is, according to them.

But first, I must take notice of a cavil he begins with, at Mr. *Locke's* defining conscience to be nothing else but <sup>1</sup> *our own opinion of our own actions*, without expressing what sort of actions are the subjects of it. Now any one, who reads that part of his *Essay*, will find that discoursing of <sup>2</sup> *innate practical principles*, he all along mentions only such actions, as are to be referred to moral rules; and that he had no reason to apprehend being misunderstood, or that it could be supposed he included any other sort of actions, no other being at all to the purpose in that question.

Before I proceed to speak of what I think the true notion of natural conscience, of what authority, and of what use it is; it will be fit to consider what the Remarker says he understands by it, which he next proceeds to tell us, but defines it more particularly in another place thus: *A natural sagacity to distinguish moral good and evil; or a different perception and sense of them, with a different affection of the mind arising from it; and this so immediate, as to prevent and anticipate all external laws, and all ratiocination.* This, he says, he takes to be *the foundation of natural religion, without which he does not know how it can subsist*; tho' he approves of Mr. *Locke's* account of natural religion, so far as it goes. *You place natural religion* (says he) <sup>3</sup> *I think in the belief of the being of a God, and of obedience due to him. This is good, so far as it goes, and is well supported. But the question is,*

<sup>1</sup> 3 Rem. p. 5.    <sup>2</sup> B. i. C. 3.    <sup>3</sup> P. 5.

*what*

*what laws those are that we ought to obey, or how we can know them without revelation, unless you take in natural conscience for a distinction of good and evil, or another idea of God, than what you have given us.* Having already anticipated this doubt, by shewing how the moral attributes of God are deducible from Mr. *Locke's* principles, and how we know what his will is, by the conformity or repugnancy of things to our reason, and with respect to human nature, of which he is the author, I need not give a particular answer to this question. But since the Remarker lays so great a stress upon his *principle of natural conscience, in that sense and notion*, which he has given of it, that he <sup>b</sup> *takes it to be the foundation of natural religion*, and thinks *the distinction of good and evil, is manifested, and supported by it*; let us farther consider it.

It would be too tedious to repeat all that the Remarker says on this subject, from the beginning of his third letter to the 16th page. I need only hint at some observations, by which it will appear, that he has not settled in his own mind a determinate idea of his *principle of natural conscience*, but argues for it sometimes in one sense, and sometimes in another; that Mr. *Locke* is not at all concerned in the greatest part of his argument; and by which the weakness of the whole will be obvious to every reader.

<sup>c</sup> After his definition, he gives us a notable illustration of his principle in the soul of distinguishing *morally good and evil*, without ratiocination, by the power we have of distinguishing *sensible qualities* without reflection, or ratiocination. He might every whit as well have told us, that since we have a power of distinguishing *moral relations*, without making use of our eye-sight, we may distinguish red, and yellow, without eyes; they being no more the proper and only inlets of our ideas of colours, than reflection is of moral distinctions; which the Remarker says we may have without reflection, since

<sup>b</sup> P. 4, and 5.    <sup>c</sup> P. 8:

*we*



we can distinguish colours, and other sensible qualities without reflection. But if this were so, Mr. *Locke* may very well say, what the Remarker believes he will not, <sup>d</sup> that then children would be able to distinguish moral good and evil, for they very clearly distinguish all the objects of sensation, that come in their way; and this principle could never be *improved*, or *corrupted*, as no one can be persuaded, that any sensation he has is more or less agreeable, or that a disagreeable sensation is an agreeable one; which if we could, it is evident, that our senses would not be sufficient to their end, to give us notice of what is convenient, or inconvenient to the body. And it is reasonable to think, if there were such an inward sensation designed, as the Remarker says, to direct us as to what is good or hurtful to the soul, it would operate as constantly as those others do: no man could prefer vice to virtue, any more than he can pain to pleasure; otherwise it would not answer the end it was designed for.

Another thing to be observed is, that most of the Remarker's arguments were anticipated by Mr. *Locke*, tho' he takes no notice of the answer to them; as to the same purpose we were now upon, Mr. *Locke* having owned, *that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men, and that from the first instances of sense, and perception, there are some things grateful, and others ungrateful to them*; <sup>e</sup> the Remarker takes occasion from thence, to desire he will grant such alike impression on the soul, with reference to moral good and evil, as a rule or direction to our actions; tho' Mr. *Locke* there says, <sup>f</sup> that those impressions he speaks of, are so far from confirming the like, with relation to moral good and evil, *that this is an argument against them*; since if there were any such impressions, *we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite, the desire of*

<sup>d</sup> Ibid. <sup>e</sup> P. 9. <sup>f</sup> Eff. B. i. C. 3. § 3.

*happiness,*

*happiness, and aversion for misery, continuing (as innate practical principles ought) to influence all our actions without ceasing, and are in all persons, and all ages, steady and universal.* But this the Remarker takes no notice of. <sup>g</sup> In another place he argues, that exorbitant practices against natural conscience are no proof, that there is no such principle; <sup>h</sup> which Mr. *Locke* grants, nor does he contend against a *natural* rule. But the generally allowed breach of a rule any where, he says, is a proof, that it is not *INNATE*, which he had given instances of in several nations. This objection not being easily answered, the Remarker chuses rather to oppose an argument, which Mr. *Locke* does not use, but on the contrary owns that it is none. But any one, who considers what <sup>i</sup> Mr. *Locke* objects, will easily see to how little purpose the Remarker takes so much pains to shew, that the same arguments, which he brings against *innate principles*, may be used to prove, that the law of Christianity is not known among Christians; for besides the great difference of an *innate law*, which men must always carry about with them, from any other, that they may avoid reflecting on, or misunderstand; the case of Christians acting against a known law cannot be the same with that, which Mr. *Locke* represents, unless the Remarker can shew any Christians, *who constantly, without the least remorse, or shame, offend against that law, which they believe; and that all the by-standers, even law-makers, and governors, silently connive at it, nay affirm that it is their duty to do so*: For this is the case of those nations, which Mr. *Locke* mentions. <sup>k</sup> But the Remarker has a shrewd objection against this argument: they are *barbarous people*, he says, and he excepts against them for witnesses, as *personæ infames*. I find, if Mr. *Locke* would convince him, that there are no *innate principles*, he must shew him some polite nation, where the people have diligently, and

<sup>g</sup> 3d Rem. p. 11. <sup>h</sup> Eff. B. i. c. 3. <sup>i</sup> 3d Rem. p. 14. <sup>k</sup> P. 10.

rightly

rightly employed their faculties, and yet are ignorant of the law of nature. This might be required, if Mr. *Locke* denied a law of nature, knowable by our natural faculties; but to prove what he affirms, that this law is not knowable to men, but by their making a right use of their faculties, it is sufficient to shew, that there are men, who are absolutely ignorant of the clearest principles of that law. No, says the Remarker, they are barbarous ignorant people; and therefore are no good witnesses, that there are no innate principles. But are they not men, I pray? What is it then, that makes them more barbarous, or ignorant than others, but their not having made a right use of their natural faculties? This is Mr. *Locke's* argument, that there are no innate principles, since some nations, for want of making a right use of their faculties, are so barbarous, or ignorant, as to have no notion of the clearest of those principles, which are esteemed innate. To which the Remarker's objection, that they are a barbarous people, not fit to be admitted for witnesses, is indeed very extraordinary. If he pleases to consider what he means by *barbarous*, and what is the cause, that these people are so, I believe he will better see the force of Mr. *Locke's* argument, and allow them to be very good witnesses in this case; tho' perhaps he might with reason except against them at the bar. All he is desired to take upon their credit is, that men do not know their duty, without making a right use of their natural faculties; and that therefore there are no innate principles, or none to any purpose, since they do not operate, till men by reflection discover that law, which is to be the rule of their actions. To prove this, Mr. *Locke* mentions some vicious practices approved in several nations; which the Remarker calls *'raking up their dirt and filth, to throw in the face of human nature'*. It shews men indeed, that they should not idly, or rashly, take up with the first notions they meet with,

<sup>1</sup> *ibid.*

but

but employ their faculties in the best manner they can, which God has given them to attain the knowledge of their duty; which they can only be ignorant of by their own fault. But what indignity this can be thought upon mankind, or what piece of ingratitude to our Maker, I believe no body but the Remarker can apprehend.

<sup>m</sup> He next preceeds to mention some virtuous actions of heathen states, contrary to their interest, and yet done with general applause, as a proof of natural conscience. They are indeed proofs of a *law of nature*, which Mr. *Locke* is no less an advocate for than he, tho' he denies *innate principles*; which leads me to a very material observation, which is, that, throughout this whole discourse, the Remarker uses indifferently, as terms of the same signification, *law of nature, natural conscience, innate principles, innate powers, and natural principles*<sup>n</sup>; which all signify very different things; and of which Mr. *Locke* has only denied *innate principles*; which considered, it will appear, that he is very little concerned in the greatest part of this dispute. But I shall only instance two or three places particularly, as where he argues, that *universal consent is not necessary to declare a principle to be natural; for the sense of musick, of beauty, of order, and proportion, are natural to mankind, tho' some men are not at all affected with them. Even the power of reason, (says he) several passions, &c. appear sooner in some than others; and if you allow these principles to be natural, and born with us, I know not why you should make such ado about the word innate. If you allow none at all, not these last mentioned, nor so much as willing, or nilling this, or that, the controversy will be changed; and I desire to know what idea you can form of a soul without any powers, or any action.* Now here it is plain, that by natural principles is only meant *powers or faculties* of the soul; which is a very different sense from that, in which

<sup>m</sup> P. 11.

<sup>n</sup> Vide p. 5. 9. 12.

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Mr.

Mr. *Locke* denies any *principles* to be *innate*, tho' he does not deny them to be *natural*. But in this sense of them he will make no a-do about the word *innate*: if the question be, whether there are innate *powers* or *faculties* in the soul, the controversy will not be *changed*, for there will be no controversy at all. Mr. *Locke* only contends against those, who say there are principles of metaphysical or moral truths originally imprinted on the mind; by which if they only mean, that there is an *innate* power or capacity in the soul of knowing those truths, they mean nothing different from Mr. *Locke*, who denies *innate principles*; for he does not deny, that there is a power in the soul of perceiving, and assenting to those truths, or of distinguishing good and evil; tho' he is not so ready at it as the Remarker, without employing his faculties about it, or without ratiocination. So there is no occasion for him to *form an idea of the soul without any powers*, nor for that supposition, which, with a seeming charitable wish, the Remarker would so groundlessly fasten on Mr. *Locke*°.

The next place I shall mention, where *innate principles*, and *natural principles*, are used in the same sense, and both only for *powers* or *faculties* of the soul, is p. 15. where he pretends to answer a *dilemma*, which Mr. *Locke* proposes concerning *innate principles*. But any one, who takes the pains to consider what he there says, will find, that he uses those terms in a quite different sense from that, which Mr. *Locke* understands by *innate principles*; and that therefore Mr. *Locke* is not at all concerned in that argument. Neither is it any thing to the Remarker's purpose of establishing *natural conscience* in his own sense and notion of it, if we may take it from his definition, p. 7. But, indeed, his uncertain use of these, and those other terms I have mentioned, makes it very difficult to know what he means by his *principle of natural conscience*²; for those

° P. 13.

² P. 16.

*principles,*

*principles*, which he here affirms to be *innate*, are powers of the soul, the exercise of which, he says, is *conditional*, and depends upon the disposition of the body, culture, and other circumstances: which, as they are very different from those *principles*, which Mr. *Locke* denies to be *innate*; so are they also from the Remarker's¹ *principle of distinguishing in moral cases without ratiocination, sufficient for a general direction of our lives, and the foundation of natural religion*. For how can it be sufficient for those ends, if it depend upon contingent circumstances? Or how can the exercise of a power of distinguishing things *without ratiocination*, depend upon any culture, or be hindered by *contrary principles*², as, he says, this power may? For by culture here must be meant a *right instruction*, or *right reflection*; and by *contrary principles*, false maxims, or opinions, (though in the same place he uses that term in a quite different sense, for powers of the soul) which are all acts of *ratiocination*; and therefore to say, that the exercise of this power depends upon them, is the same thing as to say, that the power of distinguishing things *without ratiocination* depends upon *ratiocination*. Which if the Remarker understands, I believe he will hardly make it intelligible to any body else.

From all these observations compared, and rightly applied, it will plainly appear, that Mr. *Locke* is very little concerned in this discourse, which, the Remarker says³, is in defence of natural conscience, against whom I know not, the most part of it being arguments for things, which Mr. *Locke* no less affirms than he, though he appear to oppose him, by using Mr. *Locke's* words in a different sense from that, which he understands them in; and those arguments, by which the Remarker really does oppose him, being anticipated, and fully answered in Mr. *Locke's Essay*.

¹ Page 5, 8, 9.

² Page 16.

³ Ibid.

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And



And from the inconsistency of his definition of *natural conscience*, with his illustrations of it in several places, and his loose and undetermined use of those terms, which are of greatest consequence in this discourse, I must take leave to conclude, that he has not fixed in his own mind a clear idea of that principle which he contends for; though he thinks he has given *rules, and marks*\*, by which it may sufficiently appear to others what he means by it. And therefore by those *marks* I will endeavour a little to clear his own notion to him; and for his satisfaction to establish what I think natural conscience is, according to Mr. *Locke's* principles, and in the true notion of it; though Mr. *Locke* is without reason brought into this dispute, as is evident from the Remarker's own words; *I do not remember* (says he) *that in this sense you have once named natural conscience in your book.* Why then, I pray, are so many arguments used, as if he had writ a whole book against it? By what rule is a man concluded to deny every thing, that he has not affirmed? But the Remarker is not the first, who has thought this good logic, and fair dealing against Mr. *Locke*. Whatever he writes next, if it should be of *gravitation*, or the *motion of the planets*, I think he would do well to put the articles of his religion at the end of it, for fear he should be accused of having none, if his book should not happen to name any.

But as to *natural conscience*, I desire the Remarker to examine, whether that *principle* he speaks of, or (as I had rather express it here, as less equivocal) that *power* of distinguishing in moral things *without ratiocination*, be not a consequent of a *previous* ratiocination, or instruction; by which, having got some clear or *confused* ideas of good and evil, a different affection of the mind constantly arises from them, and this so immediate, as that it

\* Page 8.    \* 3d Rem. p. 5.

may

may be truly said to be *without* ratiocination; from which the mistake may come, that it prevents, or is *before any ratiocination*, though it is really an effect of it, only operating without taking notice of its cause; as in other cases, the likings or aversions of the mind, to things, or persons, may be observed to do, which having been at first produced by some outward cause, some good, or evil, we have found, or heard, or apprehended of those things, or persons, the same affection constantly exerts itself at their presence, without any reflection on the cause, or perhaps the least sense, that it ever had a known cause.

And this sudden affection in moral cases is indeed of excellent use, when it is once *set on work by an enlightened judgment*, to keep up the distinction of good and evil; to incite, or to be a check upon mens actions, in the heat of a temptation, when they have neither time nor power to reason the case, or to reflect upon the instructions, that have been given them; and *thus* may be truly called *the support of natural religion*; or, as the apostle says, *a witness accusing or excusing those, who have no other law but that of nature*; but must not therefore be taken for the law itself, or as the Remarker calls it, the *foundation of natural religion*, but rather *natural religion for the foundation of it*; and then it may with safety be relied on. Therefore philosophers, and divines, having mostly writ for such, as have had in some measure a knowledge of their duty, do with good reason give great authority to this witness, and frequently send men to consult their consciences, as if it were the original rule and an infallible director. For it is not easily perverted, or silenced, when once rightly set on work; and has a great influence on mens actions, nothing being more insupportable, than to stand condemned in our own judgments; or more delightful, than the approbation of our own minds: and therefore this

monitor may prevail, when our passions have misled or silenced reason; or the hopes of escaping future punishments made us for a while secure.

But powerful and faithful as this witness is, since it may by false opinions, or vicious habits, take a wrong bias, (which the greatest assertors of its authority confess) and is always set on work by the first persuasions, which happen to take possession of mens thoughts, since it does not direct their opinions, but is influenced by them; this not only shews, that it is not designed for the original rule, and first director of our actions, or *the foundation of natural religion*, but that it is of dangerous consequence to lay the whole weight of morality upon conscience alone, independent of the occasions, from which it has taken the first bent. For no doubt there are too many, who by an unhappy early education, pursue with the same bent of conscience, or without the least remorse, what others (who have been better taught) abhor. Now in this case, to bid these men appeal to their consciences, as an innate guide, that will infallibly direct them in their duty, can only serve to confirm them in their prejudices, and to make them go on securely in their vicious habits, without farther examination, when they find themselves acquitted by that inward sense, which they are taught to revere as the impression of God himself. That this may be the case of many, is not denied by the Remarker\*: *We do not conceive (says he) natural conscience such a light as may not be dimmed, or it may be extinguished in some people*\*: and in another place, *appeal with sincerity to your conscience; if that be obscured, perverted, or seared, we cannot help it*†. *These principles of conscience are seeds, that may die, or may thrive, &c. they may be weak in some, and ineffectual in others, by contrary principles, or other impediments*. This being granted, it is evident, that those people

\* 3d Rem. p. 10. † Page 15. ‡ Page 16.

in

in whom these principles happen to be *extinguished, or perverted*, will in vain appeal with sincerity to their consciences: there is no way to set them right but by rectifying their judgments; they are to be warned not to trust to so dangerous a security, and to be convinced of their errors, and their obligations, on rational grounds.

I appeal to the Remarker, whether this is not the only way of dealing with a man, who has been educated from his infancy in false principles, confirmed by vicious habits, and the approbation of all his companions; whether such a man may not by reflection and reason be corrected, and convinced of the natural obligations, which the Creator has laid on him, as a rational, sociable, and dependent creature? This, I doubt not, the Remarker will allow: his zeal for an *innate light* will not transport him so far, as to put out the *light of reason*, that it may shine alone, and leave men irrecoverably in the dark, in whom this light of conscience happens to be *extinguished*: Though, he says, *he does not see, by what ratiocination we can collect what the will of God is, unless we take in natural conscience for a distinction of good and evil*. I hope on farther consideration, and what I have before said on that subject, he will not deny the consistency of our duty to reason, and the evidence of it to all, who diligently set themselves to know it. That would indeed be *an indignity to mankind, and a great ingratitude to our Maker*: But all, who perceive the reasonableness of what is required of us, the necessity of it for the preservation or perfection of our nature; all, who read the will of God in his *wisdom*, must acknowledge, that he has not been thus wanting unto men, but that all the precepts of natural religion may be clearly known by the light of reason, to any one, who sets himself to search. This being what I believe the Remarker will not

2d Rem. p. 5.

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think

think fit to deny, I take for granted, and desire him to consider, whether a man, in whom the dictates of conscience (supposing them innate) have been early obscured, or perverted, being brought to a knowledge of his duty by reason, or reflection; whether, I say, this man has not a sure foundation for natural religion, without taking in his principle of conscience for a distinction of good and evil? This he must grant, unless he will say, that *general, obscure, and indistinct notices* (for so he describes his innate principles<sup>a</sup>) are a better foundation for natural religion, than clear and distinct knowledge; which if it be too absurd to assert, the Remarker must own, notwithstanding his zeal for *innate principles*, that those, who deny them, may have a sure foundation for natural religion, as long as the precepts of it are consistent with, or evident to, the light of reason.

And farther, I suppose the Remarker will very readily allow, that when a man is thus brought by reason to a true sense of his duty, his conscience, though before perverted, will then be set right, and thenceforward condemn or acquit him, according as he obeys or not that law, which his understanding has assented to; and this *without ratiocination*, by an immediate affection of the mind. But let him consider, whether this be the effect of an original impression on the mind, anticipating all reflection, or ratiocination; or whether it does not plainly prove, that conscience is nothing else but a judgment, which we make of our actions, with reference to some law, which we are persuaded ought to be the rule of them. This, I believe, will, upon an unprejudiced examination, be found to be the true notion of natural conscience, and the best with regard to religion (as truth always is a surer support for it than the most pious mistaken notions) for this account cautions men not to trust to a

<sup>a</sup> Page 7.

peace

peace of conscience, which may proceed from false opinions; and leaves all its authority in those, who have had occasions of being rightly informed of their duty.

Thus I have done with each particular head of the Remarker's enquiries, and I hope have said enough to convince him, that Mr. *Locke's* principles of *Human Understanding* give a sufficient security against such a system, as he apprehends, a *Manichæan God*<sup>b</sup>, a *mortal soul*, an *arbitrary law of good and evil*<sup>c</sup>, and any dangerous inferences from Mr. *Locke's* notion of *cogitant matter*, viz. *That God may, for any thing we know, give the power of cogitation to some systems of matter*. For I have shewn, that the proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments are equally conclusive without a demonstrative certainty of the soul's *immateriality*. And as to that other difficulty, with which the first Remarks conclude, concerning the nature of God and his *immateriality*, upon this concession, that matter may be capable of perception and thought, Mr. *Locke* has so well confuted the *Materialists* on that point<sup>d</sup>, so strongly proved, that cogitation cannot be the power of matter, or that the supreme cogitant Being cannot be material, that I cannot imagine to what end the Remarker brings in those arguments against the immateriality of God, if he means as well to religion and Mr. *Locke*, as he would be thought to do.

But whatever he there meant, it seems he has repented upon farther thoughts, or better seen the force of Mr. *Locke's* proofs, that God is immaterial; which he there fears will rise no higher than probability, though he heartily wishes they may. But in his third letter, his judgment is brought over to his hearty wish, and he confesses<sup>e</sup>, that Mr. *Locke* very well refutes the *Materialist*, who would have

<sup>b</sup> 2d Rem. p. 11.  
<sup>c</sup> 10. <sup>e</sup> Page 23.<sup>c</sup> 3d Rem. p. 16.<sup>d</sup> Essay B. iv.

but



but one single substance in the world, namely matter. And to shew his sincerity and good will the more, he owns this where one would least expect it, when he is giving the worst insinuations he can of Mr. Locke's principles. But the manner of his doing it is an extraordinary mark of the kind intentions, and respect to Mr. Locke, which he professes, and which nobody can doubt of, who observes how ingeniously he endeavours to fasten the principles of Deism on Mr. Locke, by shewing, that some of his notions are not inconsistent with them; and that some of the questions, which he discusses, may be raised upon their principles, though none of them do necessarily depend upon those principles; and a great part of his *Essay* is directly contrary to that, which the Remarker says he cannot but think is the mystery aimed at all along, but concealed from us, viz. *That the soul of man is not a distinct permanent substance.* Let the impartial judge, whether this be to argue fairly<sup>1</sup>; or whether it does not look like a desire to make use of names to no very fair purpose. But, that I may not be suspected to have misrepresented the Remarker's way of imputing the Deists principles to Mr. Locke, I will, as briefly as possible, run over the particulars, which he compares to them.

“The grand principle of Deism<sup>2</sup> (says he) is this; there is one infinite, universal spirit, that actuates matter always, without the operation of particular spirits. And if the soul of man be nothing but an influx from another principle, not a distinct permanent substance, whosoever goes upon this principle, I do not wonder, if he can not allow innate ideas, or practical principles in the soul; for there is no permanent soul to imprint them upon.” *Ans.* But may not one, who does think the soul a permanent substance, doubt, that it has any ideas but what it received

<sup>1</sup> Vide 2d Rem. p. 12.    <sup>2</sup> 3d Rem. p. 23.

from

from sensation and reflection; because he is not conscious of any but what he can trace to those originals? And the power or faculties of receiving ideas no less require a permanent substance to exist in, than ideas themselves. Moreover (says the Remarker) upon that hypothesis the soul cannot be said to be immortal. And what is that, I pray, to Mr. Locke? Has he any where told us, that the soul cannot be said to be immortal? Does he not frequently profess a steadfast belief, that the soul is immortal<sup>3</sup>? Has he not zealously contested<sup>1</sup>, that our ignorance of what kind of substance the soul is, does not at all weaken the assurances of its immortality? Why then is this, that *the soul cannot be said to be immortal*, brought in as an opinion of Mr. Locke's, but at any rate to make that position, *that the soul is not a distinct substance*, be supposed a principle of his?

“Furthermore (says the Remarker) in consequence of this principle of Deism, and the mortality of the soul, great difficulties must needs arise to them about the resurrection, how it can be the same man, or the same person, that rises again, when both the body and the soul are new. And this would bring on nice disputes about the notions of identity, and diversity, which accordingly we find discussed at large in the *Essay*, for their satisfaction, I suppose, that go upon those principles.” It may be so; but the Remarker must give me leave to suppose too, that those notions are not discussed for their satisfaction alone, who go upon those principles; and the reason, why I take the liberty to suppose so, is, because Mr. Locke determines the ideas of identity and diversity, upon several very different principles; and because those, who do think the soul a distinct permanent substance, may have some difficulties about the re-

<sup>1</sup> *Essay*, B. iv.  
Second Letter.

<sup>2</sup> Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's

*sururrection,*

resurrection, and about the notions of identity and diversity; for identity of substance will not determine it in all cases, as personal identity, and human identity, to those, who take the body into their idea of man; and for their satisfaction, who place human identity in the same immaterial spirit, united to such and such particles of matter, in such a shape and form, Mr. Locke shews, how we may easily conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same he had bere. But supposing, with the Remarker, that discourse was designed for the satisfaction of those, who go upon the principles of Deism; that does not sure intitle Mr. Locke to their principles; and indeed these are a sort of Deists very well worth satisfying, whatever they think of the soul, since they allow the resurrection. I suppose they are of that party, which the Remarker<sup>k</sup> tells us will own both natural and revealed religion. And to satisfy such men, how consistently with their own notions, they may conceive the same persons at the resurrection accountable for their actions in this life, is worthy of a good man's pains, though he differs from them in their opinions of the soul; and much more serviceable to religion, than those can be (whatever zeal they pretend for it) who will not allow, that the resurrection, or a future state, can be established upon any hypothesis but their own. For no doubt, if men are convinced of a future state, it is of no consequence upon what grounds they are so: their mistakes about the substance of the soul, will not endanger their morals, or their salvation. And if Mr. Locke's discourse of identity and diversity was designed to resolve the difficulties, that may arise about the resurrection, that can only shew his concern to secure that essential point upon every man's principles, since he determines the ideas of identity and diversity upon several contrary suppositions;

\* Postscript.

and

and therefore there can be no reason to conclude any one of them to be his opinion, more than another, unless he has declared in favour of one, which he has done two or three times in that chapter for this, *That the soul is one individual, immaterial substance*<sup>l</sup>, the direct contrary to that, which the Remarker would have thought to be his opinion.

We come now to the next and last dispute, which the Remarker mentions, as arising from that principle, "That the soul is not a substance distinct from God and matter. From this position (he says) a question springs up concerning the powers of matter, or whether matter be not capable of cogitation<sup>m</sup>?" I should rather think this question preceded that position; it seems more rational, and natural, in the ignorance men are of *what the soul is*, first to enquire, whether that power of cogitation, which they perceive in themselves, may not be communicated to matter; and if they find no contradiction in it, (and upon that think fit to determine of the nature of a thing, which they cannot certainly know) thence to conclude, that the soul is not a substance distinct from matter. But howsoever that be, it cannot be concluded, that those, who make this question, go upon a supposition, *that the soul is not a distinct permanent substance*, which is the principle the Remarker would have supposed to be Mr. Locke's. The question, as Mr. Locke makes it, is not, *whether our cogitations are the operations of God, or of matter*; but whether God has given the power of cogitation to a material, or an immaterial substance: and which way soever this question is resolved, the soul must equally be supposed a distinct permanent substance; for a material substance is not less a substance than an immaterial.

But the fallacy, by which that supposition, *that the soul is not a distinct permanent substance*, is im-

<sup>l</sup> Vide § 13. § 25. <sup>m</sup> 3d Rem p. 24.

puted

puted to Mr. *Locke*, upon his doubting whether the soul may not be material, lies in this, that supposing the soul not to be a substance distinct from matter is taken for the same thing, as supposing it not to be distinct from the body, which are very different suppositions; and upon this fallacy it is concluded, that those, who think the soul may be material, cannot suppose it to exist after the dissolution of the body. But that one, who thinks God may have given perception and thought to some systems of matter disposed as he sees fit, may suppose this system distinct from the body; and to continue in the same state of cogitation, when the body is dissolved, we have for an instance (not to mention many others) a no less eminent philosopher than *Cicero*, who in all his enquiries about the substance of the soul, went not beyond that matter, of which the heavens are made, *Aristotle's Quinta Essentia*; though he finds reasons to think it may be immortal and survive the body; and plainly distinguishes it from body, taken for the sensible, organical parts of a man, though there is nothing of immateriality in all his considerations about the substance of the soul.

This then is evident, that none of these discourses in the *Essay*, which the Remarker mentions, as agreeing with the notion of one universal mind operating according to different systems of matter, without any particular thinking beings distinct from the universal; none of them, I say, do necessarily depend upon, or terminate in that supposition; and some of them do necessarily suppose the contrary: for if the soul is not supposed a particular substance, distinct from the universal spirit, to what purpose are any questions made or resolved about the resurrection? There is no ground for such an expectation. Who can take account, or be accountable for actions done here, if they are all the operations of one universal spirit? And who but the Remarker could

could find any consistency in that supposition, with a discourse to satisfy men how they may conceive the same persons at the resurrection, and justly subject to rewards and punishments, whatever substance the soul is, or of whatever particles the body is made up? No sort of Deists, or sect of men, that I know of, did ever reconcile these two opinions.

Those sects, which the Remarker says <sup>a</sup> were noted for holding only one universal mind, consistently with themselves denied the resurrection; and to such men Mr. *Locke's* discourse about identity and diversity could give no satisfaction in that point, nor could it be made upon their principles. But I leave the reader to judge what ground there is, from any of the particulars mentioned, for the Remarker to impute that opinion to Mr. *Locke*, and to <sup>o</sup> think that the mystery aimed at all along in an *Essay*, where upon every occasion he speaks of the soul as a real distinct substance, in too many places to be instanced; and of man as a free agent, subject to an eternal retribution, according to his doings in this life; and that so frequently, and so expressly, that it is impossible to declare his sentiments upon that grand point (for the Remarker's ease as he desires) more plainly than he has done; which, indeed, is so effectual a way of concealing a mystery so opposite to those notions, that I believe nobody will suspect it to be Mr. *Locke's* aim, but the Remarker: And he, I hope, upon further reflection, will find an easier key to decypher this philosophy, and be as forward to own his mistakes of Mr. *Locke's* principles, and wrong inferences from them, as he was to publish Remarks so injurious to him, upon uncertain conclusions, and groundless suppositions.

<sup>a</sup> Page 13, 22.<sup>o</sup> Ibid.